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ABSTRACT
Investigating Key Risk Factors Across Violent and Non-Violent Extremists in the United States
by
Leevia Dillon
Advisor: Joshua D. Freilich
Problem Statement: This study investigated risk factors commonly highlighted by prior studies
and risk assessment tools (e.g., Violent Extremism Risk Assessment Version 2 (VERA-2) and
Extremism Risk Guidance 22+ (ERG22+)). It compared the risk factors across and within two
groups – violent extremists (i.e., jihadists and far-right extremists) and non-violent extremists (i.e.,
jihadists and far-right financial/material support crime extremists) in the U.S. Jihadists and farrightists are the two greatest security threats facing the U.S., and the findings can aid
counterterrorism efforts on assessment development, identifying effective risk factors across
varying groups, and assessing violence risk.
Research Questions/Objectives: This study aimed to achieve two central objectives: (1) compare
these risk factors across and within two groups: violent extremists (i.e., jihadists and right-wing
extremists) and non-violent extremists (i.e., jihadists and right-wing financial/material support
crime extremist offenders) and (2) explore underlying associations between risk factors and
theoretical domains.
Theoretical framework: Although criminological theories are applied to better inform
radicalization and violent extremism pathways, psychological theories have dominated the risk
assessment and factor development with little influence from criminology. Both tools under study
here did not utilize criminology theories to inform their development of these risk factors. To
develop the study’s hypotheses about the extremist violence correlates, I applied and integrated
two individual-level criminological theories. Both rational choice and social network theories
inform risk factor domains and conceptualizes these factors within a nested model, similar to
ecological systems theory (Bronfenbrenner & Morris, 2007). Rational choice is an individualsituational theory focusing on individuals’ behaviours resulting from their decisions based on
situational characteristics, with the assumption of an individual’s agency. The rational choice
theory has links to social network theory. Social network is an individual-group theory outlining
individual-group interactions and emphasizes relationship significance and promoting specific
actions (e.g., violence).
Research design and subjects: This mixed-method study used 1990 – 2018 offender-level data
from the open-source U.S. Extremist Crime Database (ECDB) and randomly selected a sample of
420 offenders, including 210 violent extremists (i.e., 105 jihadists and 105 far-rightists) and 210
non-violent financial/material support crime extremists (i.e., 105 jihadists and 105 far-rightists).
The ECDB is an open-source relational database and includes many offender-level attributes, both
incident-level and individual-level characteristics. Importantly, this study enhanced the ECDB and
iv

innovatively collected new variables to fully operationalize these risk factors. The first research
question was examined using a series of binary logistic regression models to predict and compare
for significant risk factors. The second research question was investigated using tetrachoric
correlation coefficients to run an exploratory factor analysis model to determine the associations
between the dichotomous variables. The case study constructions across both groups selected three
cases each from groups and sampled for heterogeneity (n = 6). The six case studies were developed
to explore contextual nuances within the risk factors (i.e., unique behavioral manifestations of risk)
at the individual level.
Findings: Generally, the risk factors do not necessarily differ across and within both the violent
and non-violent groups with several exceptions. Specific risk factors that merit possible logical
explanations for their statistical significance are provided within the dissertation. Additionally, the
exploratory factor analysis findings concluded almost all the various motivations examined can be
grouped into the individual-situational and individual-group domains instead of the individual
domain. The qualitative study provided six case studies involving one jihadist and two far-right
extremists for each violent and non-violent group. The study provided several examples of each
risk factor extracted from the case studies to provide variation. Potential avenues of future research
were suggested to examine certain aspects of the project.
Points for consideration: First, it should be noted VERA-2 risk factors can be applicable to the
non-violent extremist groups as demonstrated from both the quantitative and qualitative evidence.
Second, several variables were highly correlated across and within domains and may result in
multiple risk factors appearing in an extremist’s profile, inaccurately raising their risk level. Third,
the risk factors were harder to map onto the non-violent far-right extremist group extremists (e.g.,
sovereign citizens, tax defiers and/or protestors) for two reasons. First, open-source data
concerning non-violent extremists are limited compared to violent extremists’ (and non-violent
jihadists), impacting risk factor variable coding. Second, it is likely the risk assessments were
developed with jihadists (both violent and non-violent) as the main focus. The ERG 22+ was
developed based on U.K cases, specifically jihadists. As such, more research is still needed to
examine whether these risk factors are truly applicable to the non-violent extremist group.
Keywords: risk factors, comparative analysis, violent extremists, non-violent extremists,
jihadists, far-right
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CHAPTER ONE
Introduction
Statement of the Problem
This dissertation identifies risk factors highlighted by two risk assessment tools (i.e.,
Violent Extremism Risk Assessment Version 2 (VERA-2) and Extremism Risk Guidance 22+
(ERG 22+) and uses prior literature and theories to operationalize them. It compares these factors
across and within two groups: (1) violent jihadists and violent far-right extremists versus (2) nonviolent jihadists and non-violent far-right financial/material support crime extremist offenders in
the U.S. 1 This study addresses the limited empirical investigation on risk factor generalizability
assertions. It uses 1990 – 2018 offender-level data 2 from the open-source U.S Extremist Crime
Database (ECDB) and randomly select samples of 210 violent and 210 non-violent
financial/material support crime jihadist and far-right extremists (n = 420). The findings contribute
to counterterrorism efforts vis-à-vis (1) identifying effective factors for different extremist groups,
and (2) assessing risk of potential for violence.
A mass shooting occurred in El Paso, Texas in a Walmart store on August 3, 2019, killing
22 people and injuring 24 others. "This attack is a response to the Hispanic invasion of Texas.
They are the instigators, not me. I am simply defending my country from cultural and ethnic
replacement brought on by an invasion,” Patrick Crusius, 21, a right-wing extremist wrote
describing his motivation, in a four-page online manifesto titled ‘The Inconvenient Truth’ (para.
1). What makes an individual like Crusius turn to violence to further their ideological goals as

I define the terms “jihadists” and “far-rightists” in Chapter Three, ‘Study definitional criteria: Jihadists vs. Far-Right
Extremists’. Both violent and non-violent financial/material support crime jihadists include individuals affiliated with
and/or supporters of Al-Qaeda (AQ), the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and similar ideological movements
embracing extreme Islamist beliefs and the global jihad.
2
See Chapter Three, ‘Description of ECDB’ section for more information on the ECDB.
1

1

opposed to Richard Bertrand Spencer, a notorious neo-Nazi and white supremacist who only
embraces a white supremacist far-right extremist ideology, but does not resort to violent behavior?
According to Leuprecht, Hataley, Moskalenko, and McCauley (2010), over 99% of people holding
extremist beliefs do not commit ideologically motivated violent acts themselves. In the post 9/11
era, the United States’ (U.S) Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and other federal, state,
and local law enforcement agencies prioritize the emergence and growing threat of violent
extremism. 3 There is a need to not only understand how and why extremist ideologies lure some
individuals to violence, but also how to prevent individuals from exposure to such ideological
movements.
To meet this demand for identification, prevention, and management of violent extremists,
policy-makers, and law enforcement officials recognize the need for violent extremism risk
assessment and identifying relevant risk factors (Cohen, Johansson, Kaati, & Mork, 2014;
Weimann, 2008). Violent extremism risk assessment and management is a core element of
effective counter-violent extremism strategies (Hart, Cook, Pressman, Strang, & Lim, 2017).
Promising assessments include the Violent Extremism Risk Assessment (VERA-2; Pressman,
2009; Pressman & Flockton, 2012) and the Extremism Risk Guidance 22+ (ERG 22+; Lloyd &
Dean, 2015). These assessments posit for the generality of their factors on a wide spectrum from
violent to non-violent extremism (Hart et al., 2017). These tools have widespread recognition
within academic and law enforcement circles (Lloyd & Dean, 2015; Meloy & Gill, 2016; Meloy
& Hoffman, 2014).

Violent extremism refers to the attitudes and behaviour of people who support or use violence to achieve ideological,
religious, political or economic goals (Federal Bureau of Justice; FBI, n.d.). For this dissertation, violent extremism
will be used instead of terrorism, to encompass a broader definition that serves as an umbrella term to include rightwing extremism, amongst other categories.

3
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Despite these generalizability assertions, prior research on identifying risk factors
commonly correlated with violence is inconsistent and inconclusive (Neumann & Kleinmann,
2013; Gill, 2015). Monahan’s (2012) seminal work called for the evaluations of such assessments
to identify empirically validated individual factors unique to violent extremism.
In response, scholars attempted to innovatively extend the research literature on risk factor
development and empirical evaluation forward, as open-source data management on individual
perpetrators mature (Gill, 2015; Meloy & Gill, 2016). However, limited literature explores the
potential for comparative risk assessment analyses across and within multiple groups of offenders,
specifically comparisons across violent extremists and non-violent extremists. One reason is the
difficulty of accessing data on a non-violent extremist comparison group. While offender-level
databases include violent extremists, fewer individual-level databases similarly track non-violent
extremists like the ECDB.
Most empirical radicalization studies focus on violent offenders to promote an extremist
cause and exclude those sharing similar ideological convictions who have not used violence in
their extremist pursuit (Borum, 2011). The exclusion of these non-violent extremists undermines
the effort to highlight factors that distinguish these groups from each other (Dillon, Neo, &
Freilich, 2019; Victoroff, 2005). In other words, using a non-violent criminal extremist comparison
group can identify factors unique to violent extremists. Thus, researchers need to identify this
comparison group on their own. Similarly, scholars (Powis, Randhawa, & Bishopp, 2019; Sarma,
2017) stress the limited empirical evidence for their generalizability across different groups (e.g.,
right-wing extremists vs. jihadists; non-violent extremists vs. violent extremists). Following this
line of inquiry, this study aims to achieve two central objectives: (1) compare these risk factors
across and within two groups: violent extremists (i.e., jihadists and right-wing extremists) and non-
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violent extremists (i.e., jihadists and right-wing financial/material support crime extremist
offenders) and (2) explore underlying associations between risk factors and theoretical domains.
Both risk assessments include risk factors across the broad spectrum of extremists motivated by
varying ideologies and designed for individuals convicted of violent extremism and/or non-violent
but criminal extremist-related offenses. The open-source Extremist Crime Database (ECDB)
provides case file information on these individuals.
Dissertation Outline
This dissertation first reviews the prior literature and includes three subsections. The first
subsection provides a historical background of general risk assessments for violence and
recidivism for general offenders and outlines three approaches to risk assessment. The second
outlines the approach for violent extremism risk assessments and delineates arguments for various
conceptual issues. Definitions of risk factors demonstrate their use in major risk assessments,
specifically the ERG 22+ and VERA-2. The third sub-section describes both risk assessments and
outlines prior literature examining them and other similar risk factors. I also draw on relevant
theories in criminology and psychology to formulate the study’s hypotheses. Here, addressing
literature gaps contribute to the growing body of academic knowledge. Second, I describe the
research design, data collection, and analyses plans. Third, both qualitative and quantitative results
are presented. Lastly, the dissertation outlines the discussion of the findings, several potential
research avenues, and several considerations.

4

CHAPTER TWO
Literature Review
General Approaches to Risk Assessments
For years, empirical research in multiple disciplines focused on understanding individual
and group-level inclinations to engage in deviance (Borum, 2015). Specifically, correctional, and
clinical professionals used offender assessments to predict recidivism likelihood and determine
which individuals pose high-risk levels to public safety. Because both risk and threat assessments
developed simultaneously (Meloy, Hoffman, Guldimann, & James, 2012), I use both
interchangeably, meaning that threat assessment is synonymous with risk assessment (Meloy,
Hart, & Hoffman, 2014).
This dissertation defines risk assessment as the systematic process of gathering and
interpreting information about an individual and the circumstances they will likely encounter to
predict and evaluate the likelihood of the behavior in question as well as prevent or mitigate the
behavior and associated consequences (Borum, 2015; Herrington & Roberts, 2012). Based on their
evaluations, these offenders receive enhanced security- and supervision-based measures. Three
main approaches formulate these evaluations and are intensively reviewed in the literature (e.g.,
Borum, 2015; Dernevik, Beck, Gran, Hogue, & McGuire, 2009; Dolan & Doyle, 2000; Lloyd &
Dean, 2015; Monahan, 1984; Powis et al., 2019; van der Hide, van der Zwan, & van Leyenhorst,
2019): (1) unstructured clinical judgement, (2) actuarial method, and (3) structured professional
judgement.
Unstructured Clinical Judgement
Until the 1970s, risk assessments focused on the nature of the conviction and/or arrest
charges as well as the professional judgements of correctional and clinical staff (Vera Institute of
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Justice, 2011). This clinical method includes unstructured or semi-structured approaches (unaided
by formal rubrics, guidelines, or protocols) with a clinician making a decision based on prior
experiences, knowledge, and expertise (Hart & Logan, 2011; Hart, Michie, & Cooke, 2007;
Monahan, 2012). This approach results in an either yes or no evaluation of behavioral likelihood.
Early research found unstructured clinical judgement to be slightly better than chance (Faust &
Ziskin, 1988; Lidz, Mulvey, & Gardener, 1993; Mossman, 1994). An example of a semi-structured
tool is the HKT-R, developed to assess violent recidivism risk (as translated by van der Hide et al.,
2019). One advantage is the flexibility to tailor to individual cases based on contextual factors
(Hart, 1998b). However, this approach does not provide sufficient reliability and validity
(Andrews, Bonta, & Wormith, 2006; Dernevik et al., 2009; McNeil, Sandberg, & Binder, 1998;
Monahan & Steadman, 1994). Such instruments do not allow for repeated measures since
clinicians could reach different conclusions about the same individual (Litwack, 2001; Quinsey,
Harris, Rice, & Cormier, 1998). Because of subjectivity and professional discretion dependence,
such assessments are prone to practitioner biases and may overlook important well-established
factors (Scurich, 2016; van der Hide et al., 2019).
Actuarial Method
This 1970s approach relies upon well-defined protocols using correlations between
identified risk factors and violence to determine factor weighting. The actuarial approach addresses
the methodological and conceptual problems posed by unstructured clinical judgement (Dolan &
Doyle, 2000; Vera Institute of Justice, 2011). This method involves a compiled checklist with prespecified scores on static factors (i.e., factors that do not change over time) to establish a total
score or sub-scores (Dolan & Doyle, 2000; Hart, 1998b; van der Hide et al., 2019). The process
uses either case file information or interviews. Based on these numerical scores, these tools are
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algorithmic and objective because several clinicians can reach a similar conclusion about the same
individual (Dawes, Faust, & Meehl, 1989; Grove & Meehl, 1996; Hart, 1998b; Otto, 2000).
Nevertheless, the approach appears rigid and raises generalizability concerns. Scholars (Burman
et al., 2007; Douglas & Reeves, 2009; Hart, 1998a; Hart, 1998b; Hart et al., 2007) found that the
actuarial approach does not account for individual variations, mostly focuses on static variables
(i.e., no consideration of change), and minimizes the role of clinical judgement. Further, the
accuracy of actuarial tools decreases when predicting for specific behaviors (e.g., violence) given
the low prevalence within the general population – i.e., low base rate problem (Burman et al.,
2007; Tuddenham, 2000). Despite this, the actuarial approach outperforms unstructured clinical
judgements (Dawes et al., 1989; Dolan & Doyle, 2000; Grove, Zald, Lebow, Snitz, & Nelson,
2000; Monahan, 1996; Mossman, 1994).
Structured Professional Judgement (SPJ)
Though the debate over the two approaches is not new, both practitioners and researchers
responded by adopting the hybrid-style SPJ approach to minimize associated weaknesses and
maximize related strengths of the unstructured clinical judgement and actuarial approaches
(Borum, Fein, Vossekuil, & Berglund, 1999; Dolan & Doyle, 2000). This approach combines the
systematic and empirical-based aspects of the actuarial approach with the sensitivity afforded to
each individual case and context (Burman et al., 2007). Indeed, Borum et al. (1999, p.324),
suggested contemporary risk assessments consider “risk” as “contextual, dynamic, and
continuous”. In other words, SPJ assessments should provide an evidence-based list of both static
and dynamic (i.e., factors that change over time) factors. Each item is assessed on a structured
behavioral rating scale from “not present” to “definitely present” based on the clinician’s
judgement and available case information, excluding tallying a total score indicating risk level
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(Andrews et al., 2006; Kemshall, 2001; RTI International, 2017). Scholars and practitioners
recognize its effectiveness because of the generic application across different offender samples,
improved predictive accuracy of recidivism by utilizing empirical aspects of the actuarial approach
while considering the individual context and protective factors (Dolan & Doyle, 2000; Douglas,
2009; Scurich, 2016). Drawbacks to the SPJ approach involve the need for experienced evaluators,
discrepancies in factor weighting, biases across multiple evaluators, and cultural and gender
diversity accommodation concerns (Aye-Maung & Hammond, 2000; Burman et al., 2007; Logan,
2017; Strub, Douglas, & Nicholls, 2014).
Importance of SPJ in Violent Extremism-Specific Risk Assessments. The post 9/11 era
resulted in renewed scholarly attention on SPJ-related risk assessment development and those
tailored toward violent extremism and extremist crimes (Borum, 2015). The SPJ approach is most
appropriate for violent extremism risk assessments for several reasons. First, it is difficult to adopt
the actuarial approach and formulate empirical-based instruments due to the low base rates of
violent extremists (Pressman, 2009; Roberts & Hogan, 2008) and limited information available
from the violent extremists themselves (Ward & Beech, 2015). Second, there is limited
understanding and evidence about extremist offending unlike routine criminal offending. The
varying potential harmful outcomes (e.g., actual, attempted, or threatened attacks) and varying
degree of preparation and planning involved to achieve these outcomes, complicates understanding
and managing extremist offending risk of individuals motivated by ideology (Borum, 2015). In
other words, because of the amorphous nature of the risk, prevention is diverse (Logan & Lloyd,
2019), thus requiring flexibility. Risk management practitioners are concerned about limiting
potential harmful outcomes achieved by the varying weapons (e.g., improvised explosive devices,
guns, vehicles) used against government entities/individuals and the public at large by lone wolves

8

or those part of a broader group. Other practitioners focus on identifying and disrupting attack
planning and material support. Additionally, professionals are interested in understanding and
managing radicalization risk in varying locations (e.g., community, prisons) and platforms (i.e.,
offline and online). As such, a multidisciplinary method is essential for understanding violent
extremism because of its multi-causal nature concerning these specific populations (Schmid,
2013). SPJ affords a multi-disciplinary approach to risk management and engages multiple trained
people with relevant expertise. Third and relatedly, SPJ considers the unique individual context
upon which risk management and associated strategies rest. Unlike other criminal behaviors,
societal context (e.g., social, political, economic, religious, cultural, and historical) influences
aspects of violent extremism such as ideology (Monahan, 2012; Pressman, 2009; Silke, 2014; van
der Hide et al., 2019). The rapid global changes of conflict and instability have a direct impact on
the motives of groups and individuals and thus should be included in individual assessments of
risk (Logan & Lloyd, 2019).
Applying Risk-Need Principles to SPJ Violent Extremism Risk Assessment
Like general offenders, a risk and need understanding is essential for violent extremist
offenders because motivations and circumstances around offending are often multifaceted and
reoffending can have a detrimental impact (Herzog-Evans, 2018; Lloyd & Dean, 2015; Powis et
al., 2019). Risk and need principles 1 relate to who and what should be treated (Bonta & Andrews,
2007). The risk principle asserts that treatment should be proportionate to offender risk levels. The
need principle states that treatment should be focused on criminogenic or in this case, violent
extremist-related factors (i.e., needs that are directly linked to violent extremist-producing
behavior). In fact, there is a clear link between risk factors and risk management strategies (Guy,
This dissertation does not discuss the third principle (i.e., responsivity – knowing how to treat offenders) since it
falls beyond the scope (i.e., it focuses on delivery) of the study’s objectives.

1
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Packer, & Warnken, 2012; van der Hide et al., 2019). As such, CVE-related programs should be
different from other interventions reducing recidivism or addressing ordinary criminality and focus
on disengagement and mitigation of radicalization and future risk of violent extremism (Pressman
& Flockton, 2012). Smith (2018) similarly notes that identification of valid risk factors can
facilitate the development of the appropriate violent extremism-related prevention and intervention
programs.
Risk Factors
Often inaccurately used synonymously, the study acknowledges the difference between
risk factors and risk indicators. Simply put, risk factors increase the likelihood of an outcome of
interest while risk indicators are assessing the process of the outcome unfolding or the individual
experiencing a risk factor (Smith, 2018). Because the study’s objective is to identify and
operationalize specific risk assessments’ risk factors, the term risk factor is used. Related risk
factor concepts are the push and pull factors influencing individuals to engage in violent extremism
(Borum, 2015). General factors involving grievances ‘push’ individuals toward violent extremism
(essentially driving them away from status quo) and specific factors involving incentives (“lures”,
p.90) appeal to and ‘pull’ them in (Horgan, 2008).
Discerning Between Specific Violent Extremism and General Offender Risk Assessments
Scholars (Dernevik et al., 2009; Pressman, 2009; Pressman & Flockton, 2012; Silke, 2014)
argue that because extremists have varying risks, needs, and motivations compared to criminal
offenders, assessments and interventions used on criminal populations may not apply. Relatedly,
such risk factors focus on radicalization and are elements of this process (Scarcella, Page, &
Furtado, 2016). In fact, scholars highlighted the complexity of the violent extremism radicalization
process due to time, varying extremist ideologies/movements, and unique individual
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characteristics (Hamm & Spaaj, 2015; Horgan, Gill, Bouhana, Silver, & Corner, 2016; Klausen,
Campion, Needle, Nguyen, & Libretti, 2016). Conversely, other scholars (Powis et al., 2019;
Smith, 2018) acknowledged some risk factors associated with violent extremism might also be
associated with general violence. In other words, some extremists with criminal profiles are like
general violent offenders; both the general criminal and violent extremist groups recruit from this
pool of people. Likewise, Powis et al (2019) asserted extremists may offend because of personal
gains rather than ideological reasons. This debate extends to the appropriateness of applying extant
forensic measures (e.g., HCR-20 Risk Management Guide) to extremist offenders (Borum, 2015;
Dernevik et al., 2009; Pressman, 2009). In fact, extant literature identified inconsistencies between
the HCR-20 risk factors and the violent extremism risk factors (Bakker, 2006; Precht, 2007;
Sageman, 2004; Silber & Bhatt, 2007).
Several literature reviews (Lloyd, 2019; RTI International, 2017; Scarcella, Page, &
Furtado, 2016; van der Hide et al., 2019) identified risk assessments for violent extremist offenders
used operationally. Promising risk assessments include the Violent Extremism Risk Assessment
(VERA-2; Pressman, 2009; Pressman & Flockton, 2012) and the Extremism Risk Guidance 22+
(ERG 22+; Lloyd & Dean, 2015). Such assessments posit for the generality of their factors on a
wide spectrum from violent extremism to non-violent extremism (Hart et al., 2017). This
dissertation considers both VERA-2 and ERG 22+ and excludes others.
Three SPJ tools targeted violent extremism assessment (i.e., VERA/VERA-2, ERG 22+,
and Multi-Level Guidelines, MLG/MLG-Version 2). All three either developed or were
developing (Hart et al., 2017) around the time of Monahan’s (2012) seminal publication. The
current study excludes MLG/MLG-Version 2 because the tool only considers individuals affiliated
with a group (Cook, 2014; Cook, Hart, & Kropp, 2013), effectively omitting the lone wolf
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population, this study considers. Additionally, because the main objective of this study is to
investigate risk factors from risk assessment tools, this study excludes other SPJ-related tools like
TRAP-18 (Meloy & Gill, 2016; Meloy, 2018) which prioritize an individual’s immediate risk of
violence (Lloyd, 2019) and screening tools (not risk assessments) like cyber-VERA (Pressman &
Ivan, 2016). Further, the government does not officially recognize these instruments unlike the
VERA/VERA-2 and ERG 22+ (Lloyd, 2019). Below is a brief overview of the two risk assessment
tools. Refer to Appendix 1 for the full list of risk factors across these tools.
Violent Extremism Risk Assessment (VERA)
The VERA tool includes generic risk factors applicable across the broad spectrum of
extremists motivated by varying ideologies and designed for individuals convicted of violent
extremism. VERA was first developed in 2009 in Canada and subsequently underwent revision,
resulting in VERA-2 (Pressman, 2009; Pressman & Flockton, 2012) and later the current VERA2R (Lloyd, 2019; Ministry of Justice and Security, n.d.). The original set of risk factors were
identified from existing literature (e.g., Kruglanski et al., 2009; Pressman, 2009; Sageman, 2004;
Saucier, Akers, Shen-Miller, Kneževié, & Stankov, 2009), and included group factors and
disengagement attributes (Lloyd, 2019). Following multiple consultations with experts and law
enforcement agencies and a pilot test on high-risk violent extremists in an Australian prison,
VERA-2 was developed (Pressman & Flockton, 2012). Because there is no English peer-reviewed
published version of the VERA-2R at the time of writing this dissertation, the study considers the
VERA-2 format (see Pressman & Flockton, 2012). VERA-2 includes four domains that classify
25 risk factors (Table 1): (1) beliefs and attitudes (i.e., 7 items), (2) context and intent (i.e., 7
items), (3) history and capability (i.e., 6 items), and (4) commitment and motivation (i.e., 5 items)
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with an additional fifth category of items known as the ‘protective’ factors 2 designed to the
mitigate risk (i.e., 6 items). Item ratings are on a 3-point ordinal scale based on the degree of risk
presence: Low, moderate, and high.
Table 1. VERA-2 risk factors.
VERA-2 risk factors
Domain 1: Belief and Attitudes
BA1. Commitment to ideology justifying violence
BA2. Victim of injustice and grievances
BA3. Dehumanization/demonization of identified targets of injustice
BA4. Rejection of democratic society and values
BA5. Feelings of hate, frustration, persecution, alienation
BA6. Hostility to national collective identity
BA7. Lack of empathy/understanding outside own group
Domain 2: Context and Intent
CI1. Seeker, consumer, developer of violent extremist materials
CI2: Identification of target (person, place, group) in response to perceived injustice
CI3. Personal contact with violent extremists
CI4. Anger and expressed intent to act violently
CI5. Expressed desire to die for cause or martyrdom
CI6. Expressed intent to plan, prepare violent action
CI7. Susceptible to influence, authority, indoctrination
Domain 3: History and Capability
HC1. Early exposure to pro-violence militant ideology
HC2. Network (family, friends) involved in violent action
HC3. Prior criminal history of violence
HC4. Tactical, paramilitary, explosive training
HC5. Extremist ideological training
HC6. Access to funds, resources, organizational skills
Domain 4: Commitment and Motivation
CM1. Glorification of violent action
CM2. Driven by criminal opportunism
CM3. Commitment to group, group ideology
CM4. Driven by moral imperative, moral superiority

CM5. Driven by excitement, adventure

Extremism Risk Guidelines 22+ (ERG 22+)
The ERG 22+ guidelines is designed to assess risks and needs of convicted violent
extremists’ and offenders’ potential to engage in violence (Lloyd & Dean, 2015). This tool also
includes generic risk factors applicable across the broad spectrum of extremists motivated by
varying ideologies and designed for individuals convicted of violent extremism and/or non-violent
Because the study’s objective is to examine the assessment’s risk factors, the VERA-2’s protective factors fall
beyond the scope of this dissertation.
2
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but criminal extremist-related offenses (Powis et al., 2019). The ERG 22+ was first developed in
2009 in the United Kingdom (Lloyd & Dean, 2015). The first version, the Structured Risk
Guidelines (SRG) was grounded on 20 convicted extremist offenders’ casework. Findings were
cross-referenced with a London Probation-sponsored project investigating influences within the
backgrounds of 12 extremist offenders (Karmani, 2009). Later, the National Centre for Social
Research conducted a process evaluation of the SRG examining the tool’s content, delivery, and
implementation (Webster, Kerr, & Tompkins, 2017). Further revisions to the SRG, based on
violent extremist offender casework, extant literature (e.g., Altemeyer, 2004), governmentsponsored research (e.g., Karmani, 2009), and expert feedback (Lloyd, 2019; Lloyd & Dean, 2015)
resulted in the development of the current ERG 22+. Her Majesty’s Prison and Probation Service
(HMPPS) mainstreamed the ERG 22+ in 2011 across prisons (Lloyd, 2019). ERG22+ includes
three categories that classify 22 risk factors (Table 2): (1) Engagement (i.e., 13 items), (2) intent
(i.e., 6 items), and (3) capability (i.e., 4 items). The ‘+’ suffix indicate any factor deemed relevant
through case formulation, affords the possibility of other factors not considered in the
abovementioned list.
Table 2. ERG 22+ risk factors.
ERG 22+ risk factor
Domain 1: Engagement
E1. Need to redress injustice and express grievance
E2. Need to defend against threat
E3. Need for identity, meaning, belonging
E4. Need for status
E5. Need for excitement, comradeship, or adventure
E6. Need for dominance
E7. Susceptibility to indoctrination
E8. Political/ moral motivation
E9. Opportunistic involvement
E10. Family or friends support extremist offending
E11. Transitional periods
E12. Group influence and control
E13. Mental heath
Domain 2: Intent
I1. Over-identification with a group or cause
I2. Us and Them thinking
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I3. Dehumanization of the enemy
I4. Attitudes that justify offending
I5. Harmful means to an end
I6. Harmful end objectives
Domain 3: Capability
C1. Individual knowledge, skills, and competencies
C2. Access to networks, funding, and equipment
C3. Criminal history

Limited Predictive Capabilities of Violent Extremism Risk Assessment
Risk assessment is an inexact science (Dolan & Doyle, 2000). As Borum (2015, p.64)
indicates risk assessments are “a problem to be solved, rather than as a prediction to be rendered.”
Other scholars (Borum, 2015; Powis et al., 2019; Sarma & Pelzer, 2015) echo similar sentiments
that violent extremism assessment tools are unable to predict extremism-related behaviors.
Similarly, Smith (2018) argues that individuals exhibiting relevant risk factors may not necessarily
predict the outcome of interest. There are several reasons for this overarching problem. Many of
these precise factors and their corresponding assessment tools may be confidential (Meloy &
Hoffmann, 2014; Powis et al., 2019; Scarcella, Page, & Furtado, 2016) due to a variety of issues,
ethical or otherwise such as low base rates (Pressman, 2009; Roberts & Hogan, 2008). Other
reasons include heavy training requirements to engage in the SPJ approach and subjective rating
discretion, that prevent independent academic empirical validation. Further, heavy reliance on
such risk factors without empirical backing is not only damaging socially but can result in false
positives. An example of a false positive case is Ahmed Mohamed (a.k.a ‘Clock Boy’) 2015 alarm
clock incident. After an alarm clock he created was mistaken by his teachers for a bomb, the then
14-year-old boy was arrested (Fantz, Almasy, & Stapleton, 2015). Another associated issue is the
difficulty of pinning down a typical profile of a violent extremist (Horgan, 2007; 2008), making it
impossible to include robust risk factors (Beardsley & Beech, 2013).
Simply put, risk assessments (in their current formulation) cannot predict future behaviors.
However, these tools can identify fundamental characteristics that set these individuals apart from
15

the general population based on life histories/experiences and current dispositions to indicate
likelihood of engaging in the outcome under study (RTI International, 2017). Pressman and
Flockton (2012) highlighted the importance of risk assessments by arguing for the distinction
between prediction uncertainty and the ability to gain knowledge about individuals based on these
assessments encompassing “motivation and commitment of an individual to terrorism
acts…historical, contextual influences, the role of friendships and affiliation…” (p.241).
Regardless of the limited predictive capability of risk assessments, the imperative to proceed is
clear (Monahan, 2018).
What Does Risk Assessment Research Say?
Risk assessment tools rely on case studies, expert guidance, and limited research evidence
(Borum, 2015; Meloy & Gill, 2016; Powis et. al, 2019). With reference to Monahan’s (2012)
assessment evaluation call, generally, developers, associated agencies, and individuals conduct
such empirical evaluations. Monahan (2012) pointed out the importance and access of
retrospective information on known violent extremism cases. Despite the widespread use of these
assessments in practice, there is limited published empirical research about their risk factor
potential generalizability across groups (Powis et al., 2019; Sarma, 2017). Many scholars have
attempted to draw on prior literature and theory to empirically identify risk factors (e.g., Hamm &
Spaaj, 2015; Horgan et al., 2016; Jensen & LaFree, 2016; Smith et al., 2016) using a ‘bottom up’
approach. Because of limited VERA-2 and ERG 22+ peer-reviewed publications, other scholars
(e.g., Smith, 2018) have either attempted to use these identified empirically validated risk factors
to draw commonalties across these tools or engaged in ‘descriptive categorization’ across the risk
assessments tools themselves (Herzog-Evans, 2018; Lloyd & Dean, 2015; Hart et al., 2017). Both
these methods have similar conclusions – there are significant risk factor overlaps between both
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VERA-2 and ERG 22+ and across identified empirically validated risk factors. However, there are
differences between both tools and there are risk factor inconsistencies (i.e., presence and/or
absence, factor operationalization) across prior literature and both tools.
This dissertation study will therefore do the opposite and use a ‘top-down’ approach. I will
identify VERA-2 and ERG 22+ risk factors and attempt to use prior literature from both
psychology and criminology theory to develop and operationalize these identified risk factors.
Beardsley and Beech (2013) found VERA (first version) is easy to apply and held promise
as a useful guide across multiple groups, group-affiliated individuals, and lone wolves. However,
the small sample size (n = 5) could not confirm this. Additionally, the study excluded non-violent
criminal extremists. In a similar vein, ERG 22+ developers and associated scholars (Lloyd & Dean,
2015; Powis et. al, 2019) acknowledged both risk factor development and evaluation findings have
generalizability issues because both studies focused on jihadists and did not include other extremist
groups such as the far-right. Additionally, the studies made no distinction between violent and
non-violent criminal extremists despite including non-violent criminal extremists within the
subject pool.
Few studies conduct analyses across multiple groups of offenders (Conway, 2017; Dillon
et al., 2019), or compare violent and non-violent criminal extremists. One reason is the difficulty
of accessing data on a non-violent criminal extremist comparison group. While offender-level
databases include violent extremists, fewer individual-level databases similarly track non-violent
extremists like the ECDB. Most empirical radicalization studies focus on violent offenders to
promote an extremist cause and excludes those sharing similar ideological convictions but have
not used violence in their extremist pursuit (Borum, 2011). Significantly, excluding a non-violent
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comparison group makes it difficult to identify factors that are unique to violent extremists
(Victoroff, 2005). Thus, researchers need to identify this comparison group on their own.
Herzog-Evans (2018) concluded ERG 22+ was suitable in the French context, as compared
to VERA-2 because these tools were based upon differing extremist characteristics. VERA-2
developed from prior literature and a sample of incarcerated Australian terrorists while the ERG
22+ is based on extant literature and UK extremist offenders’ casework. The slightly dissimilar
methodology and significant divergence of sample offender characteristics begs the question
whether these risk factors were applicable to the jihadists and far-right violent and non-violent
financial/material support crime extremists in the U.S. As such, the first research question is to
examine the extent of convergence and/or divergence of the risk factors between U.S jihadist and
far-right violent extremists and non-violent financial/material support crime extremists. Are there
similarities and/or differences in these risk factors across and within both groups?
Overlaps and Differences Between VERA-2 and ERG 22+ Risk Assessments
Since its 2012 inception, NIJ’s Domestic Radicalization to Terrorism program sponsored
risk assessment research to inform practitioners and the public in identifying radicalized
individuals and developing appropriate intervention measures (Smith, 2018). Specifically, four
major projects (Hamm & Spaaj, 2015; Horgan et al., 2016; Jensen & LaFree, 2016; Smith et al.,
2016) investigated U.S extremists (i.e., lone and/or group actors) adhering to different ideologies
using different inclusion criteria. Of interest, two studies considered both violent and non-violent
extremists (Jensen & LaFree, 2016; Smith et al., 2016). One overlapping objective behind these
projects involved identifying and isolating violent extremism risk factors. Smith (2018) mapped
these risk factors onto the risk factors in ERG 22+, VERA-2, and HCR-20 3. As expected, the risk
Based on these arguments put forth by several authors, the evaluation of the HCR-20 within the context of violent
extremism falls beyond the scope of this dissertation.
3
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assessments’ factors and the identified risk factors overlapped considerably. Additionally, Hart et
al. (2017) found the MLG individual and individual-group domains overlapped significantly with
VERA-2. Further, scholars (e.g., Herzog-Evans, 2018; Lloyd & Dean, 2015; Silke, 2014; Smith,
2018) also found overlapping categories across both VERA-2 and ERG 22+.
In addition, Herzog-Evans (2018) pointed out the ERG 22+ considered psychological
factors (i.e., need for dominance and mental health) and transitional periods that are absent from
VERA-2 though the revised version, VERA-2R included mental health/disorders. Additionally,
the VERA-2 considers six protective/mitigating factors that are absent in the ERG 22+ though the
developers considered the absence of risk factors as protective ones. Importantly, VERA-2 and
ERG 22+ do not use the same definitions and focus on different extremist populations. VERA-2
assesses violent ‘classic terrorists’ – e.g., homicides and suicide bombings while the ERG 22+
considers both violent ‘classic terrorists’ and those ‘lower threshold’ offenders committing
extremist crimes falling short of violence – e.g., material/financial support and habitual review of
extremist materials (Herzog-Evans, 2018, p.12). Such definitional distinctions can affect the
study’s coding sensitivity in terms of the risk factors to distinguish between violent and non-violent
financial/material support criminal extremists. As illustrated above because there are significant
risk factors common across both assessments, the study adapts the factor overlap tables from prior
literature (Herzog-Evans, 2018; Smith, 2018) and presents risk factor overlaps between both tools
(Table 3). The risk factor overlaps and definitional variations inform variable development and
nuances in the codebook (Appendix 2).
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Table 3. Overlaps between risk assessments’ factors.
ERG 22+
Need to redress injustice and express grievance
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Need to defend against threat
Need for identity, meaning, belonging
Need for status
Need for excitement, comradeship, or adventure
Need for dominance
Susceptibility to indoctrination
Political/moral motivation
Opportunistic involvement
Family or friends support extremist offending
Transitional periods
Group influence and control
Mental health
Over-identification with a group or cause
Us and Them thinking
Dehumanization of the enemy
Attitudes that justify offending
Harmful means to an end
Harmful end objectives
Individual knowledge, skills, and competencies
Access to networks, funding, and equipment
Criminal history

---

VERA-2
Victim of injustice and grievances
Feelings of hate, frustration, persecution, alienation
Rejection of democratic society and values
-Commitment to group, group ideology
-Driven by excitement, adventure
-Susceptible to influence, authority, indoctrination
Driven by moral imperative, moral superiority
Driven by criminal opportunism
Network (family, friends) involved in violent action
Early exposure to pro-violence militant ideology
--Hostility to national collective identity
Lack of empathy/understanding outside own group
Dehumanization /demonization of identified targets of injustice
Commitment to ideology justifying violence
Expressed intent to plan, prepare violent action
Glorification of violent action
Seeker, consumer, developer of violent extremist materials
Anger and expressed intent to act violently
Expressed desire to die for cause or martyrdom
Tactical, paramilitary, explosive training
Access to funds, resources, organizational skills
Personal contact with violent extremists
Prior criminal history of violence
Identification of target (person, place, group) in response to perceived
injustice
Extremist ideological training

Theoretical Framework
Although criminological theories are applied to better inform radicalization and violent
extremism pathways (Agnew, 2010; Smith & Damphousse, 2009; Forst, Greene, & Lynch, 2011;
Freilich, Adamczyk, Chermak, Boyd, & Parkin, 2015; Freilich & LaFree, 2015), psychological
theories dominated the risk assessment and factor development with little influence from
criminology (Sarma, 2017). Both tools under study here did not utilize criminology theories to
inform their development of these risk factors. However, recent assessment efforts highlighted
criminological influence. The Identifying Vulnerable People (IVP) guidance instrument (Cole,
Alison, Cole, & Alison, 2013) incorporated rational choice theory (Beccaria, 1764).
To develop the study’s hypotheses about the extremist violence correlates, I draw on
relevant criminological theories explaining criminality at the individual level. Hence, this study
integrates both rational choice and social network theories to inform risk factor domains (Table 4)
and conceptualizes these factors within a nested model (Figure 1), similar to ecological systems
theory (Bronfenbrenner & Morris, 2007). Rational choice is an individual-situational theory
focusing on individuals’ behaviours resulting from their decisions based on situational
characteristics, with the assumption of an individual’s agency. Rational choice theory provides
the context surrounding offender decisions to engage in extremism (Purpura, 2013). In this case,
individuals are reluctant to commit their resources to advance the group’s cause – benefits are
available to all in-group members, but the costs are borne by in-group activists (Ashutosh, 2003).
Extending this line of inquiry, what makes these activists choose violent crimes over non-violent
crimes? Based on the circumstances, the offender engaging in extremism takes advantages of
opportunities to address vulnerabilities (e.g., susceptibility to influence/authority) or fulfill
personal interests (e.g., belonging, status).
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The rational choice theory has links to social network theory. This theory is applied to both
criminal and terror networks to understand the relationship quality that keep members together
(McGloin, 2005; Sageman, 2004). Social network is an individual-group theory outlining
individual-group interactions and emphasizes relationship significance and promoting specific
actions (e.g., violence). These personal vulnerabilities/interests, dependent on perceived in-group
support and approval, draw individuals to join (Maskaliūnaitė, 2015). Similarly, researchers
(Horgan, 2011; Monahan, 2012; Stevens, 2005) argued for the importance of group and situational
influences beyond the individual to understand violence. Table 4 presents the grouping of risk
factors of the respective risk assessment accordingly to the proposed criminological themes. As
such, are there any underlying relationships between risk factors and their theoretical domains
(i.e., individual, individual-situational, and individual-group)?

IndividualGroup

IndividualSituational

Individual

Includes factors regarding the individual’s
identity, attitudes, relationships, and role
related to the extremist group.
Includes situational factors related to the
individual’s environment such as personal
social networks, capabilities, access,
transitional periods, and differential
societal/cultural perceptions.
Includes factors independent of the situation
and group including individual’s
vulnerabilities and needs.

Figure 1. Nested model to conceptualize VERA-2 and ERG 22+ factors.
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Table 4. Risk factor groupings of the respective risk assessment accordingly to the proposed criminological themes.
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ERG 22+ risk factors
Domain 1: Engagement
E1. Need to redress injustice and express grievance
E2. Need to defend against threat
E3. Need for identity, meaning, belonging
E4. Need for status
E5. Need for excitement, comradeship, or adventure
E6. Need for dominance
E7. Susceptibility to indoctrination
E8. Political/ moral motivation
E9. Opportunistic involvement
E10. Family or friends support extremist offending
E11. Transitional periods
E12. Group influence and control
E13. Mental heath
Domain 2: Intent
I1. Over-identification with a group or cause
I2. Us and Them thinking
I3. Dehumanization of the enemy
I4. Attitudes that justify offending
I5. Harmful means to an end
I6. Harmful end objectives
Domain 3: Capability
C1. Individual knowledge, skills, and competencies
C2. Access to networks, funding, and equipment
C3. Criminal history
VERA-2 risk factors
Domain 1: Belief and Attitudes
BA1. Commitment to ideology justifying violence
BA2. Victim of injustice and grievances
BA3. Dehumanization/demonization of identified targets of injustice
BA4. Rejection of democratic society and values
BA5. Feelings of hate, frustration, persecution, alienation
BA6. Hostility to national collective identity
BA7. Lack of empathy/understanding outside own group
Domain 2: Context and Intent
CI1. Seeker, consumer, developer of violent extremist materials
CI2: Identification of target (person, place, group) in response to perceived injustice

Criminological theme
Individual-group
Individual-group
Individual
Individual
Individual
Individual
Individual-group
Individual
Individual
Individual-situational
Individual
Individual-group
Individual
Individual-group
Individual-group
Individual-group
Individual-group
Individual-group
Individual-group
Individual-situational
Individual-situational
Individual
Criminological theme
Individual-group
Individual-group
Individual-group
Individual-group
Individual-group
Individual-group
Individual-group
Individual-situational
Individual-group

CI3. Personal contact with violent extremists
CI4. Anger and expressed intent to act violently
CI5. Expressed desire to die for cause or martyrdom
CI6. Expressed intent to plan, prepare violent action
CI7. Susceptible to influence, authority, indoctrination
Domain 3: History and Capability
HC1. Early exposure to pro-violence militant ideology
HC2. Network (family, friends) involved in violent action
HC3. Prior criminal history of violence
HC4. Tactical, paramilitary, explosive training
HC5. Extremist ideological training
HC6. Access to funds, resources, organizational skills
Domain 4: Commitment and Motivation
CM1. Glorification of violent action
CM2. Driven by criminal opportunism
CM3. Commitment to group, group ideology
CM4. Driven by moral imperative, moral superiority
CM5. Driven by excitement, adventure
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Individual-situational
Individual-group
Individual-group
Individual-group
Individual-group
Individual-situational
Individual-situational
Individual
Individual-situational
Individual-group
Individual-situational
Individual-group
Individual
Individual-group
Individual
Individual

What does Extant Risk Factor Research Say?
While almost all who engage in criminal extremist behaviors subscribe to a degree of
extremist beliefs, the majority holding extremist attitudes never engage in extremist-related
criminality (Leuprecht et al., 2010; McCauley & Moskalenko, 2017; Neumann, 2013). Scholars
(Stern, 2016; Wolfowicz, Litmanovitz, Weisburd, & Hasisi, 2020) postulate specific risk factors
to explain why some radicalized individuals turn to criminal extremism while like-minded others
do not. Similarly, there are cases of individuals with weak ideological mindsets, engaging in
violent extremism. This raises an important point about considering radicalized individuals falling
short of engaging in criminal extremism (i.e., violent and non-violent offenses) – non-criminal
extremists. Ideally, studies (see Bartlett & Miller, 2012) should include these individuals for
comparison. However, access to this elusive population is difficult because these individuals did
not engage in illegal extremist activities, and often fall under the radar of the authorities, media,
and others. Additionally, unlike the U.K (as established by the ERG 22+ and its consideration of
U.K legislation) which criminalizes ‘lower threshold’ offenses (e.g., possession of extremist
materials), the U.S (as established by the VERA-2 and its consideration of the U.S Department of
Defense terrorism definition) does not if the action falls under citizens’ constitutionally protected
first amendment rights such as protected speech. Based on the study’s scope and risk assessments’
target populations, this study excludes those non-criminal extremists and adopts the next best
comparative population to sample from, non-violent criminal extremist offenders.
Drawing on psychology and criminology theories (see above ‘Theoretical framework’
section), this study extends this line of inquiry to engage in comparative risk factor analyses across
and within violent extremists and non-violent financial/material support criminal extremists.
Notwithstanding the fact that it is a relatively underdeveloped body of literature, radicalization
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research represents an important sub-field of violent extremism research (Neumann & Kleinmann,
2013). Of which, one research avenue is risk assessment development and risk factor identification
(Cohen et al., 2014; Monahan, 2011; Gill, 2015; Weimann, 2008) to aid policymakers’ and law
enforcement decision-making process. Violent extremism risk assessment and management is a
core element of effective counter-violent extremism strategies (Hart et al., 2017). Specifically, risk
factor identification and empirical evaluation provides the foundation for evidence-based
intervention and prevention approaches (Bhui et al., 2012; Hart et al., 2017). While policymakers
increasingly adopt counter-radicalization CVE strategies, several issues affect identification and
empirical development of these risk factors.
First, there is a lack of consensus to measure radicalization and related risk factors (Agnew,
2010; Monahan, 2012; Wolfowicz et al., 2020). As such, this results in inconclusive research
identifying risk factors commonly associated with violent action (Allan et al., 2015; Bondokji,
Wilkinson, & Aghabi, 2017; Neumann & Kleinmann 2013; Gill 2015; Victoroff, 2005). Relatedly,
research often conflates attitudes and behaviors. In other words, attitudes may not translate to
behaviors. In fact, both surveys and experiments found a disconnect between extremist ideologies
(e.g., far-right and jihadist) and attitudes supporting violence to further those objectives and people
committing extremist-related violent crimes (Lemieux & Asal 2010; McCauley & Moskalenko,
2008). Borum (2011) concludes that researchers must investigate the links between radicalized
attitudes and behaviors (see also McCauley & Moskalenko, 2017).
Second, many cited and discussed risk factors are categorized based on their observed
presence within small samples of extremists’ profiles (e.g., Beardsley & Beech, 2013; Hart et. al,
2017) with limited consideration for non-criminal extremists (Bartlett & Miller, 2012) or nonviolent criminal extremists (Klausen et al., 2016; Smith, 2018) or non-extremist offenders (e.g.,
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Horgan et al., 2016; Pressman & Flockton, 2014). For example, Pressman and Flockton (2014)
administered the VERA-2 and general criminal-based risk assessment tools (e.g., HCR-20) to both
extremists and non-extremist offenders. Of interest, they found extremists indicated significantly
lower risk on the general criminality risk assessments but significantly higher risk on the VERA2. This indicated risk factor sensitivity and target population applicability. Though scholars are
acknowledging this and making headway in current research efforts, there is still limited empirical
foundation for the distinction between those who radicalize but fall short of engaging in violence
(Borum, 2011; Della Porta, & LaFree, 2012; Githens-Mazer & Lambert 2010). Again, this study
innovatively uses the next best comparative population, non-violent criminal extremists.
Additionally, there is still limited empirical research (e.g., Jensen & LaFree, 2016) to justify
generalizability of risk factors across varying ideologies like the far-right (Lloyd & Dean, 2015;
Powis et al., 2019; Sarma, 2017). Moreover, Smith (2018) mentioned the need for further
investigation to determine whether these risk factors are relevant at the individual level (i.e.,
limited qualitative studies).
Third, there are a few important radicalization frameworks (e.g., McCauley & Moskalenko,
2017; Moghaddam, 2005; Precht, 2007; Silber & Bhatt, 2007). These models have significant

conceptual overlap (Desmarais et al., 2017), like the risk factor overlap across these risk assessment
tools. Such research provides theoretical explanations on the mechanisms underlying how
individuals and groups adopt extremism (McCauley & Moskalenko 2008) as well as the processes
galvanizing groups to choose violence over non-violence (Bloom 2004; Kydd & Walter 2006;
McCauley & Moskalenko 2008). Though, few (e.g., Jensen & LaFree, 2016; Meloy & Gill, 2016;
Smith et al., 2016) attempted to utilize systematically collected and coded data to generate robust
inferences about causes and effects.
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This dissertation begins to address these issues. There are limited mixed-method empirical
analyses investigating these assessments’ risk factors of individuals engaging in violent extremism
and non-violent criminal extremism in the U.S. In fact, both VERA-2 and ERG 22+ risk
assessment target populations include the broad spectrum of extremists motivated by varying
ideologies and designed for individuals convicted of violent extremism and/or non-violent but
criminal extremist-related offenses (Lloyd, 2019).
Extremist Demographic Factors
Correlations demonstrate statistical relationships between two variables (without
establishing temporal order) while risk factors have a ‘predictive quality’ (Wolfowicz et al., 2020,
p.6). Ideally, only longitudinal research can identify and isolate risk factors (Murray et al., 2009),
but cross-sectional studies can examine variables like offender demographics (e.g., gender) or
retrospective factors (e.g., victimization, prior criminal history) that meet the risk factor criteria.
Systematic reviews (e.g., Desmarais et al., 2017; Smith, 2018), meta-analyses (Wolfowicz et al.,
2020) and prior research (e.g., Hamm & Spaaj, 2015; Hasisi, Carmel, Weisburd, & Wolfowicz,
2020; Horgan et al., 2016; Jensen & LaFree, 2016; Novikov & Koshkin, 2019; Smith et al., 2016)
found several offender demographics (e.g., age, gender, employment, and education) associated
with radicalization risk. As established from the extant literature, these variables specifically
outlined by Smith’s (2018) review will be included as controls within the study.
Violent Extremists
Chermak and Gruenewald (2015) found violent far-rightists were less likely to commit
ideological crimes and more likely to commit non-ideological violent behavior (e.g., drug-related
homicides) than far-leftists and jihadists. Since the FR is decentralized and heterogeneous
movement that espouses various grievances (Perry & Scrivens, 2016), it is possible certain
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individual-group risk factors (determining the intensity of group and ideological dynamics), vary
across groups. Individual-group factors include individual’s identity, attitudes, relationships, and
role related to the group. One example is “over-identification with a group or cause” that indicates
the individual’s deep entrenchment with the group’s ideology and extreme reactions when exposed
to alternative viewpoints (Roberts & Horgan, 2008). Put simply, violent jihadists are more likely
to exhibit individual-group risk factors compared to violent far-right extremists (H1a).
Individual factors are independent of the group and situation that include an individual’s
vulnerabilities and needs (Cook, 2013). An example is “mental health” which indicates an
individual’s mental health problems (Corner, Gill, & Mason, 2015; Hamm & Spaaij, 2015; Horgan
et al., 2016). Studies emphasize the individual’s psychological normality (Post, Sprinzak, &
Denny, 2003; Sageman, 2004), although recent research may suggest otherwise (Corner & Gill,
2015; Corner et al., 2015; Gruenewald et al., 2013). Though scholars (Pressman & Flockton, 2014;
Silke, 2014) argue violent extremists have different needs and motivations compared to the wider
offender population, others (Clarke & Newman, 2006; Basra & Neumann, 2016; Mullins, 2009)
suggest violent extremists’ recruitment occurs from the same offender demographics (e.g.,
criminal and violent histories). Echoing similar sentiments, other scholars (Hamm & Spaaj, 2015;
Horgan et al., 2016; Jensen & LaFree, 2016) have found that violent extremists have prior criminal
and violent backgrounds. Many tools (e.g., VERA-2 & ERG 22+) have risk factors that capture
this. Individual-situational factors include an individual’s personal social networks, capabilities,
access, and transitional periods (Herzog-Evans, 2018). For example, scholars (e.g., Jensen &
LaFree, 2016; Wolfowicz et al., 2020) found like-minded peers to have a significant effect for on
violent extremism. Similarly, many of these tools have individual-situational risk factors
indicating peers and family support/involvement in violent extremism. Hence, it is possible that
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both jihadist and far-right violent extremists exhibit both individual and individual-situational risk
factors (H1b).
Violent and Non-Violent Extremists
Jensen and LaFree (2016) found that far-rightists’ and jihadists’ ideologies have
significantly positive relationships to violence. The authors argued for the presence of a complex
interaction between ideology (i.e., individual-group) and radicalized aspects of an individual’s life,
specifically familial/friendship networks and life stability (i.e., individual-situational) factors. In
fact, prior research (Smith, 2018; Wolfowicz et al., 2020) found positive relationships between
deep commitment towards an extremist ideology and political grievances respectively on violent
extremism. Examples of individual-group risk factors emphasizing ideology are the “need to
defend against threat” and “commitment to ideology justifying violence”. As established above, it
is also reasonable to assume that violent extremists are more likely to exhibit individual risk factors
compared to non-violent extremists. Thus, violent extremists are more likely to exhibit individual,
individual-situational, and individual-group risk factors than non-violent financial/material
support crime extremists (H2a).
Non-Violent Extremists
Although two NIJ funded studies included non-violent comparison groups, they did not
examine nuances within groups such as why some individuals only turn to non-violent extremist
financial/material support criminal activity as opposed to engaging in VE. Based on the prior VE
and group dynamics literature (see H1a and H1b), we assume that jihadist non-violent
financial/material support crime extremists are more likely to exhibit individual-group risk factors
than far-right non-violent financial/material support crime extremists (H3a). Additionally, both
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jihadists and far-right non-violent financial/material support crime extremists are more likely to
exhibit both individual and individual-situational risk factors (H3b).
In summary, this study will begin addressing research gaps and extend prior research in
two ways. First, what is lacking in these projects are the simultaneous multiple comparisons across
and within both groups: violent extremists (i.e., jihadists and far-right extremists) and non-violent
extremists (i.e., jihadists and far-right criminal extremist offenders), the current subjects under
study. This study uses case information on these individuals from the ECDB which captures both
offender-level and incident-level characteristics on multiple groups including both violent and
non-violent criminal extremists (see Chapter Three for a detailed explanation of this database).
With Smith’s (2018) preliminary findings in mind, my purpose is not to evaluate these assessments
but to identify and operationalize these risk factors using both ERG 22+ and VERA-2 assessments
and prior literature and to engage in comparative analyses across and within both groups.
As such, this study is the first large-scale empirical study to investigate risk factors to
determine variations and similarities across and within the groups. Additionally, the risk factor
data captured in this study will add and extend the information on offender-level characteristics in
the database. Second, this study will make important methodological contributions. According to
Smith (2018), most quantitative studies use descriptive analyses (e.g., bivariate correlations or chisquare tests) to examine the association between each potential risk factor and the violent
extremism outcome. Simple quantitative analyses do not capture the complexity of relationships
between risk factors and the violent extremism outcome. Further, because such risk factors
increase the general likelihood of individuals engaging in violent extremism, Smith (2018) called
for further investigation to determine whether these risk factors are relevant at the individual level
This study employs a mixed-method design involving multivariate statistics to compare across and
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within the groups as well as case studies to analyze presence of risk factors at the individual level
(see Chapter Three for a detailed analysis plan).
Summary of Research Objectives and Questions
This dissertation has three central objectives: (1) identify and operationalize VERA-2 and
ERG 22+ risk factors, (2) investigate risk factors across and within jihadists and far-right violent
and non-violent financial/material support crime extremists, and (3) examine underlying
associations between variables (i.e., risk factors) and theoretical domains. There are two main
research questions: (1) investigate extent of convergence and/or divergence of the risk factors
between U.S jihadist and far-right violent extremists and non-violent financial/material support
crime extremists and (2) examine underlying relationships between risk factors and their
theoretical domains (i.e., individual, individual-situational, and individual-group). The literature
review highlighted five hypotheses:
H1: There are more similarities than differences, in the risk factors identified within the
violent extremist group.
•

H1a: Violent jihadists are more likely to exhibit individual-group risk factors
compared to violent far-right extremists.

•

H1b: Both violent jihadists and far-rightists are more likely to exhibit individual and
individual-situational risk factors.

H2: There are differences in the risk factors identified for both violent extremists and nonviolent criminal extremists.
•

H2a: Violent extremists are more likely to exhibit individual, individual-situational,
and individual-group risk factors than non-violent financial/material support crime
extremists.
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H3: There are similarities than differences, in the risk factors identified within the nonviolent extremist group.
•

H3a: Jihadist non-violent financial/material support crime extremists are more likely
to exhibit individual-group risk factors than far-right non-violent financial/material
support crime extremists.

•

H3b: Both jihadists and far-right non-violent financial/material support crime
extremists are more likely to exhibit both individual and individual-situational risk
factors.
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CHAPTER THREE
Methodology
Research Design Description
This study uses a mixed-method design to address the two research questions: (1)
investigate extent of convergence and/or divergence of the risk factors between U.S jihadist and
far-right violent extremists and non-violent financial/material support crime extremists and (2)
examine underlying relationships between risk factors and their theoretical domains (i.e.,
individual, individual-situational, and individual-group).
Study Definitional Criteria: Jihadists vs. Far-Right Extremists
This dissertation adopts the ECDB’s definitions for far-right extremists and jihadists
(Freilich et al., 2014, p.380):
“[Far-rights] are fiercely nationalistic, anti-global, suspicious of federal authority, and
reverent of individual liberties, especially their right to own guns and be free of taxes. They
believe in conspiracy theories involving imminent threats to national sovereignty or
personal liberty and beliefs that their personal or national ‘‘way of life’’ is under attack.
Sometimes such beliefs are vague, but for some the threat originates from specific racial
or religious groups. They believe that they must be prepared to defend against this attack
by participating in paramilitary training or survivalism.”
“[Jihadists] believe that only acceptance of Islam promotes human dignity. Islamic
extremists reject the traditional Muslim respect for ‘‘People of the Book’’ (i.e., Christians
and Jews). They believe that ‘‘Jihad’’ (i.e., to struggle in God’s path like the Prophet
Muhammad) is a defining belief in Islam and includes the ‘‘lesser Jihad’’ that endorses
violence against ‘‘corrupt’’ others. Islamic extremists believe that their faith is oppressed
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in nominally Muslim Middle-Eastern/Asian corrupt governments and in nations (e.g.,
Russia/Chechnya) that occupy Islamic populations. The U.S is seen as supporting the
humiliation of Islam, and exploiting the region’s resources. They believe that America’s
hedonistic culture (e.g., gay rights, feminism, etc.) negatively affects Muslim values.
Islamic extremists believe that the American people are responsible for their government’s
actions and that there is a religious obligation to combat this assault. They believe that
Islamic law – Sharia – provides the blueprint for a modern Muslim society and should be
forcibly implemented.”
Study Inclusion Criteria: Differentiating Between Violent vs. Non-Violent Extremists
Violent offenders are individuals who commit successful violent incidents (i.e., homicide,
suicide attack, and/or are killed during a law enforcement confrontation), engaged in failed or
foiled plots, and foreign fighters who went abroad and engaged in violence. 1 According to the
ECDB definition, a failed plot is an in-progress violent incident stopped during the final stage
(e.g., a bomb exploding prematurely) while a foiled plot is a violent incident that was stopped
before the perpetrators could carry out the attack (e.g., arrests of the offenders involved). Nonviolent offenders are individuals who engaged in financial schemes or material support crimes.
Additionally, those committing both violent and non-violent financial/material support
crimes are violent extremists. For instance, a far-right offender is a violent extremist when the
offender murdered a police officer and engaged in tax fraud. I investigated whether each offender,
regardless of the subsequent charges, also committed a violent act, or intended to and/or took
action to commit a violent crime (see ‘Dependent Variables (DVs)’ for additional discussion,
pp.42-43).
The study adopts Malet (2013, p.9) definition of foreign fighters as “non-citizens of conflict states who join
insurgencies during civil conflict.”
1
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Research Strategy Overview
The research strategy consisted of five stages. The first stage extracted a random sample
of jihadists and right-wing violent extremists and non-violent financial/material support crime
extremists from the ECDB. The second stage developed the coding protocol and risk factor
compilation of both risk assessment tools, with a pilot test conducted using 8% (n = 32) of the
excluded ECDB cases to refine the coding instrument. The pre-test excludes my random sample
of 420 offenders to prevent data contamination and biases. The third stage includes the coding
process for the random sample. The fourth stage involves data analyses to determine similarities
and differences in risk factors across and within both groups as well as investigate underlying
associations between risk factors and theoretical domains. The fifth stage includes qualitative indepth case study constructions (n = 6) across and within both groups.
Data Collection and Sampling Method
Again, this dissertation uses ECDB data to obtain random samples of violent extremists
(i.e., 105 jihadists and 105 right-wing extremists each; n = 210) and non-violent extremists (i.e.,
105 jihadists and right-wing criminal extremist offenders each; n = 210) with an overall sample
size of 420. I randomly sampled from the ECDB population distribution across the four groups:
violent extremists (i.e., 324 jihadists and 837 right-wing extremists) and non-violent
financial/material support crime extremists (i.e., 229 jihadists and 517 right-wing extremists). 2,3
A recent meta-analysis study (Wolfowicz et al., 2020) investigating general risk and
protective factors found small to large effect sizes. According to Cohen (1988), small effect sizes
Note these population numbers presented fulfill the study’s objectives and are not the entire offender universe
captured in the ECDB. The numbers are specified here after removing duplicates – offenders involved in multiple
incidents, non-ideological extremist offenders, extremist offenders with indistinct or ‘other’ classifications (e.g., a
jihadist committing a far-right crime), offenders committing pre-1990s and post-2018 crimes, offenders initially
charged before being acquitted/released/dismissed/exonerated, and unknown/unnamed suspects).
3
It should be noted the study excludes other categories (e.g., left-wing extremists) because of time and data constraints,
and coder limitations.
2
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center around 0.1, medium 0.3, and large 0.5. Specifically, radical attitudes (i.e., support for or
justification of radical violence) had the largest effect size while the others (e.g., national/religious
identity, police contact, thrill/risk seeking, authoritarianism/fundamentalism, etc.) ranged from
small to medium effect sizes. Based on these study’s findings, it is reasonable to assume a moderate
effect size for four reasons. First, the meta-analysis excluded many risk assessment factors (e.g.,
VERA-2 protective factors). Second, overlapping factors have definitional inconsistencies (e.g.,
police contact [number of contacts respondents had with police in the previous 12-month period]
vs. ERG 22+ criminal history vs. VERA-2 prior criminal history of violence). Third, only radical
attitudes had the largest effect size while most factors contributed small to medium effect sizes.
Lastly and importantly, violent extremism is a low base rate phenomenon (Burman et al., 2007;
Pressman, 2009; Roberts & Hogan, 2008; Tuddenham, 2000). Conducting the first a priori power
analysis using the GPower 3.1 software with the default values (e.g., alpha of 0.05, power of 0.95)
and a moderate correlation size of 0.2, the projected sample size needed is approximately 326 for
the tetrachoric matrix to run the exploratory factor analysis (EFA). Running the second a priori
power analysis with the default values (e.g., alpha of 0.05, power of 0.95) and moderate odds ratio
of 3.0 (Chen, Cohen, & Chen, 2010; Ferguson, 2009), the projected sample size needed is
approximately 66 (with an overall sample size of 264) for binary logistic regression analysis.
Considering lack of open-source information for some individuals and methodological ‘rule-ofthumb’ for sample sizes (see ‘Multivariate Analyses’ section, p.47-48), a projected sample size of
420 is suitable for subsequent analyses.
The use of open-source data in research has increased exponentially and withstood peerreview scrutiny (LaFree, 2011). Randomly selecting 105 offenders from each of the four groups
will prevent skewness and improve consistency during the comparative analysis. I used these data
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(i.e., information extracted from their case files) to code for risk factors and perpetrator
characteristics (Appendix 2).
Description of ECDB
The ECDB is an open-source database that draws on publicly available information
including media accounts, court documents, watch group reports, and scholarly records to
construct case files. The database includes far-right, left-wing, and jihadists (e.g., AQ and ISIS
members) offenders. Additionally, the ECDB considers both violent and non-violent extremist
criminal offenders. In other words, the ECDB captures both ‘classic terrorists’ and those ‘lower
threshold’ offenders committing extremist crimes falling short of violence – e.g., financial/material
support crimes. As such, the current dataset provides for outcome variation, allowing improved
inferential power (see ‘Dependent Variables (DVs)’ for a full discussion, pp.42-43).
The ECDB is a relational database and includes both incident-level and individual-level
characteristics (Freilich et al., 2014). It includes over 2,100 violent and non-violent criminal
extremists and their confederates from 1990 – 2018. For a case to be included within the database,
it needs to satisfy to two criteria. First, a criminal violent incident or financial/material support
scheme must be committed in the U.S. The criminal violent incident either involves a homicide,
suicide, or killed during law enforcement confrontation. Financial schemes include jihadists
engaging in financial fraud to finance violent extremism (Kane & Wall, 2005; Rudner, 2006; 2010)
and right-wing extremists committing tax evasion symbolizing anti-government sentiments (Belli
& Freilich, 2009; Smith & Damphousse, 2002). Material support activities exclude financialrelated schemes (e.g., providing funding) but include supply of provisions, resources, and training
(adopted from the ECDB codebook). Second, at least one of the offenders who perpetrated the
criminal act must subscribe to an extremist belief system.
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ECDB Case File Development. Because this study uses case files already established in
the database, the original search protocol (see Freilich et al., 2014 for a full discussion) will be the
same to locate additional information to code for the risk factors. In sum, the open-source data
search protocol organized around a ranking criterion, locates relevant information to address
source type reliability and information inconsistencies. In cases of information inconsistencies,
authoritative sources (e.g., court and police documents) were give credence over media reports.
Table 5 presents the ECDB source-ranking table.
Table 5. ECDB source ranking.
Order of reliability
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

Source type
Appellate court proceedings
Court proceedings subject to cross examination (e.g., trial transcripts)
Court proceedings or documents not subject to cross examination (e.g., indictments)
Corroborated information from people with direct access to information provided (e.g.,
law enforcement and other key informants)
Uncorroborated statements from people with that access
Media reports
Watch-group reports
Personal views expressed in blogs, websites, editorials or Op-Ed, etc.

One issue associated with open-source information is selectivity bias due to potential systematic
exclusion of relevant cases. Chermak, Freilich, Parkin, and Lynch (2012) conducted a preliminary
investigation on this issue using ECDB data on far-right ideologically motivated homicides. They
used a “catchment-re-catchment” strategy and included 10 specific sources (e.g., official FBI data,
media searches, watch-group listings, databases like the GTD) the ECDB relied upon to identify
its far-right homicides. Chermak et al. (2012) found that additional source inclusion resulted in a
decreasing number of events not captured by prior sources and an increasing number of identified
events. This suggests that all sources taken together are beginning to capture the universe of events.
Importantly, I enhanced the ECDB and conducted additional searches to update the case files with
new information on perpetrators and related incidents.
Codebook Development
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The relevant peer-reviewed articles (e.g., Lloyd & Dean, 2015; Pressman & Flockton,
2012) provides the list of risk factors. Because of the lack of access to the ERG 22+ and VERA-2
user manuals outlining the specific items and details for each risk factor, a constructed single item
based on the factor and corresponding domain, aided the coding process for these specific features
apart from certain variables dependent on the risk factor descriptions (e.g., ‘harmful end
objectives’, and ‘criminal history’; see Appendix 2). To reduce any underlying item formulation
bias, items were crosschecked with previous developers’ published work (e.g., VERA, Version 1;
Pressman, 2009) and I used respective theories indicated by the authors (e.g., Lloyd & Dean, 2015)
as well as prior literature (e.g., systematic reviews/meta-analyses; four NIJ projects) to develop
and operationalize these risk factors. Pretesting the coding instrument ensures refinement before
the final coding starts.
Given the limited scope of information, some variables capture indications of the risk
factors. For example, the variable ‘MENTAL_HEALTH’ capturing mental illness ideally involve
access to confidential clinical records. However, open-source information can provide indications
of mental illness through statement excerpts from both formal (e.g., police source) or informal
(e.g., family and friends) from reputable information sources (e.g., court documents, specific
media). This allows for a broader capture of information. The study adopts this coding aspect from
prior research (Jensen & LaFree, 2016) and it also reduces the likelihood of missing data. The pretest includes 8% (n = 32) of the excluded ECDB cases from those selected in the random sample
(n = 420) to prevent underlying data contamination and biases. Further, these original risk factors
and domains remain in the coding sheet to remind the coders of the overarching meaning
underlying these items.
Quantitative Examination of the Research Questions
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Coding Process
To run the appropriate statistical analyses, I converted VERA-2 and ERG 22+ ordinal
ratings (i.e., Low, Medium, and High) to binary dummy variables, measuring if there was evidence
of the risk factor in each case (0 = No, 1 = Yes). Refer to Appendix 2 for the coding instrument of
the variables under study. Because of the difficulties highlighted above regarding the risk factor
identification, scholars have employed innovative methods. Beardsley and Beech (2013)
conducted five case studies and attempted to use an ordinal rating scale to code the degree of
presence of the VERA (first version) risk factors in the open-source information. One issue with
utilizing this ordinal methodology in this study is the subjective discretion involved (like the SPJ
risk assessment protocol) which compounds the problem when there is no training for that tool.
This study codes the risk factors using binary values (see below for a detailed discussion)
and is similar to Meloy and Gill’s (2016) research strategy. There are two associated challenges
that the authors outlined with this approach. First, most risk factors capture underlying motivations
and attitudes while the coding process emphasizes behaviors. Second, risk assessments are
dynamic and focus on behavioral patterns over time instead of discrete acts. To address these
issues, coders used their judgement (with multiple discussions with the dissertation chair) while
capitalizing on their understanding of the original assessments’ risk factors and domains and to
extrapolate similar behaviors (i.e., to develop behavioral patterns) to fit the risk factor. To ensure
coding consistency, two coders double-coded approximately 21% (n = 88) of the cases from the
random samples and report inter-rater reliability estimates for each variable. After coding, I
exported the dataset to a Stata data file to run the quantitative analyses.
Dealing with Missing Data
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Missing data can reduce the statistical power of an analysis and produce biased estimates
leading to invalid conclusions (Graham, 2009; Parkin & Freilich, 2015) and may result in indirect
negative social impact. I therefore constructed a variable to capture the degree of missing data for
each case (see Appendix 2; ‘%DATAFILL’ variable) to allow for purposive sampling for the
subsequent qualitative analysis (see ‘Qualitative Examination of the Research Question’ section,
pp.47-48). I also used multiple imputation methods for categorical variables (Allison, 2001;
Graham, 2009) which preserve the largest possible sample size to avoid statistical bias that arise
from other classical methods like listwise deletion (Peters & Enders, 2002).
Dependent Variables (DVs)
The ECDB provides the three binary DVs: (1) violent extremist type (0 = violent jihadi; 1
= violent FR); (2) violence/nonviolence extremist risk (0 = non-violent financial/material support;
1 = violent); (3) non-violent extremist type (0 = financial/material support crime jihadi; 1 =
financial/material support crime FR). Again, this dissertation uses the ECDB’s definitions of FR
and jihadi extremists (Freilich et al., 2014, p.380; see Study definitional criteria: “Jihadists vs.
Far-Right Extremists” for full definitions). To reiterate, violent extremists are operationalized as
offenders who committed an ideologically motivated homicide, completed a suicide attack,
engaged in a failed or foiled terrorist plot, or committed both financial/material support crimes and
violence (Jensen and LaFree, 2016). Non-violent criminal extremists are operationalized as
offenders who engaged in extremist financial schemes or material support crimes to promote or
contribute to extremist-related causes, and did not commit any violent crimes (Jensen and LaFree,
2016).
Binary coding is easy to implement but limited information can result in incorrect
classification. I addressed this problem by considering the violent intention of the offender –
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individuals who attempted violence (e.g., plotting to cause injury or kill others) but failed to do so
are coded identical to those who successfully engaged in homicide. Non-violent financial/material
support crime extremists are coded as such when open-source documents indicate that individuals’
intentions do not include harm to others or themselves (e.g., financial fraud). This classification
manner removes the latent variable of violence engagement capacity from influencing the findings.
Independent Variables (IVs)
The study examined several factors (e.g., loner, delinquent peers, relationship troubles,
adult abuse) identified by Smith (2018) as control variables. The ECDB provides several variables
(i.e., age, race, gender, lone/group actors, marital status, education, employment). Though certain
ECDB variables (e.g., family extremist activity, military training) partly capture risk factor aspects,
additional attributes were needed (e.g., family and/or friend extremist activity, extremist and/or
non-extremist military training). I therefore created new IVs to fully measure all risk factors
highlighted by VERA-2 and ERG 22+. For example, the ‘group influence and control’ risk factor
measures whether perp made public statements claiming responsibility stating s/he did this for the
group/leader and/or the perp carried out a plan masterminded by the group/leader. Another
example, ‘driven by criminal opportunism’ risk factor measures whether the perp engaged in
extremist action because of other motives (e.g., financial) or fulfilling basic needs (e.g., food,
shelter, etc.). All new IVs had binary values measuring present or absent evidence of risk factors
(0 = No, 1 = Yes; see Appendix 2).
Descriptive Analyses
Frequencies calculated demographic characteristics (e.g., gender, race, age, marital status,
etc.) and specific offender characteristics (e.g., loner vs. group member), comparing violent and
non-violent financial crime extremists.
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Inter-Rater Reliability. Traditionally, different statistics (e.g., percent agreement,
Cronbach’s alpha, Cohen’s kappa, and intra-class coefficients) estimate rater reliability (Stemler,
2004). Cohen’s kappa (κ) values determine inter-rater reliability (IRR) for categorical variables
and account for chance agreement (Cohen, 1960; McHugh, 2012). IRR ensures coding consistency
across multiple coders. Many studies fail to consider the statistical implications on subsequent
analyses (Hallgren, 2012; Krippendorff, 2016). Hence, it is evident that researchers should
consider the reliability of data collection to address the need for result accuracy. An empirically
validated coding process increase the measurement likelihood of representing the phenomenon
under study (Hill, Charalambos, & Kraft, 2012). Accordingly, moderate kappa value ranges from
0.41 to 0.60, substantial kappa value ranges from 0.61 to 0.80, and 0.81 to 1.00 indicate near
perfect agreement (Landis & Koch, 1977). Despite these ranges, McHugh (2012) argues a kappa
value below 0.60 indicates only 15% to 35% of reliable data while a kappa value above 0.80
indicates 64-81% of reliable data. This study aimed for a 0.80 and above value for reliability
estimates.
To reiterate, I recruited and trained a graduate student and we double-coded approximately
21% (n = 88) of the cases from the random samples. As expected, we exhibited almost perfect
agreement for the variables under study, ranging from 0.82 to 1.00 based on Landis and Koch
(1977) interpretation of the Kappa values (Table 6) and thus demonstrated strong reliable data
(McHugh, 2012).
Again, the following table presents the ERG 22+ risk factor terms because of their overall
generality towards both violent and non-violent extremists and to ensure term standardization.
VERA-2 risk factors are presented (e.g., seeker, consumer, developer of violent extremist
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materials) only when the factor is used to provide specific explanation or is absent from ERG 22+
risk assessment.
Table 6. Kappa inter-rater reliability values for each risk factor variable under study.
***p < 0.001
Variables Under Study
Need to defend against threat
Need for status
Need for dominance
Political/moral motivation
Opportunistic involvement
Family or friends support extremist offending
Transitional periods
Group influence and control: Claimed responsibility on
behalf of the group/leader
Group influence and control: Masterminding plots
Need for identity, meaning, belonging
Mental health
Over-identification with a group or cause/ Hostility to
national collective identity
Attitudes justifying offending
Access to networks, funding, and equipment
Criminal history: Prior arrest
Criminal history: Prior prison
Criminal history: Prior violence
Victim of injustice and grievances
Dehumanization of the enemy
Rejection of democratic society and values
Feelings of hate, frustration, persecution, alienation
Us and them thinking
Seeker, consumer, developer of violent extremist materials
Identification of target (person, place, group) in response
to perceived injustice
Personal contact with violent extremists
Harmful end objectives/Anger and expressed intent to act
violently
Harmful end objectives: Expressed desire to die for cause
or martyrdom
Harmful means to an end/Intent to plan/prepare for
violence
Susceptibility to indoctrination
Early exposure to pro-violence militant ideology
Individual knowledge, skills, and competencies: Tactical,
paramilitary, explosive training
Extremist ideological training
Harmful means to an end: Glorification of violent action
Need for excitement, comradeship, or adventure

κ
0.93
0.95
0.82
0.96
0.98
0.98
0.96
0.91

% Agreement
98.9
97.7
91.0
98.9
98.9
98.9
98.9
96.6

z(SE)
8.72 (0.11)***
8.95 (0.11)***
7.68 (0.11)***
9.05 (0.11)***
9.17 (0.11)***
14.54 (0.07)***
9.00 (0.11)***
10.74 (0.08)***

0.92
1.00
0.94
0.91

96.6
100
96.6
95.5

8.69 (0.11)***
9.38 (0.11)***
15.62 (0.06)***
8.52 (0.11)***

0.98
1.00
1.00
1.00
0.97
0.98
1.00
0.93
0.95
0.98
0.95
0.86

98.9
100
100
100
98.9
98.6
100
96.6
97.7
98.9
97.7
93.1

10.60 (0.09)***
14.87 (0.07)***
9.38 (0.11)***
9.38 (0.11)***
9.14 (0.11)***
9.16 (0.11)***
9.38 (0.11)***
8.75 (0.11)***
8.94 (0.11)***
9.17 (0.11)***
8.96 (0.11)***
8.07 (0.11)***

0.93
0.97

96.6
98.9

8.74 (0.11)***
9.15 (0.11)***

0.94

97.7

8.81 (0.11)***

0.86

93.1

8.13 (0.11)***

0.98
1.00
0.97

98.9
100
98.9

9.17 (0.11)***
9.38 (0.11)***
9.10 (0.11)***

0.98
1.00
0.96

98.9
100
98.9

9.17 (0.11)***
9.38 (0.11)***
9.04 (0.11)***

Tetrachoric Correlations. Additionally, tetrachoric correlation coefficients determine the
associations between the dichotomous variables within each domain and across domains.
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Tetrachoric correlations (rt) assumes the latent variables are continuous and normally distributed
(Kline, 2016). Because administration of risk assessments happens in special (e.g., correctional)
settings and not among the general population, these risk factors take on a normal distribution. In
fact, Powis et al. (2019) found adequate histogram distributions of the ERG 22+ risk factors
without extreme outliers, indicating a degree of normality for an ordinal level of measurement.
Additionally, specific binary variables deduced as a special case of ordinal variables with two
categories (e.g., having family support against violent extremism is better than not having any;
Kolenikov & Angeles, 2004).
Multivariate Analyses
Logistic Regression. To address the first research question and the corresponding five
hypotheses, I estimated a series of binary logistic regression models to determine differences (H1a)
and similarities (H1b) within the violent extremist group, differences (H3a) and similarities (H3b)
within the non-violent extremist group, and differences (H2a) across both groups, in terms of the
risk factors present. According to Long (1997), sample sizes should be above 100 with 500
observations adequate for regression analyses. In this case, the study meets the minimum criteria
with 105 individuals from each group and an overall sample size of 420. Additionally, I conducted
sensitivity analyses investigating the regression models pre- and post- data imputation to prevent
biased estimates and conclusion biases (Abayomi, Gelman, & Levy, 2008; Eddings & Marchenko,
2012).
Table 7. Five regression models with the corresponding hypotheses, DVs, and IVs.
Model Nu.
Model 1
Model 2

Hypothesis No.
H1a
H1b

Model 3

H2a

Model 4

H3a

Dependent Variables
Violent extremist type
Violent extremist type
Violence/nonviolence extremist
risk
Non-violent financial/material
support crime extremist type
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Independent Variables
Individual-group risk factors
Individual and individual-situational risk
factors
Individual, individual-situational, and
individual-group risk factors
Individual-group risk factors

Model 5

H3b

Non-violent financial/material
support crime extremist type

Individual and individual-situational risk
factors

Exploratory Factor Analysis. The tetrachoric correlation matrix (i.e., correlation
coefficient values) runs an EFA model. EFA is appropriate because there is no a priori theoretical
framework and assumed associations between variables (i.e., risk factors). This will answer the
study’s second research question investigating underlying associations between risk factors and
their respective theoretical domains. According to Kline (2016), the ideal sample size for
structured equation models is 20 times the number of parameters while the minimum sample size
is 10. There are 27 VERA-2 and 26 ERG 22+ parameters hence the minimum sample sizes are
270 and 260 respectively (31 variables). In this case, the sample size outnumbers these minimum
values (n = 420). Additionally, the factor loadings computed for the risk factors measure the
corresponding domain determine domain reliability. Though EFA is often used as part of a suite
of statistical analyses for data reduction, it is also employed for another purpose. It is used to
explore patterns within the dataset and specifically determine which factors loaded well on which
domains to enable accurate classification of which risk factors are adequately measuring aspects
of the overarching domain (i.e., construct validity). In fact, EFA is used in several areas of risk
assessment research to determine construct validity of the specific instrument like sexual violence
(e.g., Violence Risk Scale–Sexual Offender [VRS-SO], Olver, Wong, Nicholaichuk, & Gordon,
2007; Olver, Neumann, Kingston, Nicholaichuk, & Wong, 2018) and importantly in extremism
(e.g., IVP, Egan et al., 2016).
Qualitative Examination of the Research Question
Case Study Methodology
I selected three cases from both groups (n = 6) to develop more in-depth understanding,
utilizing ‘thick descriptions’ (Geertz, 1973), of the risk and protective actors. I sampled for
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heterogeneity (i.e., purposive sampling) to provide variation (Tashakkori & Teddlie, 1998, p.76).
Case studies afford a nuanced understanding of changes in violent extremist pathways leading up
to the perpetration of violence. In fact, like other extremism research areas, there is value in
crafting and examining case studies to draw lessons and insights (Dicter & Byman 2006). While
the preceding quantitative findings help us to understand the risk factors influencing the general
likelihood of engaging in violent extremism, such findings fall short of contextualizing theoretical
processes at work. As such, the qualitative methodology allows the application of the integrated
theoretical criminological framework (Chapter Two) to inform the findings at the individual level.
See Appendix 4 for the case study template. Note because of the significant overlaps between both
ERG 22+ and VERA-2 risk assessments (see Table 3), the risk factors presented in the table use
the ERG 22+ risk factor terms because of their overall generality toward both violent and nonviolent extremists and to ensure term standardization. VERA-2 risk factors are presented (e.g.,
seeker, consumer, developer of violent extremist materials) only when the factor is used to provide
specific explanation or is absent from ERG 22+ risk assessment.
Narratives consider the uniqueness of how key pathways situate historically and provide
temporal details leading up to the incident. Thick descriptions of these cases afford for the
understanding of the life history of each perpetrator, specifically the gradual changes (e.g.,
motivation development, behavioural changes, preparation and planning for the act) that led him
or her to commit the violent act to tease out the unique pathway of each offender’s route to
violence. The narratives delineate chronological order to determine cause-and-effect (Yin, 2013).
Each case study concludes a detailed discussion of the key events and circumstances leading up to
the violent act. Narratives allow the exploration of the dynamic interaction between the
perpetrators’ motivations and the circumstances surrounding the violent event (Hamm, 2007).
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CHAPTER FOUR
Quantitative Results
Quantitative Study
Data Description
As discussed earlier, coding risk factors’ presence and/or absence is based on the evidence
available in the open-source information. Missing data was imputed for the demographic/control
variables for subsequent analyses. Descriptive statistics are based on the non-missing demographic
data to prevent introduction of biases via multiple imputation. As such, the subsequent section on
‘Descriptive Statistics’ (i.e., ‘Sample demographics’ and ‘Offender characteristics’ subsections)
will calculate percentages with the missing values included. Additionally, this section will
expound upon several additional variables of interest and compare them across the four groups.
Descriptive Statistics
Sample Demographics. Overall, the sample is approximately 90% male and 10% female,
with ages ranging from 14 to 79 (M = 36.6). The racial/ethnic composition of the sample consists
of 54% Whites, 13% Blacks, 16% of Middle Eastern ancestry with the remainder 17% belonging
to other categories like Hispanic and Asian Americans. Of the 420 offenders, 55% had significant
others (i.e., being married, in a cohabitation or girlfriend/boyfriend relationship), 30% were single
at the time of their arrest while 8% lost their spouses (i.e., being separated, divorced, or widowed).
Approximately 7% of offenders were never employed while 35% of them were sporadically
employed and 40% of them had regular work history. In terms of their childhood, approximately
30% of offenders had low socioeconomic statuses with 23% originating from a middle-class
family, and about 11% coming from wealthy families (i.e., high socioeconomic status). In terms
of their adulthood, majority of offenders (i.e., approximately 53%) had low socioeconomic statuses
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with 22% had a middle-class lifestyle and 18% had high socioeconomic statuses. Note sample
demographic percentages calculated include cases with missing values. Table 8 presents the
demographic variable breakdown with their respective category frequencies and percentages.
Table 8. Demographic characteristics of sample.
*Note: Percentages presented include cases with missing values.

Demographics*
Variable breakdown
Gender
Male
Female
Age
Below 18
18 – 39
40 – 65
Above 65
Race/Ethnicity Whites
Blacks
Middle Eastern ancestry
Others
Marital status
Single
Had a significant other
Lost their spouses
Employment
Never employed
history
Sporadically employed
Regularly employed
Childhood SES Low
Middle
High
Adulthood SES Low
Middle
High
Education level Homeschooled
8th grade and below
Some high school
GED/High school diploma
Some college/vocational
Vocational graduate/Associate degree
College graduate
Postgraduate work

Frequency
377
43
7
257
132
15
228
53
68
71
127
231
33
31
147
168
127
95
44
222
94
77
5
7
40
75
75
21
61
24

Percentage (%)
89.8
10.2
1.67
61.2
31.4
3.57
54.3
12.6
16.2
16.9
30.2
55.0
7.86
7.38
35.0
40.0
30.2
22.6
10.5
52.9
22.4
18.3
1.19
1.67
9.52
17.9
17.9
5.00
14.5
5.71

Offender Characteristics. Table 9 presents offender characteristic breakdown with their
respective category frequencies and percentages. Only 23% of extremists were lone wolves with
the majority (i.e., 77%) belonging to either a group or acted with others without distinct group
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boundaries. About 27% had non-extremist delinquent peers with the majority of offenders (i.e.,
about 57%) had none. About 44% of offenders were in regular contact with their family while 22%
had sporadic contact with approximately 10% of offenders having no contact with family. In terms
abuse, majority of offenders (i.e., approximately 52%) had no history of abuse while about 14%
of offenders experienced some form of childhood abuse (e.g., neglect) with 3% experiencing
adulthood abuse and another 3% experiencing both childhood and adulthood abuse. About 32% of
offenders had prior unfulfilled aspirations with 35% having none. Approximately 48% of offenders
had prior romantic problems while only 25% of offenders did not. About 33% of offenders had
prior platonic/friendship issues while 43% did not. It should be noted the following variables (i.e.,
abuse history, prior unfulfilled aspirations, prior romantic and/or platonic relationship issues) are
also captured under the broader transitional period risk factor below (see ‘Transitional Periods’
p.57 for more details on this factor)
Table 9. Offender characteristics of sample.
*Note: Percentages presented include cases with missing values.

Offender characteristics*
Lone wolf or group member
Non-extremist delinquent peers
Family contact history
Abuse history

Prior unfulfilled aspirations
Prior romantic relationship issues
Prior platonic relationship issues

Variable breakdown
Lone wolf
Group member
Absent
Present
No contact
Sporadic contact
Regular contact
No abuse
Childhood abuse
Adulthood abuse
Both types of abuse
Absent
Present
Absent
Present
Absent
Present
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Frequency
98
322
238
112
40
92
183
219
57
13
14
147
133
103
203
179
137

Percentage (%)
23.3
76.7
56.7
26.7
9.50
21.9
43.6
52.1
13.6
3.10
3.33
35.0
31.7
24.5
48.3
42.6
32.6

Unplanned vs. Planned Offense Variable. Figure 2 presents the comparison and
breakdown of planned and unplanned offenses across groups. As expected, most offenses involved
some element of planning. Interestingly, 49.5% of far-right violent extremists committed their
offenses on impulse and without prior planning, taking advantage of a situational opportunity
(Freilich & Chermak, 2009) as compared to only approximately 8% of violent jihadists. For
example, a Nazi skinhead sought to fight with a skinhead against racial prejudice member
(SHARP) but ended up shooting and killing a random bystander of a minority race because he was
standing nearby at the wrong time.
120
100
(95.2%)

Number of extremists

100

86
(81.9%)

76
(72.4%)

80
60

52
50
(47.6%) (49.5%)

40
20
0

8
(7.62%)

5
(4.76%)
Violent far-rightists

Non-violent far-rightists
Planned

Violent jihadists

6
(5.71%)
Non-violent jihadists

Unplanned

Figure 2. Unplanned vs. planned offenses.

Note: The numbers shown do not add up to 105 in each group because a minority of the cases (i.e., approximately 9%)
coded did not have an applicable offense (e.g., a radical preacher).

Mental Health Variable. Figure 3 presents the comparison and breakdown of the presence
and absence of mental health issues across groups. As expected, 73% (i.e., 307) of extremists had
no evidence of mental health issues but intriguingly, nearly 27% (i.e., 113) of extremists did. Of
the 113 extremists with mental health problems, 41% (i.e., 46) had comorbidity issues. Based on
Figure 3, nearly 41% of violent far-right extremists and 39% of violent jihadists had mental health
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problems. Putting this finding into context, approximately 20% of adults in the U.S experienced
mental illness just prior to the COVID-19 pandemic in 2019 (Mental Health America, 2022). It is
likely mental health issues appears slightly more in the extremist population compared to the
general population.
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Non-violent far-rightists
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Violent jihadists

Non-violent jihadists

Absence

Figure 3. Mental health issues.
Family or Friends Support Extremist Offending Variable. Overall, nearly 66% (i.e., 277)
of extremists had family, friends, and/or romantic partners involved in or supportive of extremist
movements (i.e., proximal relationships to perpetrator). Of the 277 extremists, a plurality (i.e.,
approximately 47%) had only like-minded friends/colleagues and nearly 30% had multiple
members (i.e., combinations of the three mentioned categories presented below) involved
in/supportive of extremism. Figure 4 presents the comparison and breakdown of the offender’s
proximal social network involved in and/or supported extremism across groups.
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2
(1.90%)

17
(16.2%)
3
(2.86%)

Violent jihadists

Significant Other

4
(3.81%)

Non-violent jihadist

Multiple members

Figure 4. Proximal social network involved in or supported extremism.

Note: The numbers shown do not add up to 105 in each group because approximately 34% of cases (i.e., 143
extremists) coded had no evidence of extremist supporting family/friends/romantic partners and are not shown here.

Personal Contact with Violent Extremists Variable. Generally, approximately 51%
extremists (i.e., 215) had personal/direct contact with violent extremists. Figure 5 presents the
comparison and breakdown of the presence and absence of the offender’s personal/direct contact
with violent extremists across groups. As expected, both violent far-rightists (i.e., 72%) and
jihadists (i.e., approximately 45%) were in contact with violent extremists. Of interest, many nonviolent jihadists (i.e., nearly 64%) were in contact with a violent extremist despite being a VERA2 risk factor used only for violent ‘classic terrorists.’
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Figure 5. Personal contact with violent extremists.
Access to Networks, Funding, and Equipment Variable. Overall, an overwhelming
majority of the extremists (i.e., 374, about 89%) had access to weapons, equipment, accomplices,
and funding. About 52% (i.e., 220) had access to multiple combinations of the four mentioned
categories with the top combinations involving access to both weapons and accomplices (i.e.,
18%). Figure 6 presents the comparison and breakdown of the risk factor across groups. Not
surprisingly, a clear majority of both violent far-rightists (i.e., 83, 79%) and jihadists (i.e., 67,
nearly 64%) had access to multiple combinations of these categories to facilitate their criminal
extremist actions. This finding is aligned with the terrorist opportunity structure proposed by
Clarke and Newman (2006) that encompasses four pillars, including both weapons and tools.
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Figure 6. Access to networks, funding, and equipment.

Note: The numbers shown do not add up to 105 in each group because approximately 11% of cases (i.e., 46 extremists)
coded had no evidence of having access to network, funding, and equipment and are not shown here.

Transitional Periods. Generally as expected, most extremists (i.e., 330, 79%) experienced
major difficulties throughout their lives prior to their crime commission. The following are the
common major difficulties found across the multiple groups: experiencing childhood and/or
adulthood abuse (e.g., neglect, physical/sexual exploitation), childhood and/or adulthood poverty,
unfulfilled aspirations, legal issues (e.g., child support, liens, foreclosure proceedings), financial
problems (e.g., credit card debts, failed businesses, defaulted loans, hospital bills), having romantic
and/or platonic problems, substance and/or alcohol abuse, housing instability (e.g., evictions,
transitional housing, homelessness, shelters), physical (e.g., diabetes, cancer) and/or mental health
problems, experiencing loss and/or death of a loved one.
Of the list of most common examples, seven of which are included within the figure below:
having romantic and/or platonic troubles, unfulfilled aspirations, had parents with harmful
parenting styles (e.g., excessive disciplinarians, uninvolved and/or neglectful parents),
experienced financial problems, housing instabilities, and legal issues. Figure 7 presents the
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comparison and breakdown of these adverse life events common across groups. The importance
of this generic non-ideological risk factor is highlighted in extant literature, bearing similarities
between extremism and routine crime (e.g., Horgan, 2014; McCauley and Moskalenko 2011; Simi,
Sporer, & Bubolz, 2016). Of interest, nearly half of the non-violent far-right extremists
experienced prior legal issues before engaging in their criminal activities and may be a unique risk
factor for the non-violent far-right movement though further quantitative research needs to confirm
this finding.
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Figure 7. Examples of transitional periods.
Tetrachoric Correlation Matrix and Multicollinearity
Tables 11 – 14 below present the variables’ correlations. The tetrachoric correlation matrix
presented here checks for multicollinearity (0.7 < |r| ≤ 0.9; Dormann et al., 2013; Midi, Sarkar, &
Rana, 2013) despite low variance inflation factor (VIF; conservative cut-off of below 2.5) and high
tolerance values of above 0.4. According to Midi et al. (2013), excluding one of the correlated
variables will reduce the multicollinearity problem which commonly occurs in risk factor studies
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(e.g., Dohoo et al., 1997). However, excluding certain variables from subsequent analyses depend
on the nature of these variables to minimize the risk of losing information. Field (2013) posits the
removal of a variable from a pair of correlated variables should be based on qualitative
interpretations. To examine the five hypotheses, my model included the proposed list of
independent variables and will exclude these five variables from the subsequent analyses (Table
10): (1) prior arrest (Individual domain), (2) seeker, consumer, developer of violent extremist
materials (Individual-situational domain), (3) susceptibility to indoctrination (Individual-group
domain), (4) dehumanization of the enemy (Individual-group domain), and (5) us and them
thinking (Individual-group domain). Explanations for the removal of these variables are presented
below.
Table 10. Hypotheses and list of proposed IVs involved with five excluded, and two retained.
Hypotheses
H1a: Violent jihadists are more
likely to exhibit individual-group
risk factors compared to violent
far-right extremists.

H1b: Both violent jihadists and farrightists are more likely to exhibit
individual
and
individualsituational risk factors.

H2a: Violent extremists are more
likely to exhibit individual,
individual-situational,
and
individual-group risk factors than

List of proposed independent variables involved
I-G: (1) Need to defend against threat, (2) Group influence and control,
Claimed responsibility on behalf of the group/leader, (3) Group influence and
control: Masterminding plots, (4) Over-identification with a group or cause/
Hostility to national collective identity, (5) Attitudes justifying offending, (6)
Victim of injustice and grievances, (7) Feelings of hate, frustration,
persecution, alienation, (8) Rejection of democratic society and values, (9)
Dehumanization of the enemy, (10) Us and them thinking, (11)
Identification of target (person, place, group) in response to perceived
injustice, (12) Harmful end objectives/Anger and expressed intent to act
violently, (13) Harmful end objectives: Expressed desire to die for cause or
martyrdom, (14) Harmful means to an end/Intent to plan/prepare for
violence, (15) Extremist ideological training, (16) Harmful means to an end:
Glorification of violent action
I: (1) Need for identity, meaning, belonging, (2) Need for status, (3) Need for
excitement, comradeship, or adventure, (4) Need for dominance, (5)
Susceptibility to indoctrination, (6) Political/moral motivation, (7)
Opportunistic involvement, (8) Transitional periods, (9) Mental health, (10)
Criminal history: Prior arrest, (11) Criminal history: Prior prison, (12)
Criminal history: Prior violence
I-S: (1) Family or friends support extremist offending, (2) Access to networks,
funding, and equipment, (3) Early exposure to pro-violence militant ideology,
(4) Individual knowledge, skills, and competencies: Tactical, paramilitary,
explosive training, (5) Personal contact with violent extremists, (6) Seeker,
consumer, developer of violent extremist materials
I: (1) Need for identity, meaning, belonging, (2) Need for status, (3) Need for
excitement, comradeship, or adventure, (4) Need for dominance, (5)
Susceptibility to indoctrination, (6) Political/moral motivation, (7)
Opportunistic involvement, (8) Transitional periods, (9) Mental health, (10)
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non-violent
financial/material
support crime extremists.

Criminal history: Prior arrest, (11) Criminal history: Prior prison, (12)
Criminal history: Prior violence
I-S: (1) Family or friends support extremist offending, (2) Access to networks,
funding, and equipment, (3) Early exposure to pro-violence militant ideology,
(4) Individual knowledge, skills, and competencies: Tactical, paramilitary,
explosive training, (5) Personal contact with violent extremists, (6) Seeker,
consumer, developer of violent extremist materials

H3a:
Jihadist
non-violent
financial/material support crime
extremists are more likely to
exhibit individual-group risk
factors than far-right non-violent
financial/material support crime
extremists.

H3b: Both jihadists and far-right
non-violent
financial/material
support crime extremists are more
likely to exhibit both individual
and individual-situational risk
factors.

I-G: (1) Need to defend against threat, (2) Group influence and control,
Claimed responsibility on behalf of the group/leader, (3) Group influence and
control: Masterminding plots, (4) Over-identification with a group or cause/
Hostility to national collective identity, (5) Attitudes justifying offending, (6)
Victim of injustice and grievances, (7) Feelings of hate, frustration,
persecution, alienation, (8) Rejection of democratic society and values, (9)
Dehumanization of the enemy, (10) Us and them thinking, (11)
Identification of target (person, place, group) in response to perceived
injustice, (12) Harmful end objectives/Anger and expressed intent to act
violently, (13) Harmful end objectives: Expressed desire to die for cause or
martyrdom, (14) Harmful means to an end/Intent to plan/prepare for
violence, (15) Extremist ideological training, (16) Harmful means to an end:
Glorification of violent action
I-G: (1) Need to defend against threat, (2) Group influence and control,
Claimed responsibility on behalf of the group/leader, (3) Group influence and
control: Masterminding plots, (4) Over-identification with a group or cause/
Hostility to national collective identity, (5) Attitudes justifying offending, (6)
Victim of injustice and grievances, (7) Feelings of hate, frustration,
persecution, alienation, (8) Rejection of democratic society and values, (9)
Dehumanization of the enemy, (10) Us and them thinking, (11)
Identification of target (person, place, group) in response to perceived
injustice, (12) Harmful end objectives/Anger and expressed intent to act
violently, (13) Harmful end objectives: Expressed desire to die for cause or
martyrdom, (14) Harmful means to an end/Intent to plan/prepare for
violence, (15) Extremist ideological training, (16) Harmful means to an end:
Glorification of violent action
I: (1) Need for identity, meaning, belonging, (2) Need for status, (3) Need for
excitement, comradeship, or adventure, (4) Need for dominance, (5)
Susceptibility to indoctrination, (6) Political/moral motivation, (7)
Opportunistic involvement, (8) Transitional periods, (9) Mental health, (10)
Criminal history: Prior arrest, (11) Criminal history: Prior prison, (12)
Criminal history: Prior violence

I-S: (1) Family or friends support extremist offending, (2) Access to networks,
funding, and equipment, (3) Early exposure to pro-violence militant ideology,
(4) Individual knowledge, skills, and competencies: Tactical, paramilitary,
explosive training, (5) Personal contact with violent extremists, (6) Seeker,
consumer, developer of violent extremist materials
Note: The bolded risk factors are those excluded from the subsequent analyses below.

Criminal History: Prior Arrest. Because the prior arrest variable perfectly correlates to
the prior prison variable (rtet = 1.00) and prior arrest is highly correlated to prior violence (rtet =
0.73), I decided to drop the prior arrest variable from the subsequent analysis.
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Seeker, Consumer, Developer of Violent Extremist Materials and Susceptibility to
Indoctrination. The ‘extremist ideological training,’ the ‘seeker, consumer, developer of violent
extremist materials,’ and the ‘susceptibility to indoctrination’ variables are strongly intercorrelated with correlations ranging from 0.76 to 0.86. Both the ‘extremist ideological training,’
and the ‘seeker, consumer, developer of violent extremist materials’ variables overlap on aspects
of violent extremist materials/propaganda and radicalization. But the ‘extremist ideological
training’ variable captures other aspects like interacting with radical preachers/extremist leaders
and/or being engaged in extremist political activism. The ‘susceptibility to indoctrination’ variable
captures aspects of sharing similar conservative values like those of the group and/or the extremist
preachers/leaders. Based on the descriptions of these risk factors, it is likely the variables are all
measuring aspects of the same underlying factor of radicalization. I dropped the ‘seeker, consumer,
developer of violent extremist materials’ and ‘susceptibility to indoctrination’ variables while
keeping the ‘extremist ideological training’ because the variable captures aspects from both
excluded variables.
Dehumanization of the Enemy and Us and Them Thinking. As expected, the
‘dehumanization of the enemy,’ ‘us and them thinking,’ and ‘feelings of hate, frustration,
persecution, alienation’ are strongly inter-correlated with correlations ranging from 0.74 to 0.81.
These variables touch on the in-group versus out-group aspect, lack of empathy/understanding and
hatred/anger towards the out-group for their perceived oppression/alienation of the in-group and a
black-and-white worldview with the ‘dehumanization of the enemy’ variable equating the outgroup with animals and placing a lower value on their rights and/or lives. Because of the high
correlations, only the ‘feelings of hate, frustration, persecution, alienation’ variable is retained for
the analyses.
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Harmful End Objectives/Anger and Expressed Intent to Act Violently and Harmful
Means to an End/Intent to Plan/Prepare for Violence. Similarly, both the ‘harmful means to an
end/intent to plan, prepare for violence’ and ‘harmful end objectives/anger and expressed intent to
act violently’ variables are highly correlated with each other (rtet = 0.78). The former touches on
the specifics of causing violence/harm with the latter involving the actual end-goals, both criminal
(e.g., causing financial grief) and/or violent (e.g., causing injury or death). One can be present
without the other but from the high correlations presented, both exist in tandem within the dataset.
However, because both are measuring different constructs, both variables are retained for
subsequent analyses.
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Table 11. Correlation matrix for variables within their associated domains.
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Risk factors
Individual-group domain
Need to defend against threat (1)
Group influence and control: Claimed responsibility on
behalf of the group/leader (2)
Group influence and control: Masterminding plots (3)
Over-identification with a group or cause/ Hostility to
national collective identity (4)
Attitudes justifying offending (5)
Victim of injustice and grievances (6)
Feelings of hate, frustration, persecution, alienation (7)
Rejection of democratic society and values (8)
Dehumanization of the enemy (9)
Us and them thinking (10)
Identification of target (person, place, group) in
response to perceived injustice
Harmful end objectives/Anger and expressed intent to
act violently
Harmful end objectives: Expressed desire to die for
cause or martyrdom
Harmful means to an end: Harmful means to an end:
Intent to plan/prepare for violence
Extremist ideological training
Harmful means to an end: Glorification of violent
action
Individual-situational domain
Family or friends support extremist offending
Access to networks, funding, and equipment
Early exposure to pro-violence militant ideology
Individual knowledge, skills, and competencies:
Tactical, paramilitary, explosive training
Personal contact with violent extremists
Seeker, consumer, developer of violent extremist
materials
Individual
Need for identity, meaning, belonging
Need for status
Need for excitement, comradeship, or adventure

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

(9)

(10)

-0.33

--

0.02
0.70

0.29
0.22

--0.11

--

0.03
0.31
0.35
0.15
0.30
0.43
0.40

0.17
0.05
0.29
-0.18
0.08
0.26
0.11

-0.28
-0.24
-0.33
-0.24
-0.47
-0.27
-0.13

0.28
0.44
0.43
0.32
0.32
0.55
0.47

-0.30
0.14
0.59
0.04
0.08
0.17

-0.49
0.30
0.27
0.50
0.47

-0.10
0.81
0.78
0.61

-0.11
0.08
0.16

-0.74
0.47

-0.56

0.41

0.002

-0.13

0.51

-0.05

0.52

0.61

0.16

0.47

0.56

0.41

0.25

-0.07

0.50

0.11

0.40

0.41

0.10

0.34

0.49

0.33

0.05

-0.13

0.44

-0.03

0.35

0.44

-0.04

0.44

0.56

0.61
0.51

0.25
0.18

0.06
-0.04

0.65
0.61

-0.05
0.14

0.40
0.57

0.52
0.52

0.05
0.24

0.44
0.43

0.54
0.70

0.10
0.43
0.22
0.20

-0.02
0.18
0.20
0.04

0.35
0.55
0.27
0.07

0.17
0.17
0.18
0.19

0.07
-0.25
-0.19
0.03

0.13
0.18
0.17
0.32

0.09
0.29
0.16
0.14

-0.03
-0.15
-0.43
0.23

0.05
0.35
0.09
0.06

0.05
0.22
0.22
0.15

0.66
0.57

0.33
0.10

0.30
-0.09

0.32
0.65

-0.23
-0.05

0.03
0.49

0.26
0.53

-0.16
0.07

0.32
0.50

0.35
0.71

0.37
0.57
0.20

0.43
0.22
0.21

0.30
-0.28
-0.08

0.48
0.58
0.32

-0.23
0.15
-0.13

0.13
0.34
0.21

0.40
0.50
0.31

-0.37
0.21
-0.06

0.29
0.51
0.35

0.53
0.62
0.51

Need for dominance
Susceptibility to indoctrination
Political/moral motivation
Opportunistic involvement
Transitional periods
Mental health
Criminal history: Prior arrest
Criminal history: Prior prison
Criminal history: Prior violence

0.41
0.63
0.62
-0.48
0.03
0.01
0.11
0.22
0.13

0.05
0.28
0.12
-0.25
-0.02
0.16
0.16
0.13
0.18

-0.38
-0.004
-0.11
-0.13
-0.05
-0.24
-0.20
-0.22
-0.26

0.52
0.66
0.59
-0.36
0.24
0.22
0.04
0.14
0.22

0.23
0.03
0.47
-0.02
0.07
-0.08
0.06
0.01
0.06

0.34
0.41
0.62
-0.32
0.36
0.28
0.16
0.10
0.20

0.61
0.57
0.49
-0.30
0.35
0.33
0.23
0.26
0.47

0.28
0.12
0.27
0.19
0.07
-0.05
0.06
0.02
0.05

0.51
0.52
0.37
-0.13
0.22
0.31
0.31
0.26
0.50

0.57
0.57
0.37
-0.33
0.38
0.40
0.23
0.31
0.47

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

(9)

(10)

Table 12. Correlation matrix for variables within their associated domains (cont.).
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Risk factors
Individual-group domain
Identification of target (person, place, group) in
response to perceived injustice (1)
Harmful end objectives/Anger and expressed intent
to act violently (2)
Harmful end objectives: Expressed desire to die for
cause or martyrdom (3)
Harmful means to an end: Harmful means to an end:
Intent to plan/prepare for violence (4)
Extremist ideological training (5)
Harmful means to an end: Glorification of violent
action (6)
Individual-situational domain
Family or friends support extremist offending (7)
Access to networks, funding, and equipment (8)
Early exposure to pro-violence militant ideology (9)
Individual knowledge, skills, and competencies:
Tactical, paramilitary, explosive training (10)
Personal contact with violent extremists
Seeker, consumer, developer of violent extremist
materials
Individual domain
Need for identity, meaning, belonging
Need for status
Need for excitement, comradeship, or adventure
Need for dominance
Susceptibility to indoctrination

(1)

(2)

(3)

-0.69

--

0.33

0.49

--

0.66

0.78

0.35

--

0.41
0.52

0.54
0.61

0.50
0.60

0.39
0.50

-0.71

--

0.09
0.36
0.10
0.20

0.06
0.27
0.31
0.18

-0.01
0.01
0.22
0.12

-0.02
0.18
0.25
0.09

0.26
0.32
0.31
0.32

0.08
0.14
0.30
0.22

-0.62
0.20
-0.02

-0.25
0.22

-0.16

--

0.24
0.48

0.24
0.68

0.02
0.60

0.20
0.53

0.45
0.79

0.17
0.73

0.34
0.04

0.58
0.22

0.35
0.30

0.25
0.19

0.20
0.41
0.32
0.37
0.40

0.39
0.45
0.49
0.44
0.59

0.52
0.24
0.44
0.14
0.56

0.31
0.42
0.41
0.32
0.41

0.57
0.45
0.39
0.48
0.86

0.50
0.56
0.49
0.40
0.73

0.28
0.01
0.04
0.12
0.20

0.25
0.33
0.04
0.18
0.32

0.41
0.06
0.09
0.02
0.35

-0.09
0.22
-0.01
-0.02
0.29

Political/moral motivation
Opportunistic involvement
Transitional periods
Mental health
Criminal history: Prior arrest
Criminal history: Prior prison
Criminal history: Prior violence

0.46
-0.30
0.20
0.19
0.14
0.06
0.23

0.49
-0.37
0.31
0.39
0.16
0.12
0.40

0.39
-0.29
0.15
0.32
0.07
-0.09
0.08

0.39
-0.22
0.21
0.27
0.08
0.11
0.20

0.43
-0.48
0.19
0.22
0.12
0.24
0.35

0.43
-0.47
0.23
0.29
0.05
0.08
0.19

0.11
-0.16
0.03
-0.24
0.01
-0.06
-0.03

0.31
-0.35
0.05
0.01
0.07
0.06
0.21

0.30
-0.34
0.20
0.10
-0.17
-0.09
0.05

0.31
-0.26
0.08
0.10
-0.05
0.02
0.03

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

(9)

(10)

-0.36
0.56
0.22
0.61
0.24
-0.43
0.12
0.19
0.05
0.09
0.25

-0.42
0.54
0.50
0.43
-0.16
0.28
0.35
0.23
0.31
0.38

-0.15
0.47
0.07
-0.20
0.10
0.31
0.13
0.01
0.22

-0.40
0.37
-0.15
0.37
0.19
0.24
0.30
0.33

-0.52
-0.53
0.18
0.19
0.01
0.004
0.29

--0.57
0.07
0.05
0.12
0.17
0.13

-0.09
0.12
0.11
0.04
-0.04

-0.69
0.49
0.46
0.47

Table 13. Correlation matrix for variables within their associated domains (cont.).
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Risk factors
Individual-situational domain
Personal contact with violent extremists (1)
Seeker, consumer, developer of violent extremist
materials (2)
Individual domain
Need for identity, meaning, belonging (3)
Need for status (4)
Need for excitement, comradeship, or adventure (5)
Need for dominance (6)
Susceptibility to indoctrination (7)
Political/moral motivation (8)
Opportunistic involvement (9)
Transitional periods (10)
Mental health
Criminal history: Prior arrest
Criminal history: Prior prison
Criminal history: Prior violence

(1)

(2)

-0.30

--

0.36
0.41
0.05
0.33
0.41
0.32
-0.24
0.002
-0.21
0.10
0.23
0.07

0.56
0.42
0.49
0.39
0.76
0.36
-0.50
0.24
0.32
0.08
0.10
0.36

Table 14. Correlation matrix for variables within their associated domains (cont.).
Risk factors
Individual domain
Mental health (1)
Criminal history: Prior arrest (2)
Criminal history: Prior prison (3)
Criminal history: Prior violence (4)

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

-0.37
0.30
0.55

-1.00
0.73

-0.66

--

Significant Control Variables for Dependent Variables
To reiterate, I used multiple imputation to address the missing data for both the
demographic and offender characteristic variables (see Table 15 for the list) and ran logistic
regression models to determine significant variables as controls for each dependent variable and
subsequent related analyses.
DV 1: Violent Extremist Type. Based on the logistic regression model (not shown), the
following are the statistically significant variables contributing to the variance of the dependent
variable: (1) Age, (2) Race, and (3) Delinquent Non-Extremist Peers (*marginally significant).
Because the adulthood SES variable was considered a perfect predictor for violence (see ‘DV 2:
Violence/Non-Violence Extremist Risk’ paragraph below), the variable was dropped from this
imputation model to determine the significant control variables for the logistic regression analyses
for Hypothesis 1 and its associated sub-hypotheses.
DV 2: Violence/Non-Violence Extremist Risk. Table 13 below presents variables’ oddsratios. The following are the statistically significant variables contributing to the variance of the
dependent variable: (1) Age, (2) Race/Ethnicity, (3) Marital status, (4) Adulthood SES, and (5)
Delinquent Non-Extremist Peers (*marginally significant) to be included for the subsequent
logistic regression analyses for Hypothesis 2 and its associated sub-hypotheses.
Table 15. Multiple imputation estimates for logistic regression for DV 3 control variables.
*p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001
Demographic Variables

Age
Race/Ethnicity
Marital Status
Childhood SES
Adulthood SES
Education Level
Employment History
Offender Characteristics Variables
Delinquent Non-Extremist Peers
Family Contact

DV 3: Violence/non-violence extremist risk
Odds ratio
SE
95% CI Lower
95% CI Upper
0.94***
0.01
0.92
0.97
0.28***
0.09
0.15
0.52
0.47*
0.15
0.25
0.87
1.98
0.87
0.83
4.71
0.14**
0.08
0.05
0.44
0.74
0.23
0.40
1.38
0.75
0.24
0.39
1.42
1.97*
0.58
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0.71
0.18

0.97
0.31

3.99
1.08

Abuse History
Unfulfilled Aspirations
Romance Trouble
Platonic Trouble
F(13, 7897.6) = 6.54***

1.33
1.24
0.87
1.64

0.49
0.38
0.32
0.52

0.64
0.68
0.42
0.88

2.75
2.26
1.78
3.05

DV 3: Non-Violent Extremist Type. Running the same logistic regression model using
these demographic variables (not shown), the following are the statistically significant variables
contributing to the variance of the dependent variable (DV3: Non-violent financial/material
support criminal extremist type): (1) Age and (2) Race to be included for the subsequent logistic
regression analyses for Hypothesis 3 and its associated sub-hypotheses.
Multivariate Statistics: Firth’s Logistic Regression
Upon preliminary analyses, the issue of data “separation” was salient and especially so in
binary datasets, leading to inflated/infinite values. In other words, these variables predict the
outcome variables perfectly. I therefore relied upon Firth's Bias-Reduced Logistic Regression, a
penalized maximum likelihood estimation method applied to logistic regression to reduce bias in
generalized linear models. This technique imposes a bias term on the standard likelihood function,
sensitive to rare occurrences (like extremism) and ultimately reduces the estimates towards zero
(Devika, Jeyaseelan, & Sebastian, 2016; Firth, 1993; Gim & Ko, 2017). Of note, both medical and
social science researchers utilized and advocated for the use of penalized maximum likelihood
estimations rather than the typical maximum likelihood estimations for logistic regression (e.g.,
Cook, Niehaus, & Zuhike, 2018; Devika et al., 2016; Heinze & Schemper, 2002).
Logistic Regression Model 1 for Hypothesis 1(a). Controlling for age, race, and
delinquent non-extremist peers variables, the following are the statistically significant individualgroup variables contributing to the variance of the dependent variable (DV 1: Violent extremist
type): (1) Need to defend against threat, (2) Victim of injustice and grievances, (3) Feelings of
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hate, frustration, persecution, alienation, (4) Harmful end objectives: Expressed desire to die for
cause or martyrdom, and (5) Harmful means to an end: Glorification of violent action. Table 16
presents the coefficients for the individual-group variables for Model 1.
Table 16. Model 1 for individual-group variables on DV 1.
*p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001
Risk Factors

B

Individual-Group Domain
Need to defend against threat
Group influence and control: Claimed responsibility on
behalf of the group/leader
Group influence and control: Masterminding plots
Over-identification with a group or cause/ Hostility to
national collective identity
Attitudes justifying offending
Victim of injustice and grievances
Feelings of hate, frustration, persecution, alienation
Rejection of democratic society and values
Identification of target (person, place, group) in
response to perceived injustice
Harmful end objectives/Anger and expressed intent to
act violently
Harmful end objectives: Expressed desire to die for
cause or martyrdom
Harmful means to an end/Intent to plan/prepare for
violence
Extremist ideological training
Harmful means to an end: Glorification of violent
action

DV 1: Violent Extremist Type
Exp (B)
SE
95% CI
Lower

95% CI
Upper

-2.01
-0.01

0.13*
1.00

0.83
0.55

-3.64
-1.09

-0.38
1.06

0.73
1.10

2.07
3.00

0.54
0.66

-0.33
-0.19

1.79
2.39

-0.03
1.54
-1.84
-0.35
-0.13

0.97
4.66**
0.16**
0.70
0.88

0.50
0.59
0.66
0.55
0.73

-1.01
0.38
-3.13
-1.42
-1.57

0.96
2.70
-0.54
0.73
1.31

-0.42

0.66

0.69

-1.77

0.93

1.21

3.35*

0.52

0.18

2.24

0.87

2.39

0.62

-0.35

2.09

0.16
1.41

1.17
4.10*

0.64
0.55

-1.09
0.33

1.41
2.49

Based on risk factor comparisons, both jihadists and far-rightists are more likely to exhibit
individual-group risk factors. With the few exceptions below, most individual-group risk factors
(i.e., 9 of the 14) were not significant indicating more commonalities than differences within the
violent group. As such, the sub-hypothesis (H1a) is rejected. Violent jihadists are 4.66 times more
likely to exhibit strong feelings of being a victim of injustice/grievance but are 84% less likely to
exhibit feelings of hate, frustration, persecution, alienation compared to violent far-rightists. As
expected, violent jihadists are 3.35 times more likely to express their desire to engage in
martyrdom and 4.10 times more likely glorify violence than violent far-rightists. Of interest,
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violent jihadists are 87% less likely to exhibit a need to defend against a threat compared to violent
far-rightists.
Logistic Regression Model 2 for Hypothesis 1(b). Controlling for age, race, and
delinquent non-extremist peers variables, the following are the statistically significant individualsituational and individual variables contributing to the variance of the dependent variable (DV 1:
Violent extremist type): (1) Individual knowledge, skills, and competencies: Tactical, paramilitary,
explosive training (*marginally significant), (2) Personal contact with violent extremists, (3) Need
for identity, meaning, belonging, (4) Need for excitement, comradeship, or adventure, (5) Need
for dominance (*marginally significant). Table 17 presents the coefficients for both the individualsituational and individual variables in Model 2.
Table 17. Model 2 for individual-situational and individual variables on DV 1.
*p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001
Risk Factors

B

Individual-Situational Domain
Family or friends support extremist offending
Access to networks, funding, and equipment
Early exposure to pro-violence militant ideology
Individual knowledge, skills, and competencies:
Tactical, paramilitary, explosive training
Personal contact with violent extremists
Individual Domain
Need for identity, meaning, belonging
Need for status
Need for excitement, comradeship, or adventure
Need for dominance
Political/moral motivation
Opportunistic involvement
Transitional periods
Mental health
Criminal history: Prior prison
Criminal history: Prior violence

DV 1: Violent Extremist Type
Exp (B)
SE
95% CI
Lower

95% CI
Upper

-0.18
0.09
0.68
1.16

0.84
1.09
1.97
3.19*

0.18
0.20
0.54
0.58

-0.53
-0.48
-0.38
0.02

0.17
0.30
1.74
2.30

-2.33

0.10***

0.63

-3.57

-1.09

1.44
1.06
1.43
-0.98
0.70
-0.38
-0.44
-0.73
0.51
-0.09

4.22*
2.89
4.18*
0.38*
2.01
0.68
0.64
0.48
1.67
0.91

0.61
0.55
0.55
0.48
0.59
0.49
0.77
0.54
0.63
0.56

-0.24
-0.03
0.34
-1.94
-0.45
-1.34
-1.95
-1.80
-0.73
-1.19

2.64
2.14
2.52
-0.02
1.85
0.58
1.08
0.33
1.74
1.01

Based on risk factor comparisons, both violent jihadists and far-rightists are equally likely
to exhibit individual and individual-situational risk factors (H1b). Two thirds of the 15 risk factors
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were not significant indicating more commonalities than differences across both violent groups.
Though marginally significant, violent jihadists are 3.19 times more likely to have had prior
tactical paramilitary, explosive training than violent far-rightists. Violent jihadists are 90% less
likely to have direct, personal contact with other violent extremists and are 62% less likely to
exhibit a need for dominance compared to violent far-rightists. Violent jihadists are 4.18 times
more likely to exhibit a need for belonging and 4.22 times more likely to exhibit a need for
excitement as compared to violent far-rightists. Overall, the results support the hypothesis (i.e.,
H1) asserting there are more similarities and common patterns (i.e., themes) than differences in the
risk factors identified within the violent extremist group.
Logistic Regression Model for Hypothesis 2(a). Controlling for age, race, marital status,
adulthood SES, and delinquent non-extremist peers variables, the following are the statistically
significant individual-group, individual-situational, and individual variables contributing to the
variance of the dependent variable (DV 3: Violence/nonviolence extremist risk): (1) Group
influence and control: Masterminding plots, (2) Identification of target (person, place, group) in
response to perceived injustice, (3) Harmful means to an end/Intent to plan/prepare for violence,
(4) Access to networks, funding, and equipment, (5) Mental health, and (6) Criminal history: Prior
violence. Table 18 presents the coefficients for all variables in the three domains in Model 3.
Table 18. Model 3 for all variables in the three domains on DV 3.
*p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001
Risk Factors

B

Individual-Group Domain
Need to defend against threat
Group influence and control: Claimed responsibility
on behalf of the group/leader
Group influence and control: Masterminding plots
Over-identification with a group or cause/ Hostility to
national collective identity
Attitudes justifying offending
Victim of injustice and grievances
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DV 3: Violence/Nonviolence extremist risk
Exp(B)
SE
95% CI
95% CI
Lower
Upper

-0.66
0.47

0.52
1.60

0.48
0.39

-1.61
-0.29

0.29
1.22

-0.70
0.23

0.50*
1.26

0.35
0.39

-1.38
-0.55

-0.03
1.00

0.24
-0.37

1.27
0.69

0.37
0.36

-0.47
-1.08

0.96
0.34

Feelings of hate, frustration, persecution, alienation
Rejection of democratic society and values
Identification of target (person, place, group) in
response to perceived injustice
Harmful end objectives/Anger and expressed intent to
act violently
Harmful end objectives: Expressed desire to die for
cause or martyrdom
Harmful means to an end/Intent to plan/prepare for
violence
Extremist ideological training
Harmful means to an end: Glorification of violent
action
Individual-Situational Domain
Family or friends support extremist offending
Access to networks, funding, and equipment
Early exposure to pro-violence militant ideology
Individual knowledge, skills, and competencies:
Tactical, paramilitary, explosive training
Personal contact with violent extremists
Individual Domain
Need for identity, meaning, belonging
Need for status
Need for excitement, comradeship, or adventure
Need for dominance
Political/moral motivation
Opportunistic involvement
Transitional periods
Mental health
Criminal history: Prior prison
Criminal history: Prior violence

0.39
-0.51
1.60

1.48
0.60
4.95***

0.35
0.35
0.38

-0.29
-1.19
0.85

1.08
0.18
2.35

-0.05

0.95

0.38

-0.81

0.70

0.28

1.32

0.39

-0.48

1.04

-0.74

0.48*

0.36

-1.45

-0.03

0.54
0.04

1.72
1.04

0.37
0.37

-0.18
-0.69

1.27
0.77

0.08
0.43
-0.22
0.20

1.08
1.54**
0.80
1.22

0.11
0.12
0.36
0.33

-0.13
0.19
-0.93
-0.44

0.30
0.68
0.48
0.84

0.24

1.27

0.34

-0.43

0.91

-0.47
-0.43
-0.08
-0.47
-0.09
-0.22
-0.18
1.07
0.06
1.00

0.63
0.65
0.92
0.63
0.91
0.80
0.84
2.92**
1.06
2.72**

0.37
0.34
0.37
0.34
0.40
0.33
0.39
0.37
0.39
0.36

-1.19
-1.11
-0.81
-1.14
-0.87
-0.86
-0.95
0.34
-0.70
0.31

0.25
0.24
0.66
0.20
0.69
0.42
0.59
1.80
0.82
1.71

Based on the risk factor comparisons, both jihadists and far-rightists across groups are
equally likely to exhibit individual-group, individual-situational, and individual risk factors. A
clear majority of the risk factors (i.e., 23 of the 29) were not significant indicating more
commonalities than differences across the violent and non-violent groups.
Violent extremists are 50% less likely to engage in plots masterminded by other extremists
and/or leaders than non-violent extremists. Violent extremists are 4.95 times more likely to focus
their ideological preparatory activities on a symbolic target compared to non-violent extremists.
Interestingly, violent extremists were 52% less likely to indicate/specify their intent to engage in
plans for violence/harm compared to non-violent extremists. Violent extremists are 1.54 times
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more likely to have access to networks, funding, and equipment than non-violent extremists.
Violent extremists are 2.92 times more likely to have mental health issues and are 2.72 times more
likely to have a prior criminal history of violence than non-violent extremists. Overall, the results
reject the hypothesis (i.e., H2) asserting there are more differences than similarities and common
patterns (i.e., themes) in the risk factors identified across both the violent and non-violent extremist
groups.
Logistic Regression Model for Hypothesis 3(a). Controlling for age and race, none of the
variables were significant (DV 2: Non-violent extremist type). Table 19 presents the coefficients
for the individual-group variables in Model 4.
Table 19. Model 4 for individual-group variables on DV 2.
*p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001
Individual-Group Risk Factors

B

Need to defend against threat
Group influence and control: Claimed responsibility on
behalf of the group/leader
Group influence and control: Masterminding plots
Over-identification with a group or cause/ Hostility to
national collective identity
Attitudes justifying offending
Victim of injustice and grievances
Feelings of hate, frustration, persecution, alienation
Rejection of democratic society and values
Identification of target (person, place, group) in
response to perceived injustice
Harmful end objectives/Anger and expressed intent to
act violently
Harmful end objectives: Expressed desire to die for
cause or martyrdom
Harmful means to an end/Intent to plan/prepare for
violence
Extremist ideological training
Harmful means to an end: Glorification of violent
action

-0.47
2.24

DV 2: Non-violent extremist type
Exp(B)
SE
95% CI
95% CI
Lower
Upper
0.63
1.17
-2.76
1.83
9.39
1.44
-0.60
5.07

1.35
0.08

3.86
1.08

0.91
1.18

-0.44
-2.23

3.14
2.40

-1.61
-0.16
0.69
-0.67
-0.98

0.20
0.85
1.99
0.51
0.38

1.04
1.22
1.03
1.03
1.15

-3.66
-2.55
-1.33
-2.68
-3.23

0.43
2.23
2.72
1.35
1.28

2.36

10.59

1.36

-0.30

5.02

0.62

1.86

1.83

-2.98

4.22

0.72

2.05

0.99

-1.21

2.66

2.07
0.86

7.92
2.36

1.08
1.12

-0.04
-1.34

4.18
3.07

Based on risk factor comparisons, all 14 risk factors were not significant indicating
commonalities rather than differences within the non-violent group. In other words, both jihadists
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and far-rightists within the non-violent group are equally likely to exhibit individual-group risk
factors.
Logistic Regression Model for Hypothesis 3(b). Controlling for age and race, the
following are the statistically significant individual-situational and individual variables
contributing to the variance of the dependent variable (DV 2: Non-violent extremist type): (1)
Early exposure to pro-violence militant ideology, (2) Need for identity, meaning, belonging, and
(3) Opportunistic involvement. Table 20 presents the odds-ratio values for the individualsituational and individual variables in Model 5.
Table 20. Model 5 for individual-situational and individual variables on DV 2. 1
*p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001
Risk Factors

B

Individual-Situational Domain
Family or friends support extremist offending
Access to networks, funding, and equipment
Early exposure to pro-violence militant ideology
Individual knowledge, skills, and competencies:
Tactical, paramilitary, explosive training
Personal contact with violent extremists
Individual Domain
Need for identity, meaning, belonging
Need for status
Need for excitement, comradeship, or adventure
Need for dominance
Political/moral motivation
Opportunistic involvement
Transitional periods
Mental health
Criminal history: Prior prison
Criminal history: Prior violence

DV 2: Non-violent extremist type
Exp(B)
SE
95% CI
95% CI
Lower
Upper

-0.75
0.61
4.08
1.81

0.47
1.84
59.1*
6.11

0.45
0.50
1.83
1.41

-1.63
-0.37
0.49
-0.95

0.13
1.59
7.67
4.56

1.38

3.97

1.23

-1.04

3.79

5.11
1.24
-2.36
-0.60
-2.30
-3.42
-1.53
-0.29
-1.68
2.49

165.67*
3.46
0.09
0.55
0.10
0.03*
0.22
0.75
0.19
12.06

2.13
1.34
1.77
1.21
1.59
1.56
1.38
1.89
1.82
2.20

0.93
-1.38
-5.84
-2.97
-5.41
-6.48
-4.23
-3.98
-5.24
-1.82

9.29
3.86
1.11
1.77
0.81
-0.36
1.17
3.41
1.88
6.80

It should be noted the table presents several elevated values of significance indicating such measures perfectly predict
one group over the other. Subsequent checks suggest this is due to the stark disparity of the presence/absence of
specific risk factors and small cell count. Of interest are the two significant risk factors and their respective
proportions. First, the ‘early exposure to pro-violence militant ideology’ shows only 1 (of 105) non-violent far-right
case presenting this risk factor versus 67 (of 105) non-violent jihadist cases. Second, the ‘need for identity, meaning,
belonging’ shows only 10 (of 105) non-violent far-right case presenting this risk factor versus 73 (of 105) non-violent
jihadist cases.
1
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Based on risk factor comparisons, both non-violent jihadists and far-rightists are equally
likely to exhibit individual and individual-situational risk factors (i.e., H3b). With the few
exceptions below, majority of the risk factors (i.e., 12 of the 15) were not significant indicating
more commonalities than differences within the non-violent groups. Non-violent jihadists are 59.1
times more likely to have prior exposure to violent extremism compared to non-violent farrightists. Non-violent jihadists are 165.67 times more likely to exhibit a need for belonging than
non-violent far-rightists. Not surprisingly, non-violent jihadists were 97% less likely to engage in
their criminal extremism for opportunistic motives compared to non-violent far-rightists.
Table 21 summarizes the major hypotheses and corresponding sub-hypotheses and whether
our quantitative analyses supported them.
Table 21. Summary of the three hypotheses and corresponding five sub-hypotheses.
Hypotheses and sub-hypotheses
H1: There are more similarities and common patterns (i.e., themes) than differences, in the risk factors
identified within the violent extremist group.
H1a: Violent jihadists are more likely to exhibit individual-group risk factors compared to
violent far-right extremists.
H1b: Both jihadists and far-rightists are more likely to exhibit individual and individualsituational risk factors.
H2: There are differences than similarities and common patterns (i.e., themes), in the risk factors
identified for both violent extremists and non-violent criminal extremists.
H2a: Violent extremists are more likely to exhibit individual, individual-situational, and
individual-group risk factors than non-violent financial/material support crime extremists.
H3: There are similarities and common patterns (i.e., themes) than differences, in the risk factors
identified within the non-violent extremist group.
H3a: Jihadist non-violent financial/material support crime extremists are more likely to
exhibit individual-group risk factors than far-right non-violent financial/material support
crime extremists.
H3b: Both jihadists and far-right non-violent financial/material support crime extremists are
more likely to exhibit both individual and individual-situational risk factors.

Evidence
Supported
Rejected
Supported
Rejected
Rejected
Supported
Rejected
Supported

Exploratory Factor Analysis
To reiterate, EFA is used to examine associations between variables (i.e., risk factors)
without specifying an a priori theoretical framework and will answer the study’s second research
question investigating underlying associations between risk factors and theoretical domains. Using
the tetrachoric correlation matrix (after excluding aforementioned variables) and adjusting it to be
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positive semidefinite (to address two negative eigenvalues), I ran an EFA using the principal factor
estimation followed by an orthogonal varimax rotation which provided the best-defined factor
structure. The recommended parallel analysis and visual scree plot (VSP) determined the number
of factors retained (Howard, 2016). Instead of the original three factors proposed (i.e., theoretical
domains), four factors were found suitable. Upon model comparison, I retained the three-factor
solution model because it not only identified a simpler factor structure but also had lesser crossfactor loadings compared to the four-factor solution model.
Prior to running the EFA, I examined the factorability of the variables to determine
suitability using three recognized criteria. First, the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) measure of
sampling adequacy was 0.83 above the recommended value of 0.80 (Kaiser, 1974). Second, the
Bartlett’s test of sphericity was significant (χ2 (406) = 3015.563, p < 0.001). Third, the determinant
of the correlation matrix is 0.001 (above the 0.00001 cut-off value; Field, 2013). Preliminary EFAs
were run to identify adequate factor loadings (values ≥ 0.40), low cross-loading values if any (ratio
of loadings < 75%, values < 0.30), and/or show high communalities (values ≥ 0.20) to eliminate
variables failing to meet these minimum criteria (Costello & Osborne, 2005; Child, 2006; Howard,
2016; Field, 2013; Samuels, 2017) to ensure the variables contributed to a simple factor structure.
As such, the following variables were excluded: (1) Group influence and control: Claimed
responsibility on behalf of the group/leader (communality ≤ 0.20 in the model despite having a
factor loading ≥ 0.40) and (2) Individual knowledge, skills, and competencies: Tactical,
paramilitary, explosive training (communality ≤ 0.20 and having a factor loading ≤ 0.40). Such
inconsistent values indicate the variables were not well explained by their associated factors. Once
excluded from the model, the issue of cross-loadings was addressed. Table 18 presents the risk
factors and associated factor loadings specifying a three-factor solution.
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The individual-group domain covered 16 risk factors explaining 32% of the variance with
factor loadings ranging from 0.44 to 0.82. Only the ‘opportunistic involvement’ risk factor loaded
negatively on the individual-group theoretical domain. The individual-situational domain
comprised of 6 risk factors explaining nearly 13% of the variance with factor loadings ranging
from 0.42 to 0.66. The individual domain covered 5 risk factors explaining approximately 9% of
the variance with factor loadings ranging from 0.43 to 0.84. Of interest, 6 risk factors did not fall
under their expected domains (highlighted in bold in Table 22), a majority of which were
motivations/vulnerabilities (i.e., 5 risk factors) falling under both the individual-group and
individual-situational domains while the ‘group influence and control: Masterminding plots’ risk
factor ironically fell under the individual-situational domain.
Time Variables: Static vs. Dynamic Risk Factors
On a separate note, the study acknowledges both dynamic and static risk factors and
included several time variables to account for this issue (see Appendix 2: Dissertation Project
Codebook for more details). Because of open-source data limitations and lack of access to these
perpetrators to establish timelines, it is difficult to ascertain the exact duration for each specific
risk factor. As such, the study captures the approximate duration of the presence of the risk factor
prior to crime commission. I compared these time variables between the extremists themselves
(i.e., followers vs. masterminds and/or self-starters) as well as across and within the multiple
groups. Because this section is supplementary and not part of the study’s main objectives, the
analyses is placed in Appendix 3.
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Table 22. Risk factors and associated factor loadings specifying a three-factor solution using a Varimax rotation.
χ2(351) = 3.6 x 104, p < 0.001***
Risk factors
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Need to defend against threat
Over-identification with a group or cause/ Hostility to national collective identity
Attitudes justifying offending
Identification of target (person, place, group) in response to perceived injustice
Harmful end objectives/Anger and expressed intent to act violently
Harmful end objectives: Expressed desire to die for cause or martyrdom
Harmful means to an end/Intent to plan/prepare for violence
Harmful means to an end: Glorification of violent action
Extremist ideological training
Victim of injustice and grievances
Feelings of hate, frustration, persecution, alienation
Rejection of democratic society and values
Need for status
Need for dominance
Political/moral motivation
Opportunistic involvement
Personal contact with violent extremists
Family or friends support extremist offending
Access to networks, funding, and equipment
Early exposure to pro-violence militant ideology
Group influence and control: Masterminding plots
Need for identity, meaning, belonging
Transitional periods
Need for excitement, comradeship, or adventure
Mental health
Criminal history: Prior prison
Criminal history: Prior violence

Individualgroup
0.73
0.81
0.45
0.66
0.62
0.53
0.51
0.73
0.66
0.67
0.64
0.44
0.63
0.61
0.82
-0.52
------------

Individualsituational
----------------0.59
0.42
0.62
0.61
0.65
0.66
------

Individual

Communalities

----------------------0.68
0.43
0.84
0.52
0.71

0.64
0.67
0.64
0.49
0.67
0.35
0.44
0.63
0.66
0.50
0.61
0.67
0.53
0.47
0.69
0.47
0.51
0.30
0.49
0.40
0.58
0.62
0.49
0.34
0.72
0.29
0.54

CHAPTER FIVE
Qualitative Results
Qualitative Study
This second part of the study involves the case study methodology and provides a detailed
narrative of each perpetrator’s background and evidence of each risk factor (see Appendices 5 –
10) and attempts to provide comparative analyses of risk factors across all six individuals. It should
be noted that all original risk factors are retained (including those excluded) for the purpose of the
qualitative analyses.
In summary, I used purposeful sampling to select six individuals based on my constructed
‘%DATAFILL’ variable, involving 3 violent and 3 non-violent individuals (two far-rightists and
1 jihadist in each group). Essentially, the variable captures the amount of open-source information
available quantified in terms of the percentage of coded values. This study puts more emphasis on
far-right extremism because of the current security threat landscape like the 2022 Buffalo shooting
in New York (Ahmed & Lynch, 2021; Ashby, 2021; Townsend, 2022). Table 23 provides details
of the selected cases.
Table 23. Case study perpetrators.
Perpetrators

Violent/Non-violent

Omar Mir Seddique Mateen
Leo Vincelette Felton
Edward Lewis Brown
Donald Ray Morgan
Gerald Joe Henson
Raymond Leo Jarlik-Bell

Violent
Violent
Violent
Non-violent
Non-violent
Non-violent

Ideology
Jihadist
Far-right
Far-right
Jihadist
Far-right
Far-right

Evidence of lone wolf or group member
at time of current arrest
Alone
Informal group
Formal group
Alone
Formal group
Informal group

Case Study and Data Description
The case studies were written after reviewing open sources compiled for each perpetrators
and updating ECDB case files with more court-related information (e.g., court transcripts) using
both

the

judyrecords

(https://www.judyrecords.com/)
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and

the

RECAP

Archive

(https://www.courtlistener.com/recap/) databases. These databases are exceptionally effective in
obtaining relevant information to code for and find examples demonstrating these risk factors. I
created a case study template that included three sections: (1) narrative summary of the event, (2)
three domain risk factors, and (3) sequential background/profile with details/evidence for each risk
factors within the corresponding domain (see Appendix 4). The crafted case studies present the
life-course of the selected perpetrators including fitting the risk factors within the context of their
backgrounds, leading up to the perpetration of their crimes. To examine variations in risk factors
relevant at the individual level, compilation of case studies allowed for emphasizing common
themes emerging across the two groups. Table 24 below presents the risk factor comparisons
across all six individuals.
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Table 24. Comparison of risk factors across the six individuals.
Perpetrators/ Risk factors
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Individual risk factors
Need for identity, meaning, belonging
Need for status
Need for excitement, comradeship, or adventure
Need for dominance
Susceptibility to indoctrination
Political/moral motivation
Opportunistic involvement
Transitional periods
Mental health
Criminal history
Individual-situational risk factors
Family or friends support extremist offending
Access to networks, funding, and equipment
Early exposure to pro-violence militant ideology
Individual knowledge, skills, and competencies:
Tactical, paramilitary, explosive training
Personal contact with violent extremists
Seeker, consumer, developer of violent extremist
materials
Individual-group risk factors
Need to defend against threat
Group influence and control
Over-identification with a group or cause/ Hostility
to national collective identity
Attitudes justifying offending
Victim of injustice and grievances
Feelings of hate, frustration, persecution, alienation
Rejection of democratic society and values
Dehumanization of the enemy
Us and them thinking
Identification of target (person, place, group) in
response to perceived injustice

Omar Mir
Seddique Mateen

Leo Vincelette
Felton

Edward
Lewis Brown

Donald Ray
Morgan

Gerald Joe
Henson

Raymond Leo
Jarlik-Bell

Present
Present
Present
Present
Present
Present
Present
Present
Present
Present

Present
Present
Present
Present
Present
Present
Absent
Present
Present
Present

Present
Present
Absent
Present
Present
Present
Present
Present
Present
Present

Present
Present
Present
Present
Present
Present
Absent
Present
Absent
Present

Absent
Present
Absent
Present
Present
Present
Present
Present
Absent
Present

Absent
Present
Absent
Present
Absent
Present
Present
Present
Absent
Present

Present
Present
Absent

Present
Present
Present

Present
Present
Absent

Absent
Present
Absent

Present
Present
Absent

Present
Present
Absent

Present

Absent

Absent

Present

Present

Absent

Absent
Present

Present
Present

Present
Present

Absent
Present

Present
Present

Present
Present

Present
Present
Present

Present
Absent
Present

Present
Absent
Present

Present
Present
Present

Present
Absent
Present

Present
Absent
Present

Present
Present
Present
Absent
Present
Present
Absent

Present
Present
Present
Present
Present
Present
Present

Present
Present
Present
Present
Present
Present
Present

Present
Present
Present
Present
Present
Present
Absent

Present
Present
Present
Present
Present
Present
Present

Present
Present
Present
Present
Present
Present
Present

Harmful end objectives / Anger and expressed
intent to act violently
Harmful end objectives: Expressed desire to die for
cause or martyrdom
Harmful means to an end / Intent to plan, prepare
for violence
Extremist ideological training
Harmful means to an end: Glorification of violent
action
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Present

Present

Present

Absent

Present

Present

Present

Absent

Present

Present

Absent

Absent

Present

Present

Present

Present

Present

Present

Present
Present

Present
Present

Present
Present

Present
Present

Present
Absent

Present
Absent

Quotes and Behavioral Evidence of Risk Factors. Throughout the case study narratives,
the offenders’ quotes and behaviors illustrate evidence of risk factor presence. This section
presents a summary of quotes and behavioral evidence to illustrate risk factors presence in these
six cases.
Need for Identity, Meaning, Belonging. Offenders engage in extremist-related activities
to obtain social approval/acceptance from his/her peers/like-minded individuals and/or in-group
(e.g., wanting to travel to join the group and be “amongst brothers”, or conducting attacks for
group initiation). Not surprisingly, all three violent extremists and the non-violent jihadist
demonstrated this risk factor. Similarly, the quantitative analyses comparing jihadists and far-right
extremists within the violent group (see ‘Logistic Regression Model 2 for Hypothesis 1(b)’ section,
pp.68-69) and within the non-violent group (see ‘Logistic Regression Model for Hypothesis 3(b)’
section, pp.72-73) found jihadists were more likely to exhibit this factor than the far-right
extremists. After getting into frequent arguments with the Catholic priest and eventually rejecting
the religion, Donald Morgan found himself looking to belong somewhere and questioned his faith
and his life’s purpose (Morgan, 2016). In another example, Leo Felton (who was biracial) felt
disconnected and racially marginalized growing up and was always looking for a “flock” to belong
to throughout his adolescence (Tough, 2003, para. 15). While in prison, Felton radicalized and
became heavily involved and influential in white supremacist circles; finally, he felt accepted and
had an overwhelmingly addictive effect on him – in Felton’s own words, “[i]t's a different kind of
belonging. It's like shooting half a gram of pure belonging into the biggest vein in your arm”
(Tough, 2003, para. 31).
Need for Status. Perpetrators demonstrate the desire for status and/or need to feel
special/valued. All six extremists exhibited this risk factor. Similarly, the quantitative analyses did
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not find this risk factor significant across both violent and non-violent extremists, indicating
similarities than differences. In the case of Donald Morgan, he proclaimed himself a ‘mujahid,’ or
holy warrior (“American Extremist Reveals His Quest to Join ISIS,” 2014) indicating his desire to
feel important. Additionally, his words indicated not only his aspirations but also his need for
status, “My entire life growing up was surrounded by the idea that I would be 82nd Airborne, I
would be Special Forces, I would serve dutifully – duty, honor and country…I thought that I would
make this [law enforcement] my substitution for what I thought was going to be, in the beginning,
a military career, an achievement, leadership” (“American Extremist Reveals His Quest to Join
ISIS,” 2014, para. 14). Similarly, Edward Brown was assessed by a forensic psychologist to have
narcissistic personality traits specifically that of superiority, grandiosity, and the need for attention
(Marchocki, 2010), which demonstrated his need for status.
Need for Excitement, Comradeship, or Adventure. Offenders demonstrated risktaking/sensation-seeking behaviors and/or exhibit their need for excitement/adventure afforded by
engaging in violent extremist-related activities. Two of the three violent extremists and the nonviolent jihadist presented this risk factor. Omar Mateen had a history of thrill and/or attentionseeking behaviors. After the 9/11 attacks, Mateen cheered the violent extremists, made fun of
America being attacked, and claimed that Osama bin Laden was his uncle and had trained him to
shoot an AK-47 to garner attention (Gurney, Brown, Dixon, & Nehamas, 2016). Additionally,
Mateen examined social media during his violent rampage to check the media coverage (Gurney
et al., 2016), indicating sensation-seeking behavior.
Need for Dominance. In this case, all six offenders show signs of a hierarchical mindset
and/or favored dominating over others (e.g., gender and race inequality/hierarchy). Similarly, the
quantitative analyses did not find this risk factor significant across both violent and non-violent
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extremists, indicating similarities than differences. Like his father, Seddique, Omar Mateen
demonstrated contempt towards women and believed men were superior to women, evident from
his co-workers complaining about his misogynistic views when he worked as a security guard
(Gurney et al., 2016). One co-worker Daniel Gilroy stated Mateen “…Something would set him
off, but the things that would set him off were always women…He did not like women at all. He
did like women in a sexual way, but he did not respect them” (Williams, Connor, Ortiz, & Gosk,
2016, para. 7-10). Edward Brown also held traditional views on gender and exerted his dominance
and influence over his wife and is also evident from his wife’s upbringing to obey her husband
(Hayward, 2020; Sanger-Katz, 2009a). In the case of Gerald Henson, he held racist views (e.g.,
whites were the true ‘chosen’ people and America is the ‘promised land’), aligned with his
teacher/guide Darrell L. Frech, a prominent figure in the anti-government movement and a
Christian Identity follower (“ADL Releases Report on Militia Activity,” 1997; Potok, 1996).
Susceptibility to Indoctrination. Five of the six extremists case studies included this risk
factor. The concept involves indoctrination and control by authoritative extremist figures/group
(e.g., both perpetrator and extremist figure/group share similar conservative values and/or
advocated violence to achieve these goals). For example, Omar Mateen’s friend, Mohammad
Malik reported Mateen listened to Anwar al-Awlaki (a now deceased al-Qaeda cleric) and
described his recordings as “powerful,” making it clear the cleric had sway over him (Gutierrez &
Ortiz, 2016, para. 4). In another example, Gerald Henson’s anti-government and -tax beliefs were
influenced by several national leaders in the Christian Patriot movement including Frech (see
above for related example in ‘Need for dominance’ section, Burghart & Crawford, 1996;
Klanwatch Project, 1996).
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Political/Moral Motivation. Not surprisingly, all six extremists engaged in criminal
extremist activities due to either political and/or moral motivations. The offenders believe their
actions are required to defend moral beliefs and/or demonstrate such beliefs to be morally superior.
For example, Elaine Brown (on behalf of Edward Brown) wrote letters to a local publication
justifying their criminal actions to further their “cause of justice” (“Imprisoned New Hampshire
tax evader apologizes,” 2014, para. 4) and “[had] done [their] job as…directed by Yahweh…that
[they] have done what is right…[and] pass the baton on to others to continue the fight.” (SangerKatz, 2007e, para. 33).
Opportunistic Involvement. Two violent extremists and two non-violent extremists
engaged in criminal extremist activities partly due to opportunistic motivation (e.g., revenge,
financial). Though it should be noted, all four extremists presented with the political/moral
motivation risk factor as well. Harris, a San Antonio prosecutor in Gerald Henson’s case observed
that white-collar criminals justify their actions using anti-government rhetoric and stated their
motivation was “80 percent greed, 20 percent political protest” (Harmon, 1996, para. 9). Similarly,
assistant U.S attorney Matthew Diggs drew the same conclusion about Raymond Jarlik-Bell –
“First, greed played a central role – [He] wanted something for nothing. Second, [his] motivation
was ideological” (Molin, 2013, para. 12). It should be noted the quantitative analyses found this
risk factor insignificant within the violent extremist group, indicating both sub-groups were
equally likely to exhibit this risk factor while being significant within the non-violent group,
demonstrating jihadists were more likely to exhibit this risk factor than the far-right extremists.
Transitional Periods. In this case, both violent and non-violent extremists have
experienced negative transitional periods including aspects in their lives that increases criminality
including relationship problems (e.g., divorce, breakups), familial/spousal death, poverty, unstable
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household, alcoholic/substance abuse, unemployment, homelessness, and dropping out from
school. Similarly, the quantitative analyses did not find this risk factor significant across both
violent and non-violent extremists, indicating similarities than differences. For example, Omar
Mateen was repeatedly suspended/kicked out of multiple schools either for behavioral problems,
poor academic performance, or both. Mateen had a history of drug abuse (i.e., steroids and
marijuana) and was expelled from the police academy in April 2007 because of poor performance
(e.g., made comments about bringing a gun to school, sleeping in class and being absent without
permission). Additionally, Mateen’s family life was strained especially between his parents (e.g.,
mother was arrested for domestic battery in 2002 over a marital dispute and his father threatened
to kill her) and was a possible hate crime victim when his residence was egged in 2002. Of interest,
two of the three non-violent extremists (and one violent far-right extremist, Edward Brown) had
prior histories of financial and/or legal difficulties and/or exposure to the court system (e.g., child
support payments, foreclosures, liens, and bankruptcy) which may be a unique risk factor for the
non-violent far-right movement as evidenced from the descriptive analyses previously (Figure 7)
though more quantitative analyses needs to confirm this preliminary finding.
Mental Health. Although the non-violent extremists did not demonstrate any signs of
mental illness, all three violent extremists exhibited signs of mental health issues. This finding is
aligned with the prior quantitative finding (see ‘Logistic Regression Model for Hypothesis 2(a)’
section, pp.69-71). For example, Omar Mateen had exhibited anti-social/conduct disorder
symptoms throughout his formative years (e.g., talking about violence and sex, getting into
verbal/physical altercations). It is possible Mateen had unspecified mental problems that went
undiagnosed (“A glimpse of Omar Mateen's past,” 2016; Huriash & Miller, 2016). Another
example, Leo Felton had a prior history of psychiatric institutionalization at the Psychiatric
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Institute of Washington since he was 10 and continued to stay in various residential homes and
hospitals until he was 14 and was enrolled in the Mark Twain School for the emotionally disturbed
before dropping out at 17 (Moser, 2002; Tough, 2003). Like Mateen, Felton had a history of antisocial/conduct behaviors – he lobbed Molotov cocktails at neighbors’ garages, tried to cut the
electrical wires of a house across the street, attempted to stab a classmate in the eye (Moser, 2002).
Criminal History. All six extremists had prior criminal histories. Additionally, all
extremists had engaged in varying forms of criminal violence except Gerald Henson. Additionally,
the quantitative study found violent extremists were more likely to have a prior criminal history of
violence than non-violent extremists. For example, Omar Mateen had a juvenile criminal record –
he was expelled for a fight with a classmate and was charged with battery and disturbing school
functions though the charges were later dropped (Huriash & Miller, 2016; Sullivan & Wan, 2016).
Additionally, Mateen had a history of domestic abuse (i.e., criminal violence) according to his exwife, Sitora Yusufiy (Blinder, Healy, & Oppel, 2016; Brown, Perez, & Levine, 2017). In another
case, Donald Morgan had a prior criminal history included four arrests with two charges for
disorderly conduct and both of which involved violence (Whisenant, 2015). For Raymond JarlikBell, he had a prior history of non-violent extremist financial crimes (i.e., promoted two tax fraud
schemes and was barred from doing so in May 2005).
Family or Friends Support Extremist Offending. Almost all the extremists except Donald
Morgan) in the sample had family and/or friends who engaged in or supported extremism.
Similarly, the quantitative analyses did not find this risk factor significant across both violent and
non-violent extremists and within these groups, indicating similarities than differences. For
example, almost all of Edward Brown’s close friends were like-minded individuals involved in
extremism – “Joe” whom he described as his one of his best friends was a former member of the
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U.S. Constitution Rangers, a defunct national anti-government militia group he led (Sanger-Katz,
2010). In another case, Raymond Bell’s wife, Ute Christine Jarlik-Bell was an anti-government
sympathizer and demonstrated beliefs aligned with the sovereign citizen movement (Pulkkinen,
2011a). Another example, Omar Mateen’s father, Seddique hosted an amateur interview show
“Durand Jirga Show” on his YouTube channel, known for its anti-U.S, anti-Pakistan, and proTaliban remarks and was even accused of sending money to Afghanistan and Turkey to fund
violence against the Pakistani government (Golding, 2016; Landay & Torbati, 2016; Prusher &
Alter, 2016).
Access to Networks, Funding, and Equipment. As expected, all six perpetrators presented
with this risk factor with varying combinations of weapons, equipment, accomplices, and/or
funding. Though the quantitative study found violent extremist were more likely to demonstrate
this risk factor compared to non-violent extremists, the qualitative study specified the risk factor
aspects. For example, Leo Felton used his girlfriend, Lisa Meetre to obtain a .38-caliber revolver
(under the guise of obtaining one for her own protection) for himself (i.e., weapon access).
Additionally, he purchased software and printing supplies to produce counterfeit bills on his home
computer (i.e., access to equipment and attempt to get illicit funds). The couple collected materials
for a fertilizer bomb, including a coffee-maker to use as a timing device and a 50-pound bag of
ammonium nitrate fertilizer and ordered explosive devices to be delivered to the apartment (i.e.,
access to equipment). In another similar case, Edward Brown was provided access to equipment
(e.g., flak jackets, air packs, and night vision goggles) and bomb-making supplies via his online
network of accomplices (Sanger-Katz, 2007c; 2007d).
Early Exposure to Pro-Violence Militant Ideology. With the exception of Leo Felton, all
the extremists in the sample did not present with the risk factor. During his adolescence, Felton
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joined a local skinhead group and was exposed to the white supremacy movement (White, 2008).
From this exposure, it is likely Felton identified with the skinhead ideology from his group
membership and developed racial hatred towards minorities. In fact, a quantitative analysis
comparing this risk factor across both violent and non-violent extremists found no significant result
indicating similarities than differences. Though, the quantitative analysis comparing this risk factor
within the non-violent extremist group found jihadists were more likely to present with this risk
factor compared to the far-right extremists (see ‘Logistic Regression Model for Hypothesis 3(b)’
section, pp.72-73).
Individual Knowledge, Skills, and Competencies: Tactical, Paramilitary, Explosive
Training. One violent extremist and two non-violent extremists presented with the risk factor. For
example, Donald Morgan’s prior employment as a sheriff’s deputy, correction officer and as a
reserve East Spencer police officer; the nature of such employment indicates a degree of tactical
training (D’Amato & Clearance, 2014; Deery, 2014; Whisenant, 2015). Similarly, Gerald
Henson’s prior enlistment in the Air Force demonstrated formal military training (“Henson, G.J.
obituary,” 2010). In the case of Omar Mateen, his prior employment and weapons training as a
security guard employed by G4S (“Orlando shooting: Who was Omar Seddique Mateen?” 2013;
Barry, Kovaleski, Blinder, & Marshal, 2016). With the varying presence of this risk factor across
and within the groups, this finding is comparable to the quantitative analyses that found this risk
factor across both violent and non-violent groups insignificant, indicating similarities and only
being marginally significant within the violent extremist group.
Personal Contact with Violent Extremists. With the exception of both the violent and nonviolent jihadists, both the violent and non-violent far-right extremists demonstrated this risk factor.
Similarly, the quantitative analyses found violent jihadists were less likely to have personal/direct
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contact with other violent extremists compared to the violent far-rightists. For example, Leo
Felton’s multiple prison stints, group membership and influence gave him direct access to violent
extremists in the white supremacist movement – Wesley “Wolf” Dellinger, leader of the East Coast
Aryan Brotherhood (who was in-charge of deciding which minority inmate should be targeted for
murder) and Michael Reid, his prison cellmate was a member of the Aryan Brotherhood
(Cambanis, 2002; Moser, 2002). In Gerald Henson’s trial, it was revealed he had associations with
members from violent anti-government militia groups like the Montana Freemen of Justus
Township (“The poison spreads,” 2015; United States of America v. Gerald Joe Henson, 1997).
Raymond Jarlik-Bell’s membership and leadership to the sovereign citizen movement provided
personal contact with violent extremists like Francis Schaeffer Cox (Pulkkinen, 2011b).
Seeker, Consumer, Developer of Violent Extremist Materials. All six extremists engaged
in violent extremist materials (offline and/or online), were involved in communication, or involved
in extremist material dissemination/development. Similarly, the quantitative analyses did not find
this risk factor significant across both violent and non-violent extremists, indicating similarities
than differences. Omar Mateen consumed violent jihadist videos (e.g., beheading) and listened to
Anwar al-Awlaki according to people close to him (Allen, 2018; Chen, 2018; Gutierrez & Ortiz,
2016; Smith, 2016). Similarly, Leo Felton was a seeker and consumer of neo-Nazi and/or Aryan
nations materials (Moser, 2002). Raymond Jarlik-Bell propagated violent extremist content by
hosting a website with militia and sovereign citizen content including Cox’s violent antigovernment speech to foment a violent revolution (Pulkkinen, 2011b). In a similar case, Gerald
Henson who owned a commercial printing company was capable to and involved in the
distribution of violent (and non-violent) extremist materials like the Posse Comitatus handbook, a
far-right violent extremist group involved in an armed conflict with federal marshals in the 1980s,
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and the “OPLAN [Operation Plan] American Viper,” a document describing a strategy for militia
groups waging a guerilla war against the federal government (“Arizona ‘Viper Militia’ Members
Charged,” 1996; “Buchanan aide tied to anti-Semites,” 1996).

Need to Defend Against Threat. All six extremists sympathized/identified with the
extremist cause and felt the need to ‘do something’ and/or ‘to defend against’ a perceived injustice.
One example, Edward Brown habitually equated his situation to the standoff near Waco, Texas
attempting to demonstrate the government’s overzealous pursuit and persecution (Sanger-Katz,
2007b). Such victim-based sentiments illustrate his need to redress injustice and express his
grievances with the government. As such, the standoff was seen as Brown’s response to the need
to defend against the government threat. In another case, Gerald Henson (in his authority as a
United Sovereigns of America representative) expressed his anti-government grievances and the
need for his group to defend against this threat – “Christians uniting together to bring this country
back to where God is in control instead of the stinking people that run this country, and the elitist
people that are devil, [S]atanistic worshippers” (Burghart & Crawford, 1996, p.11). Another
example, Felton saw and experienced racial victimization during his incarceration and because the
whites were the minority, they felt threatened – “This was not a game. Guys were dying. It was a
very serious situation. There was definitely a siege mentality among whites…We were surrounded
on all sides by an antagonistic alien presence. We stuck together” (Tough, 2003, para. 18).
Similarly, the quantitative analyses did not find this risk factor significant across both violent and
non-violent extremists, indicating similarities than differences.
Group Influence and Control. While both the violent and non-violent jihadists exhibited
this risk factor, none of the far-right extremists presented it. Specifically, this risk factor looks at
whether the perpetrator was coerced to engage in extremism and/or evidence of command and
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control links (e.g., claiming responsibility for doing something on behalf of the group/leader). For
example, Omar Mateen claimed responsibility of the 2016 Pulse nightclub shooting and stated he
was doing this on behalf of the group as exemplified from his statement, “…Just let it be known
it's going to be done in the name of the Islamic State…” (“Omar Mateen 911 Transcript,” 2016,
p.11). It should be noted this finding is possibly an artifact of the sampling technique for the
qualitative analysis. In the prior quantitative study, violent extremists were less likely to engage in
plots masterminded by other extremists and/or leaders than non-violent extremists. It would be
interesting to compare this factor across both jihadist and far-right groups irrespective of the
violence to examine these aspects under study and other related group influence and/or control
dynamics.
Over-Identification with a Group or Cause/ Hostility To National Collective Identity. All
six extremists in the sample presented with this risk factor. The perpetrator deliberately withdraws
from societal involvement (e.g., dissolving personal effects, withdrawing from school/resigning
from a job) and/or expresses hostility towards national identity (e.g., not voting, renouncing
citizenship, passport/flag burning, referring to themselves as “Islamic State citizens” or “residents
of Kansas” instead of American citizens, desire to move to another country like Syria and not come
back), positively identifies with the extremist group and/or exhibits extreme reactions when
exposed to alternative viewpoints (Roberts & Horgan, 2008; Tausch et al., 2009; Wolfowicz et al.,
2020). For example, Raymond Jarlik-Bell’s continual involvement within the anti-tax protestor
and sovereign citizen movements despite prior to his formal prosecution and his extreme anger in
law enforcement encounters over the validity of vehicular licensing disagreements indicates Bell
was deeply entrenched within these movements (Hansen, 2010; Hansen, 2011; Pulkkinen, 2011b;
United States Attorney’s Office, 2013); his current arrest did not deter him either (Molin, 2013).
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In another case, Leo Felton, who was biracial, grew to believe race as a spiritual concept instead
of a biological one based on Imperium by Francis Parker Yockey and he attempted to rationalize
his preference to identify as white, by using his deep commitment to the cause in comparison to
his fellow associates, “My intention was something that nine-tenths of my comrades in the
movement ran their mouths about all day long for years on end yet simply lacked the courage to
do. Under such circumstances I saw nothing immoral in my withholding of part of my genealogy
from them” (Tough, 2003, para. 27). It is likely Felton tried to overcompensate for his lack of a
‘thorough white lineage’ through his deliberate over-commitment to the cause. Similarly, the
quantitative analyses did not find this risk factor significant across both violent and non-violent
extremists, indicating similarities than differences.
Attitudes Justifying Offending. All six extremists in the sample presented with this risk
factor where the offenders provided ideological justifications for their offending. For example,
Omar Mateen posted a statement on Facebook (before he died) demonstrating his attitude
justifying his violent offending: “You kill innocent women and children by doing us airstrikes.
Now taste the Islamic state vengeance. In the next few days you will see attacks from the Islamic
state in the [USA]…may Allah accept me” (Blinder, Robles, & Perez-Pena, 2016, para. 2-3;
Kennedy, 2016, para. 3). In another case, Leo Felton wrote a letter to the judge justifying his
offending to establish “a politically and territorially autonomous White nation somewhere in North
America” and saw no “honorable alternative to armed revolt” (Tough, 2003, para. 2).
Victim of Injustice and Grievances. All six extremists in the sample expressed strong
feelings of victimization of injustice and grievances. Similarly, the quantitative analyses did not
find this risk factor significant across both violent and non-violent extremists, indicating
similarities than differences. For example, Omar Mateen posted a Facebook message about group-

92

based injustice/victimization (see above for related example in ‘Attitudes justifying offending’
section) and later reiterated similar feelings, “You have to tell America to stop bombing Syria and
Iraq. They are killing a lot of innocent people. What am I to do here when my people are getting
killed over there. You get what I’m saying?” (“Omar Mateen 911 Transcript,” 2016, p.2). In
another example, Donald Morgan’s religious devotion isolated him from his family and friends
(Morgan, 2016). Around this time, Morgan started to follow the Middle East conflicts and began
posting extremist statements on his Facebook page (“American Extremist Reveals His Quest to
Join ISIS,” 2014). At this juncture, it is likely Morgan started to develop feelings of injustice and
expressed his grievances via such postings.
Feelings of Hate, Frustration, Persecution, Alienation. All six extremists in the sample
expressed strong feelings of hate, frustration, persecution, and/or alienation. This risk factor
captures the perpetrator’s feelings of hatred/frustration toward out-group others and/or feel “out of
place” around others because of related in-group/personal persecution/discrimination and
alienation. It should be noted this variable focuses on emotions directed towards the out-group
while the former focuses on emotions directed towards the in-group. Similarly, the quantitative
analyses did not find this risk factor significant across both violent and non-violent extremists,
indicating similarities than differences. One example, besides Omar Mateen’s contempt/hatred
towards women (see above ‘Need for dominance’ section), ex-colleague Gilroy stated he had
“always referred to every other race, religion, gender in a derogatory way” (Williams et al., 2016,
para. 11) and had “never heard him refer to anybody who was black or gay as anything else but
the [N-word] and queers” (Perez, 2016, para. 4). Based on this, Mateen expressed hatred and
intolerance and used dehumanizing language toward various racial and religious groups. In another
example, it is likely Leo Felton’s adolescent exposure to and identification with white supremacy
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led to his hatred towards minorities and rejecting his blackness (“Supremacist accused in bombing
plot was brought up by civil rights activists,” 2001; Tough, 2003; White, 2008). In fact at 19,
Felton viciously assaulted Edward Torres (the victim suffered a fractured jaw and skull), a CubanAmerican taxi driver using a tire iron and left him to die in what he described as a ‘road rage’
incident (which was later duly rejected by the jury) despite it bearing indications of racial
animosity and later bragged about attacking a Pakistani in his presentencing report (Moser, 2002;
United States of America v. Leo Felton, 2006).
Rejection of Democratic Society and Values. With the exception of Omar Mateen, all of
the extremists in the sample presented with the risk factor where the perpetrators reject
democratic/pluralistic values (e.g., wanting to live under Sharia law and not recognizing statutory
law or ‘man-made law’ such as being anti -tax, -government, rejects multiculturalism). For
example, Leo Felton believed the government was “wrong” for allowing mixed-race relations
(“Supremacist accused in bombing plot was brought up by civil rights activists,” 2001, para. 4).
Additionally, his group membership to the White Order of Thule, which advocates for violence to
further white supremacy and to rid the U.S. of a multi-racial society, indicates his anti-government
sentiments specifically on multiculturalism. In another example, besides expressing his antigovernment sentiments and the need to defend against said threat (see above ‘Need to defend
against threat’ section), Gerald Henson’s statement reflect his rejection of democracy but instead
choosing to recognize Biblical laws. Similarly, this is seen in Edward Brown’s case when he
declared the couple have abandoned “man’s law” and only follow biblical laws (Senz, 2007, para.
2).
Dehumanization of the Enemy. All six extremists in the sample used dehumanizing
language to describe the enemy. For example, Leo Felton wrote the following statement in a letter
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to his accomplice, “If I don't hear back from you before Jan. 28th. I might be on the street! Scary
thought (for the untermenschen, not me)” (Moser, 2002, para. 46). Based on his written prose,
Felton used dehumanizing language to describe non-Whites as inferior and/or sub-humans. In
another example, Gerald Henson expressed his hatred towards Jews and disparaged them, referring
to them as “Czarian, Zionist pigs” (Burghart & Crawford, 1996, p.11).
Us and Them Thinking. All six extremists in the sample expressed moral detachment, a
lack of empathy and/or understanding outside the in-group. In the case of Edward Brown, he
believed the militia were creating their own “courts…for the purpose of taking back America” and
asserted the conflict between the government and the militia movement would not conclude except
through violence – “There's two freight trains coming down the track full steam ahead…We will
never release any firearms to the United States” (Wickham, 1996, para. 12). His statement
demonstrated his worldview in a rigid “us vs. them” fashion. In another case, Donald Morgan
described himself as a “mujahid pledging allegiance to al-Baghdadi and Islamic state commanding
good and forbidding evil,” (“American Extremist Reveals His Quest to Join ISIS,” 2014, para. 31)
not only demonstrated his commitment to the group and its cause but the clear demarcation
between evil and good. Additionally, his support for the destruction of Israel by “any methods”
(Raab, 2014, para. 9) indicates moral detachment.
Identification of Target (Person, Place, Group) in Response to Perceived Injustice.
Interestingly with the exception of both the violent and non-violent jihadists, both far-right violent
and non-violent extremists explicitly mention/blame specific targets for their perceived grievances
– offenders focused their ideological preparatory activities on targets. It should be noted this
finding is possibly an artifact of the sampling technique for the qualitative analysis. In fact, a prior
quantitative finding revealed violent extremists are more likely to focus on a specific target than

95

non-violent extremists (see ‘Logistic Regression Model for Hypothesis 2(a)’ section, pp.69-71).
However, this qualitative finding indicates this risk factor can be applicable to non-violent
extremists. For example, after prior run-ins with law enforcement over driving with expired tabs
and without license plates, Edward Bell and his wife conducted surveillance on the home of the
officer involved and threatened arrest on the Duvall Mayor, using any force necessary.
Additionally, Ute filed a 26-page memo in King County District Court identifying and threatening
specific targets with arrest – “…Your judges, Duvall mayor and prosecutor and police chief, and
KING COUNTY SHERRIF(sic) Sue Rahr, KING COUNTY SHERIFF officers, and KING
COUNTY COMMISSIONERS are enforcing a privilege code upon public vehicular travelers …
when in fact the law used to do it is wholly inapplicable to me, my family, and my automobiles as
has been proven, so every man or woman on the soil of Washington can arrest all judges presiding
over such cases therein, and any other public official in collusion with this racketeering activity”
(Pulkkinen, 2011a, para. 53). Based on Ute’s statements and the couple’s actions, it was obvious
Bell identified specific targets and engaged in preparatory activities against them (i.e., surveillance
and filing nonsensical legal documents with the courts).
Harmful End Objectives/Anger and Expressed Intent to Act Violently. With the exception
of the non-violent jihadist, all extremists in the sample presented with the risk factor where the
offenders had harmful objectives to hurt/kill others/oneself (e.g., perp made explicit threats). For
example, Edward Brown indicated his harmful end objectives to engage in violence and murder if
the authorities came for him and demonstrated his us and them thinking, “the chief of police in
this town, the sheriff, the sheriff himself will die. This is war now, folks” (Tuohy, 2015, para. 10).
In fact, he has been quoted in newspapers of his murder intent and specifying that “there’s going
to be a lot of hanging of government officials” (United States of America v. Elaine A Brown and
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Edward Lewis Brown, 2007, p.13). In another case, Gerald Henson’s anti-government speech to
the media called upon “Christians uniting together to bring this country back to where God is in
control instead of the stinking people that run this country…” (Burghart & Crawford, 1996, p.11).
Based on his statement, it was clear Henson had a harmful end objective to overthrow the
government. Another example, while incarcerated Leo Felton corresponded via letters with his
accomplice about racist ideologies and importantly wrote about his plans though vague indicating
a harmful objective of murder and violence, pending his release (United States of America v. Leo
V. Felton and Erica Chase, 2005; see above for related example in the ‘Dehumanization of the
enemy’ section).
Harmful End Objectives: Expressed Desire to Die for Cause or Martyrdom. Three of the
six extremists (i.e., two violent and one non-violent) expressed their desire to either die for their
cause and/or engage in martyrdom. For example, Donald Morgan tweeted the following statement,
“…Give me martyrdom wherever I may be” (“American Extremist Reveals His Quest to Join
ISIS,” 2014, para. 32). In another case, an excerpt of Edward Brown’s interview demonstrated his
willingness to die for the cause, “…True American citizens like myself will die for my country…”
(Wickham, 1996, para. 12). Similarly, the Brown couple indicated they were willing to die for
their cause instead of surrendering to the government several times (Sanger-Katz, 2007a; 2007b)
and on one such occasion, his wife Elaine stated, “We don't know how this will end. But there are
only two ways we are coming out of here. Either as a free man or as a free woman, or in body
bags. That has not changed, and that's the stand that everyone must take. Because if we come out
in body bags, there's going to be a few more, too. That's not a threat, that's just noticing them that
this is the stand that we will take” (Sanger-Katz, 2009a, para. 17). It should be noted the
quantitative analyses found violent jihadists were more likely to demonstrate this risk factor
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compared to the violent far-rightists and could be an artifact of the sampling technique for the
qualitative analysis.
Harmful Means to an End/Intent to Plan/Prepare for Violence. All six extremists
engaged in and/or specified their plans to harm. For example, the judge at the trial stated Donald
Morgan had “clearly implied…he is trying to go to Syria or Iraq as the next step and trying to be
actively engaged” (i.e., harmful means to an end; Marzullinew, 2014, para. 12). Another example,
Gerald Henson expressed his aspirations to reprint the Protocols of the Elders of Zion (Burghart
& Crawford, 1996, p.11) to promote and distribute such ideas and likely with intent to incite hatred
and violence (i.e., harmful means to an end). In another case, Leo Felton started to execute his plot
and recruitment for the Aryan Unit One group to carry out criminal extremist activities with
specifics in mind – the plot was modeled on the Order (known as the Silent Brotherhood or Brüder
Schweigen), a white supremacist group of outlaws who robbed armored cars of $4 million,
counterfeiting money, and murdered Jewish radio host, Alan Berg in 1984 to further a white
supremacist agenda and to ensure the existence and a future for the whites and the children (Moser,
2002; “White supremacist indicted for bank robbery,” 2001; see above for related example in ‘Harmful
end objectives/Anger and expressed intent to act violently’ section).
Extremist Ideological Training. All six extremists in the sample presented with this risk
factor where the offenders have relevant violent ideological-related training. Examples of such
include indoctrination via the internet, offline/online spiritual/religious talks with extremist
leaders/group members, and/or being engaged in extremist political activism. It should be noted
though this VERA-2 risk factor is applicable to violent extremists (due to the nature of the risk
assessment itself), it can be seen within the non-violent extremist group as evident from this
finding. In fact, prior quantitative analyses did not yield any differences between both groups. This
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qualitative finding indicates this risk factor can be applicable to non-violent extremists. Though
this VERA-2 risk factor is applicable to violent extremists (due to the nature of the risk assessment
itself), it can be seen within the non-violent extremist group as evident from this finding. For
example, evidence proved Omar Mateen was radicalized online via consumption of violent
beheading videos and Anwar al-Awlaki sermons (Allen, 2018; Chen, 2018; Gutierrez & Ortiz,
2016; Pilkington & Roberts, 2016; Smith, 2016). In another case, Gerald Henson’s anti-U.S
government and anti-tax beliefs stemmed from his ideological training (i.e., both violent and nonviolent) from both violent and non-violent content and from his teacher/guide whom he works
closely with Frech, a prominent figure in the anti-government movement and several national
leaders in the Christian Patriot movement.
Harmful Means to an End: Glorification of Violent Action. Four of the six extremists in
the sample presented with this risk factor where perpetrators justify violence as legitimate and/or
sanctioned by a higher authority/entity necessary to achieve ideological goals and/or a noble cause.
For example, Leo Felton (like many far-right violent extremists) aimed to instigate a “racial holy
war” (i.e., RAHOWA, a term created by the Creativity Movement – a white supremacist pseudoreligion to lend credence to the concept using religion). In another case, Edward Brown saw their
actions as “civil disobedience” in the tradition of biblical entities and the American founding
fathers (Sanger-Katz, 2009b, para. 6) and believed to be “directed by Yahweh” (Sanger-Katz,
2007e, para. 33).
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CHAPTER SIX
Discussion and Conclusion
Discussion of Multivariate Analyses Findings
This dissertation examined risk factors within and across violent and non-violent jihadi and
far-right extremists. Similar to general offenders, risk-need principles (Bonta & Andrews, 2007)
are essential for extremist offenders because their motivations and circumstances are often
multifaceted, and their recidivism harms society. Smith (2018) points out valid risk factor
identification can facilitate the development of appropriate violent extremism-related prevention
and intervention programs. Overall, I found that the risk factors did not vary across and within the
violent and non-violent groups as evident from the lack of support for hypotheses and associated
sub-hypotheses examining risk factor differences (i.e., H2 and H2a; H1a; H3a) and support for
hypotheses and associated sub-hypotheses examining risk factor similarities within groups (i.e.,
H1 and H1b; H3 and H3b). Additionally, the latter hypotheses further distinguish within these
groups.
In fact, a qualitative study comparing 40 cases of either group-based or lone violent and
non-violent extremists showed significant similarities with several variables distinguishing
between the groups (Knight, Keatley, & Woodward, 2019). Of interest, the study proposed the
COM-B model developed in Health Psychology area to explain general behaviors (e.g., Michie,
van Stralen, West, 2011; Michie, West, Campbell, Brown, & Gainforth, 2014) to contextualize
their findings. The COM-B model postulates Capability (C – psychological and physical),
Opportunity (O – physical and social) and Motivation (M – automatic and reflective) are all
required for Behavior (B) to occur and the authors suggested its applicability to violent extremism;
counterterrorism efforts should include removing capability, opportunity, and/or motivation (bin
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Hassan & Pereire, 2006). Additionally, the former authors theorized the possibility of non-violent
extremists lacking in one of the three components needed for violence, it could be beneficial for
risk assessment – to evaluate if an individual is simply not motivated to be violent and less of a
risk or is non-violent because of limited capability and/or opportunity and therefore of higher risk.
Because this dissertation examines three theoretical domains and classifies the risk factors
accordingly, future research avenues can look into operationalizing risk factors and using the
COM-B framework as a guide. Next, it should be noted VERA-2 risk factors can be applicable to
the non-violent extremist groups as demonstrated from both the quantitative and qualitative
evidence (see Chapters Four ‘Quantitative Results’ and Five ‘Qualitative Results’ for more details,
pp.49-99). Relatedly, several variables were highly correlated and resulted in multicollinearity (see
‘Tetrachoric Correlation Matrix and Multicollinearity’ section, pp.57-64) and were dropped from
subsequent analyses. Certain risk factors (with the exception of the risk factor overlaps between
risk assessments) focusing on different characteristic are ultimately measuring the same
overarching concept. This may result in multiple risk factors appearing in an extremist’s profile,
inaccurately raising their risk level. Fourth, the risk factors seem to be harder to map onto the nonviolent far-right extremist group for two reasons: (1) open-source data concerning non-violent
extremists are limited compared to violent extremists’ (and non-violent jihadists), impacting risk
factor variable coding and may be an artifact of the dataset and (2) it is likely the risk assessments
were developed with jihadists (both violent and non-violent) as the main focus (see ‘Non-violent
Extremists’ section for a detailed discussion, p.115).
Violent Extremists.
Need to Defend Against a Threat. Of interest, violent far-rightists are 87% more likely to
exhibit a need to defend against a threat compared to violent jihadists. As established previously,
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the violent far-right extremist movement is loosely organized but with overarching rhetoric about
White power grounded in xenophobia and perceived threats posed by non-White/minority groups
like Jewish, feminist, and the LGBTQ+ communities and the urgent need to “preserve” their
heritage and “homeland” (p.821). The recent Buffalo mass shooting perpetrated by eighteen-yearold Peyton Gendron targeting African Americans highlighted the ‘white genocide’ and ‘white
replacement’ conspiracies and their resentment/hatred towards immigrants and nonWhite/minority groups which fosters the urgency for immediate action (Sardarizadeh, 2022).
Similarly, twenty-one-year-old Patrick Crusius emphasized this concept as his motivation behind
the 2019 El Paso, Texas Walmart mass shooting (see ‘Chapter One. Introduction’ pp.1-4).
One possible explanation for the greater odds of far-right extremists’ acting against these
threats is the idea of the perceived symbolic proximity of the threat (i.e., near and far threats).
More specifically, this concept refers to the oppressor’s role in cultural, religious, economic, or
demographic ‘replacement’ of the extremist’s in-group (Ware & Clarke, 2022). Notwithstanding
the physical location, the far enemy for both jihadists and far-right extremists are the perceived
invaders while the near enemy refers to anyone allowing/facilitating the perceived invasion.
Jihadists focused more on the “far enemy” (i.e., Western countries and their encroachment in the
Middle East) than the “near enemy” (i.e., repressive Arab regimes and/or pro-Western rulers)
while the far-rightists (depending on the categories – e.g., anti-government extremist vs. neo-Nazi)
targeted either the “near enemy” and/or “far enemy” (i.e., “near enemy” – federal/state
government, Jews; “far enemy” – real and/or perceived immigrants including Asians, Hispanics,
and by extension African Americans and religious minorities like Muslims). See Ware and Clarke
(2022) for a detailed argument.

102

Since this comparative study focused only on U.S perpetrators and both the symbolic and
physical proximity of these targets being on U.S soil, it is possible the far-right extremists might
express more feelings of being under threat and have greater urgency to defend against such
threats. It should be noted this study acknowledges the individual cases of violent jihadists who
similarly exhibit feelings of being threatened albeit by the far enemy. For example, twenty-twoyear-old 1 University of North Carolina graduate, Mohammed Reza Taheri-azar, the 2006 UNC
SUV perpetrator, wrote in a letter he intended to either travel to Afghanistan/Iraq to fight American
troops or enlist in the military and use their own weapons against them – “ideally…I wanted to fly
an airplane over Washington, D.C. and drop a nuclear bomb on the city.” (Gill, 2012, p.14;
Kurzman, 2011).
Victim of Injustice and Grievances & Feelings of Hate, Frustration, Persecution,
Alienation. Violent jihadists are 4.66 times more likely to exhibit strong feelings of experiencing
injustice/grievance and are 84% less likely to exhibit feelings of hate, frustration, persecution,
alienation compared to violent far-rightists. Though both feelings of victimization and hatred
usually occur simultaneously, it should be noted the study accounts for the difference between
victimization and hatred. Essentially, the victimization variable captures emotions expressed for
the in-group (i.e., victims) and the hatred variable captures emotions directed towards the outgroup (i.e., invaders or enemies).
Indeed, on one hand, this study found that many violent far-right perpetrators engaged in
hate crimes (e.g., murder of a minority person) or violent attacks against government/law
enforcement officials and the offenders pre- and post- attacks statements and/or motives reflected
their in-group persecution and hatred/frustration toward these out-groups. On the other hand,

1

The perpetrators’ ages are at time of arrest.
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violent jihadists engaged in violent plots aligned with their pre- and post- attacks statements and/or
motives of experiencing injustice and/or victimization (e.g., focus on the effects of U.S foreign
policy and its oppression on Muslims). This study acknowledges the individual cases of violent
far-right extremists expressing both victimization and hatred. Thirty-four-year-old George David
Loeb, a white supremacist and the perpetrator who murdered Harold J. Mansfield Jr., an African
American sailor, had expressed hatred towards minorities especially towards African Americans
and had previously harassed them. Seven weeks before the murder, Loeb expressed feelings of
victimization through a letter he wrote to a news agency: “[L]et me just say this_WAKE UP! There
is no need to judge each individual nigger. We do not have the time.... It is your obvious intention
to reinforce the mistaken impressions of the ignorant. This is to the detriment of the besieged white
community…” (“The Nizkor Project,” 2012, para. 7).
Desire for Martyrdom. As predicted, violent jihadists were 3.35 times more likely than
their far-right counterparts to express a desire for martyrdom and/or exhibit willingness to die for
their cause. In fact, suicide attacks are signature of religious and/or ethno-separatist groups like
jihadists but less prominent in the far-right modus operandi (in the narrow sense where the
attacker’s death is part of the strategy (Freilich, Parkin, Gruenewald, & Chermak, 2019; MillerIdriss, 2018; Koehler, 2020a). This may be due to the far-right’s distinctive martyrdom traditions
of ideological commitment and the hyper-masculine identity of glorifying the “warrior hero” of
fighting till the end. Such mentality manifests in their attacks (mass shootings and murdersuicides) where majority of the far-right extremists survived their violence and were later glorified
within radical circles despite not dying for the cause (Koehler, 2020b). Examples of such
extremists included Anders Breivik amongst others. Though not discounting the minority who
either successfully committed or attempted albeit unsuccessfully to commit suicide like Wade
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Michael Page, the 2012 Wisconsin Sikh Temple attack perpetrator and Dylan Roof, the 2015
Charleston church shooting perpetrator respectively, the notion to live to fight another day appears
to be their take on the martyrdom concept and a necessary ingredient for inspiration and worship
for zealots (Koehler, 2020b). Relatedly, this explanation segues neatly into the following section
on the glorifying violence variable.
Glorification of Violence. VERA-2’s risk factor captured one aspect of violence
glorification where the perpetrator accepts violence as morally justified and sanctioned by a higher
authority (Pressman, 2009; Pressman & Flockton, 2012) with the factor being 4.10 times more
likely to be present in jihadi cases compared to far-right ones. In fact, both violent extremist groups
glorify violence albeit in similar yet slightly different ways. Historically, both jihadi and far-right
cases share this ideological aspect, but modern far-rightists are no longer interested in emulating
‘classical’ jihadism and prominent jihadists’ ideologues but instead ‘spectacularizing’ violence
(Brzuszkiewicz, 2019; 2020). Spectacularization is the process of “presenting and performing
violent acts… [like] a show” and are increasingly adopted by both contemporary violent extremist
groups (Brzuszkiewicz, 2020, p.72) though modern violent jihadists still present that aspect of
using a higher authority to justify violence, thus explaining this finding. One potential suggestion
for the VERA risk assessment to consider the aspect of spectacularizing violence in their risk factor
description of glorifying violence.
Prior Tactical, Paramilitary, Explosive Training. Though marginally significant (p =
0.046, p < 0.05), violent jihadists are 3.19 times more likely to have had prior tactical, paramilitary,
explosive training than violent far-rightists. This includes both formal non-extremist training (e.g.,
enlisting in the military) but also extremist-related training (e.g., attending Al-Qaeda training
camps). Additionally, there is empirical evidence (e.g., Cooley, 2002; Hafez, 2008) military
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training increases risk of participating in violence among jihadists. It is worth noting the weak and
almost negligible relationship here because many violent far-rightists have either formal or
informal training making them potentially lethal in their attacks. Government reports (e.g.,
Department of Homeland Security [DHS], 2009; FBI, 2008) have indicated far-right recruitment
activities within the U.S. military. In fact, Mendesohn (2011) posits such trained individuals are
deemed more desirable than those without and are specifically recruited by violent extremist
groups. It would be interesting to compare the risk factor between these violent extremist groups
and the general population to examine its uniqueness to violent extremism.
Personal Contact with Violent Extremists. Violent jihadists are 90% less likely to have
direct, personal contact with other violent extremists than violent far-rightists. This could very well
be the case of contemporary jihadists compared to the past where traditional organizational
recruitment happened through either close social contacts or trusted individuals vouching for a
potential incoming member. This is evident from the rise of the “lone wolf” phenomenon and the
widespread exploitation of the internet by violent extremist groups, aiding online radicalization
with no direct contact to the group members or its leaders (Byman, 2017; Weimann, 2014). Of
course, the lone wolf threat is not limited to jihadi groups but applicable to far-rightists among
other extremist groups to varying degree of success (Byman, 2017; Simon, 2016). However,
violent far-rightists have either formal group membership with contacts to its leaders/group
members or are “hopefuls” with direct contacts and are eager to prove their worth to the group. An
example would be Justin Tyme Hayes a.k.a “P.a.n.i.c” (an acronym for [P]utting [A]ny [N]igger
[I]n [C]heck) – a Coors Skin member, a White supremacist group – wore white laces until he “shed
blood” for the gang and was subsequently pictured wearing red ones, earned by “stomping”. This
was four days after the attempted murder of a then nineteen-year-old Hispanic man, Sergio Cortez,
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in a group fight with fellow group members and other like-minded associates. Because this variable
only captured and coded for violent extremist contacts only, one future research avenue is to
examine whether having non-violent extremist contacts is unique to the non-violent extremist
group.
Need for Belonging. As expected, violent jihadists are 4.18 times more likely to exhibit a
need for belonging compared to violent far-rightists. In fact, prior studies often classified the
contemporary far-right movement as weak and decentralized (Michael, 2013; Parent & Ellis III,
2014; Perry & Scrivens, 2016) compared to the jihadist movement. Though not discounting
individual cases of far-right individuals’ need for belonging (e.g., engaging in violence against
minorities to either gain membership or prove their worth to the group), it is possible the lack of
clear hierarchy/leadership structure, formal membership, and divided groups weakened their need
for group belonging (e.g., pledging allegiance to a group and/or wanting to be part of a group,
engaging in extremist activities for social approval).
Need for Excitement/Adventure. Violent jihadists are 4.22 times more likely to exhibit a
need for excitement compared to violent far-rightists. It could be that jihadists are more likely to
express their intent to go overseas to engage in extremism, indicating their need for adventure
(United Nations Security Council, 2015). including the thrill/excitement presented when engaging
in clandestine planning and execution of attacks. Some theorists (e.g., Atran, 2014; Gibson, 1994;
Hacker, 1983; Kellen, 1979; Levine, 1999; Nussio, 2017) claim political violence appeals to
individuals who seek and require stimulation. In fact, 49.5% of far-right extremists engaged in
unplanned offenses compared to just 8% of violent jihadists, indicating higher levels of
planning/forethought within the violent jihadi group. Consistent with this suggestion, many
incarcerated extremists have expressed excitement as their motivation behind their involvement
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(Juergensmeyer, 2000). Similarly, Lakhani and Hardie-Bick (2020) posit seeking excitement,
thrill, and risk motivates further criminality based on their empirical data of former violent
extremists in the UK. A recent experimental study found sensation seeking (i.e., the need for
adventure and thrill) influenced the relationship between the search for meaning and extremism
(Schumpe, Bélanger, Moyano, & Nisa, 2020).
Need for Dominance. Violent jihadists are 62% less likely than violent far-rightists to
exhibit a need for social dominance, the preference for social inequality with one group dominating
over others (Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 1994). van Assche, Dhont, and Pettigrew (2019)
measured social dominance by including statements like the following: “An ideal society requires
some groups to be on top and others to be on the bottom” which is consistent with this dissertation’s
‘DOMINATE’ variable. They found authoritarianism and social dominance were associated with
increased far-right support via prejudice/discrimination in the U.S. In fact, a comparative study on
terrorism and intergroup violence attitudes between American and Lebanese samples revealed
Americans high in social dominance supported violence against the Middle East while the
Lebanese with low social dominance supported violence against the West (Henry, Sidanius, Levin,
& Pratto, 2005).
Violent Extremists vs. Non-violent Extremists.
Group Influence and Control: Masterminding Plots. Violent extremists are 50% less
likely to engage in plots masterminded by other extremists and/or leaders than non-violent
extremists. One plausible reason for this is the “lone wolf” phenomenon compounded further by
the widespread exploitation of the internet by violent extremist groups, aiding online radicalization
despite limited access to members of the extremist group (Byman, 2017; Weimann, 2014). These
violent extremists are “self-starters” – in fact, Moskalenko and McCauley (2011) theorized
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ideology, ideas of justice, and empathy may play important roles in solo mobilization and violence
compared to group-based violence and offered two theories to explain this: Strong reciprocity and
group identification. Strong reciprocity posits a willingness to punish moral transgressors even if
the transgression was committed against someone else (Fehr, Fishbacher, & Gaechter, 2002).
Group identification is the basis of intergroup conflict and enables self-sacrifice for the wellbeing
of others including taking action against those threatening the in-group – positive group
identification combined with the perception the in-group is under attack and/or victimization
fosters negative identification of the out-group committing the injustice (McCauley, 2006;
Moskalenko & McCauley, 2011). One example of a violent jihadist, thirty-five-year-old ex-Navy
seaman Paul Gene Rockwood Jr. an ardent follower of jihadist ideologue Anwar al-Awlaki was
convinced it was his religious obligation to seek vengeance by killing those who defiled Islam (i.e.,
ideas of justice). He began researching viable targets for execution (United States Attorney’s
Office, 2010). In Rockwood’s own words while he was studying Islam, he started to understand
what drove the 9/11 attackers (i.e., empathy) – “These people felt that they had been under attack.
They kind of saw it as a self-defense response. It was like you’d be impressed if an American
soldier jumps on a grenade to save his buddies; it takes a lot of courage to give up your life like
that” (Murphy, 2011, para. 13).
In the case of a far-right violent extremist, thirty-one-year-old Samuel James Johnson, he
radicalized in the Mower County Jail through his cellmate, discovered “white pride” and went on
to join the National Social Movement (after his release) before forming the Aryan Liberation
Movement because the former group was not “extreme enough” (i.e., ideology; Furst, 2014;
Sorenson, 2009). An ardent fan of Hitler and his white supremacist beliefs, Johnson sympathized
with him and believed Germans achieved prosperity through his antisemitic rule (empathy).
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Similarly, Johnson believes deportation of illegal immigrants and racial separatism are solutions
to the whites’ problems – National socialism can “get the white race to come together…[then] we
can end class warfare between the rich and poor. Everyone will be able to do what they can do
best” (Sorenson, 2009, para. 23) indicating his ideas of justice. Though the study does not discount
non-violent far-right extremists who engage in criminal actions without “any instructions” like
Wayne A. Hicks who owned and operated a company facilitating clients (most of whom belonged
to the Patriot movement) to hide their assets from the IRS for a fee (Office of Public Affairs, 2010).
Non-violent jihadists provide material support for other violent extremists overseas and
often at the request of others (i.e., group influence/control or ‘social coercion’). One example,
twenty-one-year-old Amer Sinan Alhaggagi, an ISIS supporter created social media accounts on
Twitter and Facebook using Gmail accounts for authentication for other like-minded individuals
between October and November 2016 and perceived his actions as providing a service to the
extremist group (Office of Public Affairs, 2019). In another instance, forty-year-old Ramiz Zijad
Hodzic, a Bosnian refugee and war veteran, was solicited by thirty-seven-year-old Abdullah Ramo
Pazara, a family friend with similar background experiences and later went on to become an ISIS
commander in Syria, for money and equipment (Hughes & Clifford, 2017; Zagier, 2015). In the
case of a non-violent far-right extremist, seventy-two-year-old tax protestor Dorothea Joan Joling
was an accomplice to her husband’s criminal activities and justified her actions via her marriage
vow to be an obedient wife and left all household decisions to him (Moran, 2014).
Identification of a Target in Response to Perceived Injustice. Violent extremists are 4.95
times more likely to focus their ideological preparatory activities on a target perceived to be
symbolic to their injustice than non-violent extremists. It is worth noting ideology plays a role in
target selection – it provides violent extremists with a cause for mobilization and provides a mental
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framework to view surrounding events and people’s actions (Drake, 1998). People and institutions
they perceive guilty of transgressing extremists’ ideologically-based moral doctrines are justified
legitimate targets. By extension, such an ideology allows extremists to justify their violence by
displacing their responsibility onto either their victims or other actors whom ideologicallyspeaking are responsible for the state of affairs and/or injustice causing the extremists to engage
in violence. Based on this, one possible explanation is violent extremists tend to be guided by
ideology (e.g., religion or ethno-nationalism) compared to non-violent extremists.
It should be noted this VERA-2 risk factor is applicable to violent extremists (due to the
nature of the risk assessment itself) but can be applicable to non-violent extremists (see
‘Identification of target (person, place, group) in response to perceived injustice’ section, p.93-94).
Perpetrators who engage in material support may not necessarily have a direct target but rather an
indirect one in mind to focus their ideological preparatory activities on. In 2005, Brooklyn
bookstore owner, Abdelrahman Farhane and jazz musician, Tarik Shah were involved in
discussion voicing their intention to raise and send money overseas to purchase “sophisticated
weapons” for the Afghanistan mujahedeen (Preston, 2006, para. 12) though there was no evidence
of a direct reference to a target. Perpetrators engaging in tax evasion/fraud (e.g., stop filing/paying
taxes or filing fraudulent returns to receive refunds not entitled to them, establishing sham trusts)
held frustration/hatred towards the IRS prior to the current crime and took steps to cause financial
grief/losses while simultaneously obtaining financial gain. Such perpetrators often use anti-tax
and/or anti-government rhetoric to justify their actions both in and out of court and/or filing
retaliatory liens against government officials attempting to obstruct their activities – engaging in
paper terrorism. For example, David Carroll Stephenson, a sham trust scheme promoter together
with his accomplice, Michael Shanahan, sold more than 400 bogus packages telling clients they
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could avoid taxes under this scheme, costing the Federal Treasury of more than $8.5 million dollars
(Haley, 2006; United States Attorney’s Office, 2006).
Harmful Means to an End/Expressed Intent to Plan, Prepare Violent Action. Violent
extremists were 52% less likely to indicate/specify their plans for violence/harm than non-violent
extremists. This risk factor in combination with the ‘harmful end objectives/anger and expressed
intent to act violently’ risk factor (i.e., perpetrators have harmful objectives/goals to harm/hurt/kill)
though not significant bears semblance to the leakage warning behavior concept originally
proposed by O’Toole (2000) in her study on school shooters. Leakage warning behavior is
communication to third parties of the perpetrators’ intent to engage in violence and/or do harm to
a target via attacks (Meloy & O’Toole, 2011; Meloy, Mohandie, Knoll, & Hoffman, 2015). Most
cases of large-scale violence (e.g., public figure assassinations and stalking, adult or adolescent
mass murders, school or campus shootings) and more importantly, both domestic and foreign acts
of terrorism involving targeted violence indicate prior leakage behaviors (Meloy et al., 2012;
Meloy & O’Toole, 2011). Other studies looked at the extent of such warning behaviors and have
suggested leakage amongst other warning behaviors to identify “weak signals” of lone wolves
through online linguistic data (Brynielsson et al., 2013; Cohen et al., 2014). It is possible
contemporary violent extremists may only exhibit weak leakage behaviors as indicated by the latter
findings and when compared with non-violent extremists the degree of leakage behaviors drops,
thus explaining the finding.
It should be noted this VERA-2 risk factor is applicable to violent extremists (due to the
nature of the risk assessment itself) but can be applicable to non-violent extremists (e.g., jihadists,
sovereign citizens, tax protestors) albeit through indirect means. For example, non-violent jihadists
provide material support in the form of financial support (i.e., sending/raising money) for other
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violent extremists overseas to purchase weapons, ammunition, and equipment as an indirect means
to further their cause. In the case of anti-tax protestors, these offenders file retaliatory liens against
government officials to ruin their credit or cause financial difficulties (i.e., “paper terrorism”).
Access to Networks, Funding, and Equipment. As hypothesized, violent extremists are
1.54 times more likely to have access to networks, funding, and equipment than non-violent
extremists. It could be due to the nature of this risk factor describing the prerequisites of conducting
a (mostly) violent attack. Most of the non-violent attacks were tax evasion/fraud. This risk factor
(with the exception of having friendship networks consisting of like-minded individuals with antigovernment/IRS sentiments) may not be relevant to such individuals engaging in financial crimes.
Mental Health and Prior Criminal History of Violence. Violent extremists are 2.92 times
more likely to have mental problems and are 2.72 times more likely to have a prior criminal history
of violence compared to non-violent extremists. A U.S study comparing both violent and nonviolent extremists by LaFree, Jensen, James, and Safer-Lichtenstein (2018) found individuals with
prior mental illness and criminality (i.e., both violent and non-violent) are more likely to engage
in violent extremism. The slight difference in the criminal history variable finding can be due to
operationalization differences (i.e., participation in violent/non-violent crime vs. prior arrest, prior
prison, and prior violence). Prior criminality is established as one of the best predictors for future
criminality and this relationship is seen for extremists (Boncio, 2017; Ljujic, van Prooijen, &
Weerman 2017; van Leyenhorst & Andreas, 2017; Wolfowicz et al. 2020). However, despite
research alluding to a positive association between prior mental health issues and criminality, the
same cannot be said for the relationship between mental illness and extremism. Several studies
(e.g., McCauley & Moskalenko, 2011; Nijboer, 2012; Post, Sprinzak, & Denny, 2003; Sageman,
2004) concluded extremists are psychologically normal but recent research suggest otherwise and
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mental illness when combined with other risk factors increase likelihood of extremist violence
(Corner & Gill, 2015; Corner et al., 2015; Gruenewald et al., 2013). Ultimately, these findings are
aligned with prior literature.
Non-violent Extremists.
Prior Exposure to Violent Extremism. As expected, non-violent jihadists are 59.1 times
more likely to have prior exposure to violent extremism compared to non-violent far-rightists.
Though this VERA-2 risk factor is applicable to violent extremists (due to the nature of the risk
assessment itself), it can be seen within the non-violent extremist group as evident from this
finding. Approximately 64% of non-violent jihadists in the dataset had prior exposure to violent
extremism either through their refugee experiences/status or their exposure to violence in conflict
zones in comparison to just under 1% of non-violent far-right individuals. For example, forty-yearold Ramiz Zijad Hodzic, a Bosnian refugee and war veteran, led and acted with five others to raise
and send money and equipment overseas to foreign fighters from May 2013 to February 2015
(Office of Public Affairs, 2019; Patrick, 2020). Of interest, drawing from his interviews with
incarcerated violent jihadists since 1980s, Post (2005, p.616) concluded these individuals had
“hatred…bred in the bone” since childhood and highlighted the refugee experience being
fundamental to identity development. Aligned with Post’s findings, 55% of violent jihadists in the
study’s sample had prior exposure to violent extremism. Additionally, this study adds non-violent
jihadists exhibit this risk factor too.
Need for Belonging. Non-violent jihadists are 165.67 times more likely to exhibit a need
for belonging than non-violent far-rightists. Because a similar finding was noted within the violent
extremist group, the explanation for this finding can be referenced above (see ‘Need for belonging’
subsection under the ‘Violent Extremists’ section, p.108).
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Opportunistic Involvement. Not surprisingly, non-violent jihadists were 97% less likely to
engage in their criminal extremism for opportunistic motives compared to non-violent far-rightists.
Non-violent jihadists provide material support such as providing financial support for other violent
extremists overseas to purchase/supply weapons, ammunition, and equipment, joining up with an
extremist group to provide logistical support like medical and domestic services to foreign fighters,
or distributing propaganda materials. For example, twenty-year-old Jaelyn Young expressed her
intent to join ISIS as a medic on social media before being apprehended by law enforcement in
August 2015 at the airport (Fausset, 2015). In another case, twenty-two-year-old Terrence Joseph
McNeil solicited for the murder of 100 U.S. soldiers by distributing ‘kill lists’ containing
identifying information online and encouraging others to have them killed (Office of Public
Affairs, 2017). Such criminal extremist activities conducted by these individual perpetrators are
attempts to contribute to the extremist group’s cause (i.e., political and/or moral motivation) with
minimal evidence of an opportunistic/financial motivation. In comparison, non-violent far-right
extremists like anti-government and/or -tax protestors have either opportunistic or a mix of both
opportunistic and political motivations. For example, fifty-six-year-old Peter Kay Stern, a member
of the Americans For Preservation of Constitutional Heritage (an anti-government, Freeman group
that denies government’s authority and believes they are exempt from laws including taxation) and
founder of common law court “Our One Supreme Court” in 1996, obtained fraudulent financial
instruments from Freeman leader LeRoy Schweitzer after attending his seminars in November
1995 and presented these bogus checks to the IRS and banks attempting to pay off his debts/taxes
and obtain an erroneous refund (Dalesio, 2000; Southern Law Poverty Center, 1999).
Discussion of Exploratory Factor Analysis Findings
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As expected, most of the risk factors fell within the three domains with the exception of
the three risk factors excluded from the analysis because they failed to meet the three factorability
criteria, indicating their poor fit to their respective domains (see ‘Exploratory Factor Analysis’
section for a detailed explanation, pp.73-75). Of interest, all five motivation/vulnerabilities-related
risk factors fell under either the individual-group or individual-situational domains. According to
Borum (2004), the most effective method to explain extremist behavior is a combination of factors
and person-centric factors are usually not the most significant. The EFA findings aligned with this
argument. In fact, individual domain-related factors explained the least amount of domain variance
compared to the other factors and their associated domains. Additionally, it is possible the risk
factors capturing these motivations encompassed either situational or group aspects. In fact, both
the ‘need for status’ and ‘need for dominance’ risk factors involve group-based aspects – both
motivations involve aspects of distal relationship significance and/or hierarchy and group-based
dynamics. Additionally, the negative factor loading of the ‘opportunistic involvement’ risk factor
on the individual-group theoretical domain indicates offenders engaging in criminal extremist
activities for self-interest (e.g., financial gain or revenge) run counter to the goals of engaging in
extremism which are usually group-oriented like that of the ‘political/moral motivation’ risk factor,
which loads positively on the domain.
Ironically, both ‘need for identity, meaning, belonging’ and ‘group influence and control:
masterminding plots’ risk factors fell under the individual-situational domain. It could be the
nature of the variables grouped under this domain – all of the risk factors capture perpetrator’s
unique circumstances involving ease of access to things and importantly direct access/relationships
to like-minded people, including the ‘group influence and control: masterminding plots’ variable.
The ‘need for identity, meaning, belonging’ motivation involve proximal relationship dynamics,
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specifically social approval via group initiation, traveling to join the group, pledging allegiance to
a specific group.
Conclusion
In conclusion, this dissertation involves both a quantitative and qualitative study. In terms
of the quantitative findings, two of the three overarching hypotheses (H1 and H3) and associated
sub-hypotheses (H1b and H3b) were supported while the third hypothesis (H2) and other associated
sub-hypotheses (H1a; H2a; H3a) were not. Generally, the risk factors do not necessarily differ across
and within both the violent and non-violent groups (Table 18 for the summary of the major
hypotheses and corresponding sub-hypotheses). Specific risk factors that merit possible logical
explanations for their statistical significance are provided (see ‘Discussion of Multivariate
Analyses Findings’ section for details, pp.100-115). Additionally, the EFA findings concluded the
various motivations (with the exception of ‘need for excitement, comradeship, or adventure’ risk
factor) examined can be grouped into the individual-situational and individual-group domains
instead of the individual domain (see ‘Discussion of Exploratory Factor Analysis Findings’ section
for explanation, pp.115-117). The qualitative study provides six case studies involving one jihadist
and two far-right extremists for each violent and non-violent group. The section provides several
examples of each risk factor extracted from the case studies to provide variation. Potential avenues
of future research were suggested to examine certain aspects of the project.
Additionally, this dissertation brought up several points for consideration. First, the study
found majority of the risk factors were common across and within all four groups with slight
differences demonstrated by the quantitative evidence presented to either support or reject the
hypotheses. Specifically, those that posit for risk factor similarities were supported while those
that posit for risk factor differences were rejected. Second, it should be noted VERA-2 risk factors
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can be applicable to the non-violent extremist groups as demonstrated from both the quantitative
and qualitative evidence. Third, several variables were highly correlated within an assessment and
resulted in multicollinearity (see ‘Tetrachoric Correlation Matrix and Multicollinearity’ section,
pp.57-64). Certain risk factors focusing on different characteristics are ultimately measuring the
same overarching concept. This may result in multiple risk factors appearing in an extremist’s
profile, inaccurately raising their risk level. Fourth, the risk factors seem to be harder to map onto
the non-violent far-right extremist group extremists (e.g., sovereign citizens, tax defiers and/or
protestors) for two reasons. First, open-source data concerning non-violent extremists are limited
compared to violent extremists’ (and non-violent jihadists), impacting risk factor variable coding.
Second, it is likely the risk assessments were developed with jihadists (both violent and nonviolent) as the main focus. The ERG 22+ was developed based on U.K cases, specifically jihadists
(Herzog-Evans, 2018; Lloyd & Dean, 2015; Powis et. al, 2019). As such, more research is still
needed to examine whether these risk factors are truly applicable to the non-violent extremist
group.
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Appendix 1: Risk Factors across the Two Risk Assessment Tools
ERG 22+
VERA-2
Domain 1: Engagement
Domain 1: Beliefs and attitudes
E1. Need to redress injustice and express grievance
BA1. Commitment to ideology justifying violence
E2. Need to defend against threat
BA2. Victim of injustice and grievances
E3. Need for identity, meaning, belonging
BA3. Dehumanization /demonization of identified targets of injustice
E4. Need for status
BA4. Rejection of democratic society and values
E5. Need for excitement, comradeship, or adventure
BA5. Feelings of hate, frustration, persecution, alienation
E6. Need for dominance
BA6. Hostility to national collective identity
E7. Susceptibility to indoctrination
BA7. Lack of empathy/understanding outside own group
E8. Political/ moral motivation
Domain 2: Context and Intent
E9. Opportunistic involvement
CI1. Seeker, consumer, developer of violent extremist materials
E10. Family or friends support extremist offending
CI2: Identification of target (person, place, group) in response to
perceived injustice
E11. Transitional periods
CI3. Personal contact with violent extremists
E12. Group influence and control
CI4. Anger and expressed intent to act violently
E13. Mental heath
CI5. Expressed desire to die for cause or martyrdom
Domain 2: Intent
CI6. Expressed intent to plan, prepare violent action
I1. Over-identification with a group or cause
CI7. Susceptible to influence, authority, indoctrination
I2. Us and Them thinking
Domain 3: History and capability
I3. Dehumanization of the enemy
HC1. Early exposure to pro-violence militant ideology
I4. Attitudes that justify offending
HC2. Network (family, friends) involved in violent action
I5. Harmful means to an end
HC3. Prior criminal history of violence
I6. Harmful end objectives
HC4. Tactical, paramilitary, explosive training
Domain 3: Capability
HC5. Extremist ideological training
C1. Individual knowledge, skills, and competencies
HC6. Access to funds, resources, organizational skills
C2. Access to networks, funding, and equipment
Domain 4: Commitment and motivation
C3. Criminal history
CM1. Glorification of violent action
(+) Any other factors
CM2. Driven by criminal opportunism
CM3. Commitment to group, group ideology
CM4. Driven by moral imperative, moral superiority
CM5. Driven by excitement, adventure

Appendix 2: Dissertation Project Codebook
For coders to note:
•
•
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Both VERA-2 and ERG 22+ common risk factors are integrated and operationalized accordingly. The original risk factors are
retained here.
Definitions of FRs and jihadists (Freilich et al., 2014, p.380):
o “[Far-rights] are fiercely nationalistic, anti-global, suspicious of federal authority, and reverent of individual liberties,
especially their right to own guns and be free of taxes. They believe in conspiracy theories involving imminent threats to
national sovereignty or personal liberty and beliefs that their personal or national ‘‘way of life’’ is under attack.
Sometimes such beliefs are vague, but for some the threat originates from specific racial or religious groups. They believe
that they must be prepared to defend against this attack by participating in paramilitary training or survivalism.”
o “[Jihadists] believe that only acceptance of Islam promotes human dignity. Islamic extremists reject the traditional
Muslim respect for ‘‘People of the Book’’ (i.e., Christians and Jews). They believe that ‘‘Jihad’’ (i.e., to struggle in God’s
path like the Prophet Muhammad) is a defining belief in Islam and includes the ‘‘lesser Jihad’’ that endorses violence
against ‘‘corrupt’’ others. Islamic extremists believe that their faith is oppressed in nominally Muslim MiddleEastern/Asian corrupt governments and in nations (e.g., Russia/Chechnya) that occupy Islamic populations. The U.S is
seen as supporting the humiliation of Islam, and exploiting the region’s resources. They believe that America’s hedonistic
culture (e.g., gay rights, feminism, etc.) negatively affects Muslim values. Islamic extremists believe that the American
people are responsible for their government’s actions and that there is a religious obligation to combat this assault. They
believe that Islamic law – Sharia – provides the blueprint for a modern Muslim society and should be forcibly
implemented.”
o General coding values: 99 – Missing

NOTE: Several variables are adopted and/or adapted from ECDB, PIRUS, and Gill (2015) codebooks.

Construct
ID Variables

Variable name
DATE_CODED

Description
Date coding is completed

MASTERFILE

Masterfile number

RANDOM_
SUSPECT_ID
SUSPECT_NAME

Randomly assigned ID number

Values
Time period 1:
YYYY/MM/DD

String

SUSPECT_VIOLENT

ECDB S1/SF1 – Suspect’s
name
Extremist type

OVERALL_GROUP

Perp’s classification

ARRESTYEAR

Year of arrest for current
extremist offense
Year of extremist death

1 – FR VE
2 – Jihadist VE
3 – FR non-VE
4 – Jihadist non-VE
YYYY

0 – Non-violent
extremist
1 – Violent
extremist
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DEATHYEAR

YYYY

Notes
Numbers are based on
ECDB case file records

Violent offenders are
individuals who commit
successful violent incidents
(i.e., homicide, suicide, and
killed in action during law
enforcement confrontation)
and individuals who engaged
in failed and foiled plots.
Non-violent criminal
offenders are individuals
who engaged in
financial/material support
schemes.
*In the case of an offender
committing both violent and
non-violent crimes, s/he is
violent.

CONTROL
VARIABLES

Perp’s gender

RACE/ETHNICITY

Perp’s race

GRP_LONE

Lone wolf or group member at
time of current arrest

AGE

Perp’s age at time of current
arrest
Perp’s marital status at time of
arrest
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GENDER

MARRY

0 – female
1 – male
1 – White, nonHispanic
2 – Black, nonHispanic
3 – Hispanic
4 – Asian
5 – Arab/Middle
Eastern ancestry
6 – Native
American
7 – Biracial
8 – Other
1 – acted alone
2 – part of formal
group
3 – part of informal
group
4 – acting with
others with no clear
group boundaries
*Continuous
0 – Single (include
those below 18)
1 – Married
2 – Separated
3 – Divorced
4 – Widowed
5 – Cohabitating
6 – BF/GF

Code ‘2’ if divorce is not
official/finalized.
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EMPLOYMENT_HISTO
RY

Perp’s employment history

0 – never employed
1 – sporadically
employed
2 – regularly
employed
1 – Low
2 – Middle
3 – High

SES_CHILDHOOD

Perp’s socioeconomic strata in
childhood (below 18).

SES_ADULTHOOD

Perp’s socioeconomic strata in
adulthood (18 and above).

1 – Low
2 – Middle
3 – High

EDUCATION

Highest level of education
achieved by perp.

1 – Homeschooled
2 – < 8th grade
3 – Done 8th grade
4 – Some high sch
5 – GED
6 – High sch dip.

NOTE:
1 = Low (e.g., receives
welfare, lives close to the
poverty line, regularly
unemployed or have a blue
collar job, lives in subsidized
housing)
2 = Middle (e.g., does not
receive welfare, lives in
lower-middle/ middle class
neighborhood, steady
employment, owns/ holds a
mortgage on a house, has
college degree)
3 = High (e.g., works a highincome/white-collar job,
lives and owns a house in a
middle or upper class
neighborhood, afford luxury
items, has college degree or
is self-employed as a
successful entrepreneur)

Perp’s prior involvement with
non-extremist delinquent
peers/gang members.

FAMILY_CONTACT

Perp’s family contact history

ABUSE

Perp was abused (verbally or
physically).

ASPIRATION

Perp had clear unfulfilled
education or career aspirations.
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DELINQUENT_PEERS

7 – Some college/
vocational
8 – Vocational
graduate/Associate
degree
9 – College
graduate
10 – postgraduate
work
0 – No
1 – Yes

Peers with prior criminal
history and/or gang
membership (non-extremism
related)
0 – No contact
NOTE:
1 – Sporadic contact 1 = Distant (has little regular
2 – Regular contact contact with most family
members, rarely attends
family events, does not
celebrate holidays with
family, etc.)
2 = Close (regularly interacts
with one or more family
members, attends family
events on a regular basis,
usually celebrates holidays
with family, etc.)
0 – No
Include both family/non1 – Childhood
family member abuse (e.g.,
2 – Adult
neglect, beatings, bullying,
3 – Both
domestic violence, etc.)
0 – No
NOTE: For example, perp
1 – Yes
indicated/talked about
becoming a professional

ROMANCE_TROUBLE
PLATONIC_TROUBLE
MISSING
DATA

%DATAFILL

Perp had issues
finding/maintaining romantic
relationships.
Perp had issues
finding/maintaining nonromantic relationships.
Calculate the number of rows
(i.e., risk factors) filled for each
perp and find the percentage.
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RISK ASSESSMENT TOOLS: VERA-2 & ERG 22+ RISK FACTORS
IndividualSYMPATHY
Prior to the current offense, was
group
there evidence the perp
sympathized/identified with the
extremist cause ‘to do
something’ or ‘to defend
against’ a perceived
injustice/threat?
SYMPATHY_TIME
If yes, when did it occur?

0 – No
1 – Yes

(e.g., lawyer/doctor) or
wants to attend
college/obtain higher
education in the past but was
unable to fulfill these goals
because of varying reasons.

0 – No
1 – Yes
*Continuous

Variable is constructed for
the subsequent qualitative
analysis (done before
multiple imputation)

0 – No
1 – Yes

ERG 22+ Risk Factor:
Need to defend against
threat
Perp feels threatened due to
his circumstances, perp
sympathizes/agrees with the
extremist cause/ideology to
‘defend against’ a perceived
injustice/threat.

0 – < 6 months
1 – < 1 year
2 – < 2 years
3 – < 3 years
4 – < 4 years
5 – < 5 years
6 – > 5 years

Individual

STATUS

Individual

DOMINATE
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DOMINATE_TIME

Prior to the current offense, was
there evidence the perp
demonstrated the desire for
status and/or need to feel
special/valued (e.g., individual
perceive himself/herself as a
“soldier of God”; refer to
himself/herself as having a
noble mission to do something;
made verbal statements about
wishing to engage in similar
media prominent attacks; perp
is a leader and/or some highranking individual)?
Prior to the current offense, was
there evidence the perp
exhibited signs of a hierarchical
mindset to dominate others
(e.g., men and women are not
supposed to be treated equally;
some races are more superior to
others; sovereign citizens are
above the law, wishing for
certain religions to dominate
over others)?
If yes, when did it occur?

0 – No
1 – Yes

ERG 22+ Risk Factor:
Need for status
Perp’s motivation is to feel
special and/or valued (e.g.,
hero, soldier, and/or
warrior).

0 – No
1 – Yes

ERG 22+ Risk Factor:
Need for dominance
Social dominance is favoring
hierarchical inter-group
relations and focus more on
inequality rather than
equality. For example, group
membership of a white
supremacist organization
implicitly shows this
mindset.

0 – < 6 months
1 – < 1 year
2 – < 2 years
3 – < 3 years
4 – < 4 years
5 – < 5 years
6 – > 5 years

Individual

POLITICAL

Individual

OPPORTUNITY

Was there evidence the perp
believed that his/her actions is
required to defend moral beliefs
and/or demonstrates that these
beliefs are morally superior
(e.g., it is my duty to kill the
infidels because God says so; I
am providing funds to AQ
because I believe that this will
help the cause; incite a race
war)?
Was there evidence the perp
engaged in extremist actions
because of other motives (e.g.,
financial, wants to engage in
violence, revenge)?
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0 – No
1 – Yes

ERG 22+/VERA-2 Risk
Factor: Political/moral
motivation/Driven by
moral imperative, moral
superiority
Perp believes his/her actions
is required to defend moral
beliefs and/or demonstrates
that these beliefs are morally
superior.

0 – No
1 – Yes

ERG 22+/VERA-2 Risk
Factor: Opportunistic
involvement/Driven by
criminal opportunism
Perp had non-extremist
motives. Some individuals
are not interested in the
ideology/cause and are
interested in fulfilling other
needs.
Exclude need for status,
sense of belonging and need
for excitement. These are
independently captured by
the following variables:
STATUS, BELONGING,
and EXCITEMENT.

Individualsituational

Individual

Was there evidence the perp
had family or friends involved
in the extremist movement or
engage in extremist actions
(e.g., raising funds for a
cause/support extremism)?

NETWORK_4_STRG

If yes to option 4, write the
member combination.

TRANSIT

Prior to the current offense, was
there evidence the perp went
through major negative
transitions?
If yes, write these transitional
period events.
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NETWORK

TRANSIT _STRG

0 – No
1 – Family
2 – Friend/colleague
3 – Spouse, Partner,
BF, GF
4 – Multiple
members (e.g.,
combination of
family and friends)
String

0 – No
1 – Yes
String

ERG 22+/VERA-2 Risk
Factor: Family or friends
support extremist
offending/Network (family,
friends) involved in violent
action
Perp has access to social
(i.e., familial, spousal and/or
friends) networks involved
in extremism and these
individuals engage in the
extremist movement or
related actions.
NOTE: Proximal
relationships to perp
ERG 22+ Risk Factor:
Transitional periods
Major transitional periods in
the perp’s life include
problems with relationships
(e.g., divorce, breakups),
familial/spousal death,
poverty, unstable household,
alcoholic/substance abuse,
unemployment,
homelessness, dropout from
school, etc.

Individualgroup
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GRPINF1

Was there evidence the perp
made public statements
claiming responsibility for the
incident/attack/offense, stating
that he/she was doing this for
the group/leader?

0 – No
1 – Yes

GRPINF2

Was there evidence
extremists/leaders
masterminded the
plot/attack/offense and the perp
agreed to carry/carried it out?

0 – No
1 – Yes

Individual

BELONGING

Was there evidence the perp
engaged in extremist-related
activities to obtain social
approval/acceptance from
his/her peers/like-minded
individuals (e.g., pledging
allegiance, wanting to travel to
join the group and be “amongst
brothers”, or conducting attacks
for group initiation)?

0 – No
1 – Yes

Individual

MENTAL_HEALTH

Was there evidence the perp
had a history of mental illness,
personality disorders, learning

0 – No
1 – Mental illness
(unspecified)

ERG 22+ Risk Factor:
Group influence and
control
Perp was either coerced to
participate by other
extremists/leaders and/or
there was evidence of
command and control links.

ERG 22+/VERA-2 Risk
Factor: Need for identity,
meaning, belonging/
Commitment to group,
group ideology
Perp demonstrates a need to
belong with the group.
Affiliation and commitment
to the group are attained via
social bonding (Bakker,
2006; Sageman, 2004) and
social approval/acceptance
from the in-group.
ERG 22+ Risk Factor:
Mental health
Perp has mental health
problems, personality

disabilities, and/or engaged in
anti-social behaviors?
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Individualgroup

JUSTIFY

Was there evidence the perp
provided reasons for wanting to
engage in his/her offending
(e.g., to inflict violence/harm on
the “enemy” – “they deserve to
die”) and/or provide
moral/ideological judgements
about the “righteousness” of the
in-group in contrast to the
“unworthiness” of the outgroup (e.g., “Whites are the
superior race; blacks and
Asians – labeled as ‘mud
people’ - were created during

2 – Personality
disorders
3 – Learning
disabilities,
cognitive deficits,
developmental
disorders
4 – Mood disorders
5 – Anti-social
behaviors/conduct
disorders
6 – Associated
stressor/trauma
issues
7 – Psychotic
disorders
8 – Comorbidity
(presence of two or
more diagnoses)
0 – No
1 – Yes

disorder, learning
disabilities, and/or engaged
in anti-social behaviors.
NOTE: Include both official
(e.g., from
psychologist/psychiatrist)
and unofficial diagnoses
(e.g., from police sources)
and/or speculations (e.g.,
relatives/family/peers).

ERG 22+/VERA-2 Risk
Factor: Attitudes that
justify offending/
Commitment to ideology
justifying violence
Perp provides ideological
justifications for his/her
offending (i.e., violent and/or
non-violent actions) in
pursuit of his/her noble cause
and/or why the out-group
deserve the infliction of
harm/violence (i.e.,
justified).

Individualsituational

ACCESS

ACCESS_6_STRG
Miscellaneous WEAPON_USED
variable

‘practice’ creations”, earning a
SS bolt tattoo by killing a black
man)
Was there evidence the perp
had access to weapons,
equipment (e.g., bullet-proof
vests, night vision cameras,
bomb-making manuals,
pressure cookers), accomplices
and/or funds?

0 – No
1 – Weapons
2 – Equipment
3 – Accomplices
4 – Funds
5 – Multiple options
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If yes to option 5, write the
access type combination.

String

If yes to option 1, what was the
weapon used/found during the
current incident?

1 – gun, handgun,
firearm
2 – knife/shank
3 – blunt
object
4 – biological
substance
5 – chemical
substance;
6 – nuclear
substance;
7 – bomb
(unknown
substance)
8 – incendiary
bomb
9 – pipe
bomb/IEDs
10 – smoke

ERG 22+/VERA-2 Risk
Factor: Access to networks,
funding, and
equipment/Access to funds,
resources, organizational
skills
Perp has organizational skills
and/or access to accomplices
with such skills, resources,
and funds to execute the
violent extremist attacks.
NOTE: Exclude if the FBI
provides the weapons.

WEAPON_FOUND_16_
STRG
Individualsituational

PRIOR_ARREST
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PRIOR_PRISON
PRIOR_VIOLENCE

If yes to option 16, write the
weapon combination found
during the current incident?
Prior to the current offense, was
there evidence the perp was
arrested?
Prior to the current offense, was
there evidence the perp had
ever been to prison?
Prior to the current offense, was
there evidence the perp had a
history of criminal violence
(include general encounters
with law enforcement not
resulting in arrests and
convictions)?

bomb
11 – car/truck
bomb
12 – letter
bomb
13 – fire/arson
14 – bodily
weapons
15 – other weapon
16 – Multiple
options
String
0 – No
1 – Yes
0 – No
1 – Yes
0 – No
1 – Yes

ERG 22+/VERA-2 Risk
Factor: Criminal
history/Prior criminal
history of violence
Perp has a criminal history
(both violence and nonviolence; extremism and
non-extremism).

Individualgroup

VICTIM

VICTIM_TIME
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Individualgroup

DEHUMAN

DEHUMAN_TIME

Individualgroup

REJECTDEMO

Prior to the current offense, was
there evidence the perp
exhibited strong feelings of
being a victim of
injustice/grievance (e.g., perp is
obsessed with specific related
events/phenomena; made
statements indicating in-group
is under attack)?
If yes, when did it occur?

Prior to the current offense, was
there evidence the perp used
language (e.g., “bury the
infidels alive”) or expressed
opinions dehumanizing the
‘enemy’ (e.g., dogs, pigs, etc.)?
If yes, when did it occur?

Prior to the current offense, was
there evidence the perp
expressed anger/rejection of
democratic/pluralistic values

0 – No
1 – Yes

0 – < 6 months
1 – < 1 year
2 – < 2 years
3 – < 3 years
4 – < 4 years
5 – < 5 years
6 – > 5 years
0 – No
1 – Yes

0 – < 6 months
1 – < 1 year
2 – < 2 years
3 – < 3 years
4 – < 4 years
5 – < 5 years
6 – > 5 years
0 – No
1 – Yes

ERG 22+/VERA-2 Risk
Factor: Need to redress
injustice and express
grievances/Victim of
injustice and grievances
Perp expressed strong
feelings about perceived
injustices/discrimination
(can be about either personal
or relevant to the in-group).
NOTE: Sees oneself or ingroup others as a
victim/target of some sort of
injustice/grievance/prejudice
ERG 22+/VERA-2 Risk
Factor: Dehumanization of
enemy/Dehumanization
/demonization of identified
targets of injustice
Manner of perp’s speech:
Dehumanization of the outgroup and related persons by
attaching animal-like/nonhuman labels and puts a
lower value on their rights
and/or lives.
ERG 22+/VERA-2 Risk
Factor: Need to redress
injustice and express
grievance/Rejection of

REJECTDEMO_TIME

Individualgroup

REJECTDEMO_STRG
HATRED
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HATRED_TIME

(e.g., wanting to live under
Sharia law and not recognizing
statutory law or ‘man-made
law’ such as being anti -tax, government, rejects
multiculturalism, etc.)?
If yes, when did it occur?

0 – < 6 months
1 – < 1 year
2 – < 2 years
3 – < 3 years
4 – < 4 years
5 – < 5 years
6 – > 5 years
String
0 – No
1 – Yes

If yes, write the main concern.
Prior to the current offense, was
there evidence the perp
expressed feelings of
hatred/frustration toward outgroup others or feel “out of
place” around others because of
related in-group/personal
persecution/discrimination and
alienation (e.g., perceived
unjust targeting of unborn
babies/political oppression of
certain minorities/religion,
discriminatory/racist practices)?
If yes, when did it occur?
0 – < 6 months
1 – < 1 year
2 – < 2 years
3 – < 3 years
4 – < 4 years
5 – < 5 years

democratic society and
values
Perp detaches himself/
herself from the democratic,
pluralistic society and rejects
values and norms where s/he
lives. Perp expresses
acceptance of laws derived
from higher religious
entities.

ERG 22+/VERA-2 Risk
Factor: Need to redress
injustice and express
grievance/Feelings of hate,
frustration, persecution,
alienation
Perp expresses strong
feelings of hate/persecution
towards the society/where
s/he resides at (can be about
either personal or relevant to
the in-group).
NOTE: This variable focuses
on emotions directed
towards the out-group but for
VICTIM emotions are
directed towards the ingroup.

Individualgroup

HOSTILITYOVERID
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HOSTILITYOVERID_TI
ME

Individualgroup

USTHEM

6 – > 5 years
0 – No
1 – Yes

Prior to the current offense, was
there evidence the perp
exhibited loss of personal
agency, take on the collective
identity (e.g., using ‘we’/ ‘us’
to indicate the group) and/or
accept a singular view about the
explanation of the world (e.g.,
individual argues with
others/seems unwilling to
accept when alternative views
are presented, perp continues
his actions despite lack of
support around him, perp seems
dissatisfied/disillusioned with a
‘mild version of extremism’
and moves on to a more
extreme one)?
If yes, when did it occur?
0 – < 6 months
1 – < 1 year
2 – < 2 years
3 – < 3 years
4 – < 4 years
5 – < 5 years
6 – > 5 years
Prior to the current offense, did
the perp expressed a lack of
empathy or understanding
outside the in-group (e.g., does
not really mingle with

0 – No
1 – Yes

ERG 22+/VERA-2 Risk
Factor: Over-identification
with a group or
cause/Hostility to national
collective identity
Perp is deeply entrenched in
the group ideology/cause
(e.g., moving on to more
extreme viewpoints, sees
himself as part of the group),
lose personal agency, tend to
have extreme reactions in the
face of alternative views on
societal, religious or political
issues (e.g., deliberately
withdraws from societal
involvement, expresses
hostility towards national
identity – not voting,
renouncing citizenship,
passport/flag burning,
referring to themselves as
“Islamic State citizens” or
“residents of Kansas” instead
of American citizens, desire
to move to another country
like Syria).
ERG 22+/VERA-2 Risk
Factor: Us and Them
thinking/Lack of
empathy/understanding
outside own group

USTHEM_TIME

CONTENT

Individualgroup

TARGET
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Individualsituational

‘dissimilar others’, praising
deaths of out-group individuals)
or exhibit “us vs. them” (e.g.,
black & white) thinking (e.g.,
“it is better if blacks did not
exist”)?
If yes, when did it occur?
0 – < 6 months
1 – < 1 year
2 – < 2 years
3 – < 3 years
4 – < 4 years
5 – < 5 years
6 – > 5 years
Prior to the current offense, was 0 – No
there evidence the perp engaged 1 – Yes
in violent online (e.g.,
extremist-related posts on
Reddit)/offline communication
or seek out/possess/distribute
extremist material (include both
hardcopies/softcopies), or
involved in website/material
development or
information/propaganda
dissemination?
Prior to the current offense, was
there evidence the perp
explicitly mention/blame the
target (i.e., person, place, or
group) for his/her perceived
grievance (e.g., perp focuses

0 – No
1 – Yes

Perp exhibit moral
detachment, lack of
empathy, nor understanding
for the out-group. Perp’s
worldview is a rigid “us vs.
them” perspective.

ERG 22+/VERA-2 Risk
Factor: Harmful means to
an end: Seeker, consumer,
developer of violent
extremist materials
Perp actively seek
out/possess violent extremist
literature and/or involved in
website/material
development,
information/propaganda
dissemination, and online
communication.
VERA-2 Risk Factor:
Identification of target
(person, place, group) in
response to perceived
injustice

his/her ideological preparatory
activities on target)?
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Individualsituational

CONTACT

Prior to the current offense, was
there evidence the perp had
direct contact (offline/online)
with other violent extremists
(e.g., perp’s fellow group
members)

0 – No
1 – Yes

Individualgroup

HARMFUL_INTENT

Prior to the current offense, was
there evidence the perp had a
harmful objective/goal (e.g.,
provoke a ‘holy war’, bring
about a harmful regime change,
cause a government shutdown)
to hurt/kill others/oneself (e.g.,
perp made explicit threats)

0 – No
1 – Yes

Individualgroup

MARTYR

Prior to the current offense, was
there evidence the perp
expressed willingness to die for
a cause or express desire to
engage in martyrdom?

0 – No
1 – Yes

Perp specifies
person/place/group symbolic
of the perceived grievance.
NOTE: Code for both
general (e.g., federal
government, USA) and
specific (e.g., FBI, IRS)
targets.
ERG 22+/VERA-2 Risk
Factor: Access to networks,
funding, and equipment/
Personal contact with
violent extremists
Perp has direct contact with
other violent extremists.
ERG 22+/VERA-2 Risk
Factor: Harmful end
objectives/Anger and
expressed intent to act
violently
Perp has a harmful
objective/goal (e.g., intent to
bring about a harmful regime
change) to harm/hurt/kill
others and/or himself/herself.
ERG 22+/VERA-2 Risk
Factor: Harmful end
objectives: Expressed
desire to die for cause or
martyrdom
Perp must exhibit his/her
preparedness to sacrifice

Individualgroup

PLAN
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Miscellaneous UNPLANNED
variable
Individualgroup

INDOCTRINATE

Prior to the current offense, was 0 – No
there evidence the perp engaged 1 – Yes
in/specify plans to harm (e.g.,
buy/supply weapons, provide
financial/material support for a
group like travelling overseas to
fight or providing funds for
others to do this, filing liens)?
Was the offense unplanned (i.e.,
done on the spur of the
moment, without forethought)?
Was there evidence the perp
exhibited any of the following
characteristics: (1)
unquestioning loyalty towards
those they consider established
religious/political/ideological
entities, (2) deep admiration
towards certain authoritative
extremist figures, (3) sees these
authoritative extremist
figures/groups as ‘role models’,
and/or (4) seek

0 – No
1 – Yes
0 – No
1 – Yes

his/her life for a cause (e.g.,
writing a will).
NOTE: There is a difference
between violent extremists
intending to cause/engages
in material damage to
infrastructure but no
intention to die
himself/herself.
ERG 22+/VERA-2 Risk
Factor: Harmful means to
an end/Expressed intent to
plan, prepare violent action
Perp is prepared to engage in
harmful acts to achieve a
harmful objective/goal to
harm/hurt/kill others and/or
himself/herself.

ERG 22+/VERA-2 Risk
Factor: Susceptibility to
indoctrination/Susceptible
to influence, authority,
indoctrination
Perp is susceptible to
indoctrination and control by
certain authoritative
extremist figures/group and
both (i.e., perp and extremist
figure/group) share similar
conservative values (e.g.,

legitimization/validation from
leaders/group?
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CHILDHOOD_EXPOSU
RE

Was there evidence the perp
0 – No
had childhood/early exposure to 1 – Yes
ideological violence (e.g.,
political, nationalistic, ethnic,
or religious
conflicts/upheavals)?

racial, ethnic, religious,
gender, and sexual
orientation) and/or beliefs
about advocating violence to
achieve these goals.
NOTE: The variable looks at
perp’s view of violent
extremist figures/group. For
example, perp is under
in/direct orders from the
leader of the organization to
conduct an attack (e.g.,
suicide attacks); perp
believes s/he is a follower of
a leader and attempts to
answer his/her call for
attacks; exhibits devotion
towards the leader.
ERG 22+/VERA-2 Risk
Factor: Transitional
period/ Early exposure to
pro-violence militant
ideology
Perp’s early exposure to proviolence ideology within the
family/home (e.g., by
parents/relatives’ racist
rhetoric) or outside (e.g.,
living/born in conflict zones,
involvement in violent
political movements).
NOTE: This exposure can
come from within the

PRIOR_SKILLS

Was there evidence the perp
had prior military/paramilitary,
tactical or explosive training?

0 – No
1 – Yes

Individualgroup

IDEO_TRAINING

Was there evidence the perp
had prior relevant violent
ideological-related training
(e.g., indoctrination via the
internet, offline/online
spiritual/religious talks with
extremist leaders/group
members, engaged in extremist
political activism)?

0 – No
1 – Yes
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Individualsituational

family/home or outside (e.g.,
living/born in conflict
zones).
ERG 22+/VERA-2 Risk
Factor: Individual
knowledge, skills, and
competencies: Tactical,
paramilitary, explosive
training
Perp has prior
military/paramilitary,
tactical, or explosive
training.
NOTE: Code for BOTH
extremism-based experience
(e.g., weapons/bomb-making
training in militant groups,
prior military involvement in
local or overseas conflict
zones) and non-extremism
experience (e.g., enlisting in
the military).
VERA-2 Risk Factor:
Extremist ideological
training
Perp has training/education
that shaped ideologicalrelated beliefs (e.g., “online
radicalization”).
NOTE: Political extremist
activism can include both
organization/attending
related events (e.g.,

GLORIFY_VIOLENCE

Was there evidence the perp
0 – No
justified violence as
1 – Yes
legitimate/sanctioned by a
higher authority necessary to
achieve ideological goals and/or
a noble cause (e.g.,
supplementing statements with
fatwas or other forms of
leadership directives)?

Individual

EXCITEMENT

Was there evidence the perp
0 – No
appeared to be risk1 – Yes
taking/sensation-seeking, or had
a need for excitement/adventure
to engage in violent extremistrelated activities?
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Individualgroup

meetings, hosting media,
giving speeches)
ERG 22+/VERA-2 Risk
Factor: Harmful means to
an end/ Glorification of
violent action
Perp accepts that violence is
morally justified and
sanctioned/elevated by a
higher religious/political/
ideological authority/entity.
NOTE: This variable is
different from the
IDEO_TRAINING variable
– ONLY code this when
perp makes statements that
violence is sanctioned by a
higher authority and/or perp
views engaging in violence
is his/her life’s/noble duty to
achieve ideological goals.
ERG 22+/VERA-2 Risk
Factor: Need for
excitement, comradeship
adventure/Driven by
excitement, adventure
Perp demonstrates
excitement and/or adventure
to engage in violent
extremism-related activities.

Appendix 3: Time Variables: Static vs. Dynamic Risk Factors
Based on the analysis (not shown), the model comparing time variables of these risk factors
between followers and criminal extremist masterminds and/or self-starters were not significant.
Another similar analysis (not shown) comparing time variables within the violent extremist group
(DV 1: Violent extremist type) were not significant.
Running the same logistic regression analysis comparing time variables but across violent
and non-violent extremist groups (DV 2: Non-violent extremist type), the model was significant.
Non-violent jihadists were 1.33 times and 1.35 times more likely to harbor feelings of being
threatened (i.e., feelings the need to defend against perceived threat) and exhibit moral
detachment/lack of empathy towards the out-group (i.e., us and them thinking) for a longer time
prior to crime commission compared to non-violent far-rightists respectively. Non-violent jihadists
were 30% less likely to hold feelings of societal rejection and detachment from democratic society
for a longer time prior to crime commission compared to non-violent far-rightists.
Table 25. Model 1 for time variables on DV 2.
*p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001
Risk Factor Time variables

B

Need to defend against threat
Need for dominance
Victim of injustice and grievances
Dehumanization of the enemy
Rejection of democratic society and values
Feelings of hate, frustration, persecution, alienation
Over-identification with a group or cause/ Hostility to
national collective identity
Us and them thinking
F(8, 1860) = 2.76**

0.28
-0.02
-0.01
0.14
-0.35
0.07
-0.20
0.30

DV 2: Non-violent extremist type
Exp(B)
SE
95% CI
95% CI
Lower
Upper
1.33*
0.18
1.02
1.72
0.98
0.12
0.78
1.24
0.99
0.10
0.82
1.20
1.15
0.19
0.83
1.59
0.70**
0.08
0.56
0.88
1.07
0.12
0.85
1.34
0.82
0.10
0.64
1.05
1.35*

0.18

1.04

1.76

Based on the analysis, the model comparing time variables across violent and non-violent
extremist groups (DV 3: Violence/nonviolence extremist risk) was significant. Violent extremists
are 14% less likely to hold feelings of societal rejection and detachment from democratic society
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for a longer time prior to crime commission compared to non-violent extremists. Additionally,
violent extremists are 1.20 times more likely to hold feelings of hatred, frustration, and/or
persecution/alienation for a longer time prior to crime commission compared to non-violent
extremists.
Table 26. Model 2 for time variables on DV 3.
*p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001
Risk Factor Time variables

B

Need to defend against threat
Need for dominance
Victim of injustice and grievances
Dehumanization of the enemy
Rejection of democratic society and values
Feelings of hate, frustration, persecution, alienation
Over-identification with a group or cause/ Hostility to
national collective identity
Us and them thinking
F(8, 1502.6) = 3.50***

-0.05
-0.01
-0.02
0.13
-0.15
0.18
0.03
0.08

DV 3: Violence/nonviolence extremist risk
Exp(B)
SE
95% CI
95% CI
Lower
Upper
0.95
0.08
0.82
1.12
0.99
0.07
0.86
1.13
0.98
0.07
0.85
1.12
1.14
0.13
0.91
1.42
0.86**
0.05
0.77
0.96
1.20*
0.10
1.01
1.42
1.03
0.08
0.89
1.19
1.09

0.13

0.87

1.37

Overall, it is possible these significant time variables indicate the specific risk factors either
appearing first or appearing later in an extremist’s radicalization process which can explain why
these risk factors capturing their feelings and/or attitudes are held either longer or shorter
respectively. Because this analysis is exploratory, a potential research avenue is to examine the
risk factor time variables and compare them between followers and leaders.
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Appendix 4: Case Study Template
Perpetrator’s name:
Event Narrative Summary

Individual risk factors
Need for identity, meaning, belonging
Need for status
Need for excitement, comradeship, or adventure
Need for dominance
Susceptibility to indoctrination
Political/moral motivation
Opportunistic involvement
Transitional periods
Mental health
Criminal history
Individual-situational risk factors
Family or friends support extremist offending
Access to networks, funding, and equipment
Early exposure to pro-violence militant ideology
Individual knowledge, skills, and competencies: Tactical, paramilitary, explosive
training
Personal contact with violent extremists
Seeker, consumer, developer of violent extremist materials
Individual-group risk factors
Need to defend against threat
Group influence and control
Over-identification with a group or cause/ Hostility to national collective identity
Attitudes justifying offending
Victim of injustice and grievances
Feelings of hate, frustration, persecution, alienation
Rejection of democratic society and values
Dehumanization of the enemy
Us and them thinking
Identification of target (person, place, group) in response to perceived injustice
Harmful end objectives/Anger and expressed intent to act violently
Harmful end objectives: Expressed desire to die for cause or martyrdom
Harmful means to an end/Intent to plan/prepare for violence
Extremist ideological training
Harmful means to an end: Glorification of violent action
Perpetrator’s sequential background/profile with details/evidence below for each risk
factor present within the corresponding domain
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Appendix 5: Violent Extremist Case 1 - Omar Mir Seddique Mateen
Perpetrator’s name: Omar Mir Seddique Mateen
Event Narrative Summary
On June 12, 2016, Omar Mir Seddique Mateen (29), a trained gunman entered and shot up the
Pulse nightclub in Orlando, Florida, geared towards gay patrons, armed with a semiautomatic
AR-15 rifle and a Glock firearm. 1,2 Mateen killed 49 people and wounded 53 others. 3 During
the standoff, Mateen made several 911 calls pledging his alliance to Islamic State of Iraq and
Syria (ISIS) and its leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and conducted the attack on the group’s
behalf. 4 After a nearly three-hour long hostage situation, Mateen was killed in a police
shootout. 5 In 2016, the Pulse nightclub attack was considered the deadliest shooting by a single
gunman, the deadliest attack on the gay community, and the deadliest case of terrorism since
September 11, 2001, on American soil. 6,7
Individual risk factors
Need for identity, meaning, belonging
Present
Need for status
Present
Need for excitement, comradeship, or adventure
Present
Need for dominance
Present
Susceptibility to indoctrination
Present
Political/moral motivation
Present
Opportunistic involvement
Present
Transitional periods
Present
Mental health
Present
Criminal history
Present
Individual-situational risk factors
Family or friends support extremist offending
Present
Access to networks, funding, and equipment
Present
Early exposure to pro-violence militant ideology
Absent
Individual knowledge, skills, and competencies: Tactical, paramilitary, explosive
Present
training
Personal contact with violent extremists
Absent
Seeker, consumer, developer of violent extremist materials
Present
Individual-group risk factors
Need to defend against threat
Present
Group influence and control
Present
Over-identification with a group or cause/ Hostility to national collective identity
Present
Attitudes justifying offending
Present
Victim of injustice and grievances
Present
Feelings of hate, frustration, persecution, alienation
Present
Rejection of democratic society and values
Absent
Dehumanization of the enemy
Present
Us and them thinking
Present
Identification of target (person, place, group) in response to perceived injustice
Absent
Harmful end objectives / Anger and expressed intent to act violently
Present
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Harmful end objectives: Expressed desire to die for cause or martyrdom
Harmful means to an end / Intent to plan, prepare for violence
Extremist ideological training
Harmful means to an end: Glorification of violent action

Present
Present
Present
Present

Perpetrator’s sequential background/profile with details/evidence below for each risk factor
present within the corresponding domain
On November 16, 1986, Omar Mir Seddique Mateen, an American citizen was born in Queens,
New York to Afghanistan immigrants, father Seddique Mir Mateen and mother Shahla Mateen. 8,9
In 1980, Seddique worked a series of menial jobs in New York after immigrating to support his
family (consisting of his wife, Mateen, and his three sisters) before he found his “calling as an
insurance agent.” 10 In 1991, Mateen moved to Florida with his family and went to school in the
Port St. Lucie area. 11 Seddique became a traveling salesman and was “required to drive an
automobile great distances, travel up and down stairs, bend, stoop, sit for extended periods of times
[sic], and visit individuals at their homes and businesses before he was injured in a car accident
and had to file for disability.” 12 Seddique claimed his annual salary was $100,000. 13 Later,
Seddique enjoyed success as an insurance broker registered in Florida and New York and corporate
records indicated other businesses including real estate, a beauty salon, and art dealing. 14 Seddique
owned at least five properties along the Treasure Coast and two expensive, branded vehicles. 15
Based on his family’s assets and employment nature, Mateen grew up in a relatively middle to
high class socioeconomic strata. Beyond the opulence lies a disturbing family portrait of arrogance,
grandiosity and violence: A father who declared online to lead a “transitional revolutionary
government” in Afghanistan and was involved in multiple disputes with others, a mother arrested
for domestic battery, and a son with a propensity for violence. 16 According to Vinnie Krestalude
who lived next door to the Mateens between 1998 and 2000, Seddique was involved in frequent
neighborhood disagreements including arguments with Krestalude’s father when Seddique
accused Krestalude’s younger brother of throwing rocks at his home. 17,18 Mike Mazzone, another
neighbor recalled the Mateens to be neighborly and kind though he was not close to them. After
the Mateens moved away, the neighbors “would see [Seddique] on the road at a red light and he
would go off ... start shooting us the bird, screaming and yelling.” 19 On one occasion in 2004,
police were called to a run-in between Krestalude, Seddique, and an unknown third man at the
Treasure Coast Mall but no arrests were made. 20 It is likely Seddique had difficulties maintaining
platonic interactions (which bears similarities to his own son’s friendships through the years).
Despite the Mateens moving in prior to 9/11, the Krestaludes called the police after the attacks
reporting the family’s activities as suspicious on hindsight. 21 However, the police did not find
anything disreputable. 22 Based on this, it is likely the Mateens experienced harassment and
discrimination post 9/11. The Mateens may have been a victim of a hate crime when eggs were
thrown at the family’s residence in January 2002 (not long after the 9/11 attacks). 23 Throughout
the years, Seddique’s children took to saying they were Persian to avoid racial backlash and any
perceived link to extremism. 24 Though it is also likely Seddique may have been a victim of racial
discrimination prior to the 9/11 attacks as well. In July 2001, Shahla told police Seddique was
attacked because of his language barrier but he refused to talk to the police about the incident. 25
Later in 2002, Shahla was arrested for domestic battery because of a marital dispute and Seddique
had threatened to kill her but the charges were eventually dropped in 2003. 26,27 The police report
listed her occupation as a teacher but also as unemployed. 28 In other 911 calls, Shahla alleged
146

Seddique attacked her but later brushed it off while in another, she reported both Seddique and
Mateen were fighting with her. 29 Such incidents reflected strained relationship dynamics between
Mateen’s parents and himself. Seddique had an active online presence with a Facebook following
of more than 10,000 and airing and hosting an amateur interview show “Durand Jirga Show” on
YouTube with dozens of recordings since 2011. 30,31 Seddique formed a religious nonprofit “The
Durand Jirga Inc.” incorporated in 2010, devoted to resolving the “Durand Line” border issue
between Afghanistan and Pakistan. 32,33,34 Together with Seddique, are two of his daughters and a
son-in-law who was active in Afghanistan politics. 35 According to former Afghanistan official, the
show is known for its anti-U.S, anti-Pakistan, and pro-Taliban remarks. 36,37 In one video Seddique
denounced the Pakistani government and supported the Taliban, “Our brothers in Waziristan, our
warrior brothers in [the] Taliban movement and national Afghan Taliban are rising up.” 38 In
January 2014, Seddique interviewed Ashraf Ghani in Kabul (eight months before he became
Afghanistan president) and touched on economic development and youth unemployment in
Afghanistan and the interview was aired on a California-based television broadcast for
Afghanistan expats since approximately 2013. 39,40 In fact, Seddique praised Ghani during the
interview but became angry after Ghani tried to engage in peace talks with the Taliban. 41 At times,
Seddique wore Army fatigues, giving the bizarre façade of his political prominence because he
stated it was an outfit he wore but later admitted it was a Halloween costume and paid $100 for
them. 42,43 In other videos, Seddique declared his own candidacy for president in 2015 (though
there was no election at that time) and later portrayed himself as the new but self-proclaimed
Afghanistan president and demanded all government officials to obey his orders only and later
ordered the arrests of Ghani and other senior officials, referring to them as traitors. 44,45 In fact,
Seddique encouraged his supporters to use violence against Ghani, “we want to find a hero to take
the turban off Ashraf Ghani and slap him a few times and very hard…This traitor has rolled up his
sleeves to destroy our country.” 46,47 Seddique even put forth cabinet minister names for his
fictitious government on a now-deleted Facebook page, “Islamic Revolutionary Transitional
Government of Afghanistan.” 48 Later, evidence show Seddique sent money to Afghanistan and
Turkey and had been accused of raising money to fund violence against the Pakistani
government. 49 On other occasions, Seddique bragged about his so-called ties to U.S Congress.50
To keep up appearances and make his claims credible, Seddique posted photos featuring himself
in Congress alongside former representatives Charles Rangel, Dana Rohrabacher, and Ed Royce. 51
All three representatives either did not remember Seddique or only recalled him vaguely. 52 Though
he did have ties to the FBI when prosecutor Sara Sweeney later acknowledged Seddique’s work
as an FBI informant “at various points” between January 2005 and June 2016. 53 Based on
Seddique’s radical political leanings, it is likely Mateen may have been exposed to violent militant
ideology from his father in adulthood. Further, this is evident of Seddique’s support for extremism
(i.e., familial network). Despite his political activities and the degree of familial involvement,
Seddique claimed he had little impact on Mateen’s radicalization and propensity for violence. 54
Throughout his formative years, Mateen was repeatedly suspended or kicked out of multiple
schools for anti-social behaviors/conduct problems such as engaging in verbal and/or physical
altercations with students, being verbally abusive and aggressive, lacked self-control, had a
preoccupation with violence and sex and showed no remorse for his transgressions. 55,56 During
Mateen’s enrollment in the St. Lucie County district from 1992 to 1999, there were 31 documented
incidents of classroom misconduct. 57 Maribel Del Rio-Roberts, an assistant professor at Nova
Southeastern University specializing in child and adolescent psychology, concluded he did not
receive treatment he needed as a child. 58 “Thirty-one behavioral offenses beginning as young as
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first grade and 48 in high school is definitely a considerable amount. It's actually alarming. The
fact that he was physically aggressive and verbally abusive goes to show he didn't have much
consideration for how his actions affected others, and that's a warning sign.” 59 Rio-Roberts added
that individuals who carry out attacks like the Orlando massacre typically have prior histories of
behavioral problems or mental illness. 60 Based on this, it is reasonable to assume Mateen had
unspecified mental health issues which went undiagnosed. In both elementary and middle school,
his teachers described him as unfocused and uncontrollable in class. 61 William Winkler, Mateen’s
classmate at Mariposa Elementary recalled him taking kids’ toys and bullying others especially
girls. 62 Winkler added Mateen frequently needed one-on-one tutoring but was unsure if Mateen
was diagnosed with any learning disabilities. 63 In third grade, Mateen sang “marijuana, marijuana”
instead of “Mariposa, Mariposa” while reciting the school song. 64 Based on this, it is clear Mateen
had some knowledge of drugs though it is unknown whether he was exposed to them at ages 8 and
9 (but was known to have smoked marijuana in high school). By fourth grade, Mateen’s teachers
stated he was “at least” two years behind academically and school officials stated Mateen’s parent
refused to sign parental consent for testing though the documents did not specify what he would
be tested for. 65 As a result, Seddique often had to pay frequent visits to Mateen’s schools either
because of his poor academic performance (i.e., Mateen earned C’s, D’s, and F’s) and/or
behavioral problems. 66 In April 1999, a middle school teacher wrote a letter to Seddique about
Mateen’s behavioral issues, challenging the father’s claim of blaming his son’s struggles on the
difficulty of her class by explaining that his “attitude and inability to show self-control in the
classroom” were the main sources of his classroom struggles. 67 In May 1999, as a Southport
Middle School student, because of Mateen’s irrepressible behavior, both Seddique and Shahla
were given an “intervention syllabus” and was told Mateen was failing seventh grade. 68 At one
point, Mateen had to be moved to another class “to avoid conflicts with other students.” 69 Mateen
behaved in a highly condescending manner towards others and that same seventh-grade report
noted just that: “[He] spoke only to his father in Farsi, and never addressed anyone else.” 70 In fact,
it is noted Seddique himself had a reputation for being disrespectful towards female teachers and
dismissive of complaints about Mateen. 71 There is a possibility of lax and enabling parenting and
a distant relationship between father and son. In fact, interviews and open-source information put
forth a picture of Seddique being “protective” but not close with Mateen. 72 Based on his father’s
behavior towards women, it was clear Mateen’s views and behaviors toward women mirrored his
father’s and indicated Mateen’s need for dominance. As the only son and unlike his three sisters,
he was a loner and seemed to have trouble making friends (i.e., platonic relationship problems). 73
Being an Afghan American meant he stuck out in the small South Florida town and he was bullied
severely as a result (i.e., childhood bullying). 74 Justin Delancy who took the bus with Mateen for
several years, described his fellow school mate’s bullying experiences, “He was brutally bullied.
He was a chubby kid and got bullied about his weight. He was probably one of the only kids of
[Afghan] descent. That made him stand out a bit as well.” 75 Delancy added kids would not allow
Mateen to sit beside them or he would get slapped on the back of his head at times but he would
take it in stride and laugh it off, making fun of himself to divert the attention away from himself,
though that hardly worked. 76 Though on one occasion, a former classmate recalled Mateen
threatened to shoot his classmates because of the bullying. 77 Months prior to the 9/11 attacks,
Mateen was expelled from Martin County High School where he attended for approximately two
years, for a fight with a classmate and was later charged with battery and disturbing school
functions. 78,79 Though government officials declined to prosecute, Mateen later recorded the
incident on his job applications stating he “…was 14 years old when this fight occurred…and
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learned a big lesson from it”. 80 Marty Bielicki, a former dean at Martin County High School stated
on social media that Mateen had a prior juvenile criminal history and that “if his employer had
access to his juvenile record, he would be the last person to own a weapon.” 81 At this juncture, this
indicated the start of Mateen’s criminal history and proclivity towards violence. Robert Zirkle, a
then freshman in the Martin school district recalled Mateen “started changing and acting different”
when 9/11 happened. 82 As a teenager attending Spectrum alternative school for students with
behavioral issues in Stuart city, Mateen cheered the terrorists, making fun of how America was
attacked, and claimed that Osama bin Laden was his uncle likely in an effort to garner attention,
albeit negative. 83, Mateen boasted how the former deceased Al-Qaeda leader taught him to shoot
an AK-47 and on the day of the attacks, he mimicked the World Trade Center strikes by pretending
to be an airplane striking a wall. 84 Another former student remarked “…We see the one plane hit.
And then see the second plane hit. . . . He was smiling. It was almost like surreal how happy he
was about what had happened to us.” It is unknown whether Mateen was exposed to extremist
ideology in his early years judging from his peculiar statements and behavior, witnessing the 9/11
attacks in his classroom. Zirkle added Mateen was expelled after the incident. 85 Based on his fellow
classmates’ statements, it is possible Mateen’s feelings of alienation developed into hatred towards
Americans. Mateen’s stint at Spectrum lasted only one semester before he returned to Martin
County High but withdrew in April 2003, and graduated that same year from Stuart Adult
Community High School in the top half of his class to get his GED. 86,87,88 Across both schools,
Mateen was suspended for 48 days with two of the suspensions for “fighting with injury” and was
known to smoke marijuana (i.e., drug abuse). 89,90 According to court records 91, Mateen meandered
aimlessly through life after he left high school but he managed to earn an associate degree in
criminal justice technology from Indian River State College in 2006 and holding a 2.76 GPA,
taking an active step to achieve his career aspirations to be in law enforcement. 92,93 According to
Robert Lane, a school representative stated the college had no record of Mateen involved in
disciplinary actions or encounters with campus security. 94 His work history from 2002 to 2006
consisted of short-term, sporadic employment throughout high school and college and never
working more than a year at any one place: a sales clerk at GNC vitamin and supplement store, a
sales associate at Hollister, a floor watcher at Gold’s Gym, a bagger at Publix, a cashier at Nutrition
World, at Walgreens, and at Circuit City, a cashier and cook at Chick-fil-A. 95,96,97 As Mateen
matured, he became obsessed with weight lifting to shed the weight he endured from childhood
bullying. One of Mateen’s friends, Sean Chagani, remarked on his physique and asked whether he
was taking steroids and recalled him smirking and saying “Can you tell?” 98 Based on Mateen’s
response, it is clear he took steroids (i.e., drug abuse). Stefan Comvalius, a former trainer at a Port
St. Lucie gym who worked security previously was a victim of a nightclub shooting recalled
Mateen stating he “…wouldn’t leave it in the court’s hands, [He’d] kill him, [He’d] kill his parents,
the dog – everybody would have to die if he shot [him],” when he asked about the shooter. 99 This
is another instance of Mateen’s penchant towards violence. Mateen’s dream was provisionally
realized when he was employed by the Florida Department of Corrections and assigned as a trainee
to the Martin Correctional Institution in Indiantown in 2006. 100,101 In fact people who attended or
worked at the college said Mateen had viewed the correctional institution as a “steppingstone” to
being a police officer though he knew he had to graduate from a police academy. 102 However in
April 2007 just six months into his employment (i.e., October 2006 to April 2007) 103, Powell H.
Skipper, the institution’s warden, recommended Mateen to be expelled from the training program
at the same college and was subsequently kicked out. 104,105,106 Again, his classroom behavior was
called into question. His supervisors found him sleeping in class and on the gun range on
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approximately two occasions and on another, he disappeared from campus without telling his
instructors. 107 Apparently, Mateen explained he fell ill with a high fever and he “was scared and
must have dozed off in the classroom. [His] mother called [him] to come home and rest.” 108
Mateen’s transcript showed he earned B’s in five of his corrections academy courses but left six
courses including “weapons” and “defensive tactics” incomplete. 109 Other occasions reflecting his
harmful end objectives to engage in violence and murder was when Mateen asked a fellow recruit
if he would tell on him for showing up to class with a gun (first occasion on April 14, 2007) and
threatened to shoot and kill his fellow recruits during a class barbeque when a piece of pork
touched his hamburger on another (second occasion during the Spring of the same year). 110,111 The
timing of Mateen’s statement of bringing a gun to class was unnerving because just two days later,
student Seung-Hui Cho perpetrated the Virginia Tech shooting, killing 33 (including himself) and
23 injured. 112 According to Skipper, “In light of recent tragic events at Virginia Tech, Officer
Mateen's inquiry about bringing a weapon to class is at best extremely disturbing.” 113 Despite the
termination, Mateen was hired by G4S, a private security company that same year as a security
guard. Prior to his employment and after passing a background check, Mateen completed a training
course and was required by gun laws to train with weapons including fulfilling the required eight
hours on a shooting range. 114,115 This is evident Mateen had prior weapons training (i.e., learning
how to shoot a gun with accuracy 116). According to a former student, they “had to hit center mass
— shoulders, arms, they didn’t count.” 117 Mateen was a skilled marksman who scored near perfect
scores – the maximum score on the state’s live-fire test is 240 and his scores were in the 230s with
the highest being 238 before dropping to 223 in his August 2014 test. 118 Further, Mateen held both
security officer and statewide firearm licenses. 119 His licenses indicate his ease of access to
weapons (i.e., firearms). Of interest, a psychologist denied administering a mental health
evaluation prior to obtaining firearm license (required under state law) despite her name being on
the form, submitted to the state of Florida on September 6, 2007. 120 The form certified “the
employee is mentally and emotionally stable” and allowed Mateen to obtain a Class G firearm
permit to carry out his duties as a security guard. 121 Mateen did score above average for the
Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory [MMPI] and had a favorable recommendation for
armed security employment. 122 During his stint as a security guard, several coworkers complained
of his racism, misogyny, homophobia, and violent threats. 123 In fact a coworker, Daniel Gilroy
said Mateen “…was scary in a concerning way. And it wasn't at times. It was all the time. He had
anger management issues. Something would set him off, but the things that would set him off were
always women, race or religion. [Those were] his button pushers. [He] always referred to every
other race, religion, gender in a derogatory way. He did not like black people at all. That was
mentioned once or twice, but more so was women. He did not like women at all. He did like women
in a sexual way, but he did not respect them” 124 It was only a matter of time before Gilroy requested
a transfer to get away from Mateen because working with him was so difficult and “toxic,” stating
he had “never heard [Mateen] refer to anybody who was black or gay as anything else but n---ers
and queers.” 125,126 Based on their interactions, Mateen expressed hatred and intolerance and used
dehumanizing language toward various racial and religious groups. As highlighted above and his
previous behavior, Mateen demonstrated clear disdain towards women and exhibited signs of a
hierarchical mindset of men being superior to women. In 2008, Mateen met Sitora Yusufiy, an
Uzbekistan immigrant, on Myspace portraying himself as a charmer with a decent job and dreams
to become a police officer. 127,128 Despite Yusufiy’s father expressing his disapproval of his
daughter’s relationship with Mateen because they met online, the couple married in April 2009
and bought a condominium in Fort Pierce (between Interstate 95 and the shore in a working-class
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neighborhood) but separated after nine months. 129,130,131,132 According to Yusufiy, Mateen quickly
became controlling, abusive, and unpredictable. 133 Yusufiy accused Mateen of domestic abuse and
being a steroid abuser and called her parents to help her leave the relationship. 134 Yusufiy said
Mateen forced her to hand him her paychecks, forbade her from leaving the house except for work,
and from calling her parents; minor violations were met with violence. 135 “He would just come
home and start beating me up because the laundry wasn’t finished or something like that,” Yusufiy
added. 136 According to experts like Deborah Epstein, a law professor and a co-director of the
Domestic Violence Clinic at the Georgetown University Law Center, domestic violence is used by
male abusers to impose their perceived view of conventional gender roles and such “traditions” in
the U.S were entrenched in the idea of men having control over women: “That’s our culture: It’s
all about men controlling women in their lives.” 137 Later in July 2011, a judge ruled their marriage
was “irretrievably broken” (i.e., romantic problems). 138,139 Subsequently in September 2011,
Mateen met his current wife, Noor Zahi Salman on an internet dating site, Arab Lounge and their
union resulted in a young son born in September 2012, Zakariaya Omar Mateen (though his name
has been changed after the incident). 140,141,142 Similar to Yusufiy’s domestic abuse experiences,
Mateen began abusing Salman six months into their marriage and isolating her while abusing
steroids (contributing to weight gain and mood destabilization) 143; Salman mentioned an instance
while they were shopping, Mateen had punched and bruised her shoulder and threatened her with
more violence if she told her parents about it while she was pregnant. 144,145 Another time, Mateen
had slammed Salman into a wall and strangled her, telling her to “stay out of [his] business.” 146
His difficulty in maintaining platonic relationships carried on throughout his adult life – Mateen
rarely spoke to others and even when spoken to, “he would just look at you like you were crazy,”
according to neighbor Jason Beers. 147 Similarly, Mateen’s imam at the Islamic Center of Fort
Pierce where he worshipped since childhood said he would visit “three or four times a week” and
rarely interacted with others. 148 For the final two years of his life approximately since 2014,
Mateen became angrier over the plight of the Muslims overseas. 149 At this point, it is possible
Mateen began viewing violent extremist materials. In fact, Salman was aware Mateen watched
jihadist videos (e.g., beheading videos) evidence of Mateen’s consumption of online
content. 150,151,152 Further, evidence proved Mateen was radicalized via the internet. 153 Mateen told
Mohammad Malik, a friend, he was listening to Anwar al-Awlaki (a now deceased al-Qaeda cleric)
and described his recordings as “powerful.” 154 It was clear Awlaki held a certain degree of sway
over Mateen (i.e., indoctrination). In 2013, G4S took Mateen from his security post at the St. Lucie
County Courthouse after he made “inflammatory comments” boasting about his so-called terrorist
ties to al-Qaeda and Hezbollah and saying he hoped the FBI would raid his home so he could
become a martyr (i.e., evidence demonstrating his intent for martyrdom). 155,156 His comments
resulted in the sheriff’s office notifying the FBI and request for his removal from the courthouse. 157
According to the St. Lucie County sheriff, Ken Mascara, a deputy mentioned something (possibly
distasteful) which upset Mateen and he “became very agitated and made a comment that he could
have Al Qaeda kill my employee and his family… he followed it up with very disturbing comments
about women and followed it up with very disturbing comments about Jews and then went on to
say that the Fort Hood shooter was justified in his actions.” 158 Based on Mateen’s sentences, it is
evident of his hatred for women and Jews. Additionally, Mateen sympathized with and glorified
the mass shooting violence perpetrated by Nidal Hasan, an Army psychiatrist, at Fort Hood, Texas,
killing 13 and injuring over 30 others. 159 Subsequently, G4S transferred him to work at a
residential golfing community. 160 According to G4S spokesman Nigel Fairbrass, court officials
never mentioned these comments except Mateen’s behavior was unconducive to the courthouse
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environment and straining relationships between him and his co-workers. However, Mateen
acknowledged those remarks but only did so in anger over continuous harassment. On one
occasion, Mateen said a fellow security guard had provoked him stating, “We have to be careful –
Omar may send us a bomb and he will get his 72 virgins.” 161 On another occasion, a deputy told
Mateen he had pork oil on his fingers and that he was going to rub them on his shirt. 162 Similar to
his childhood bullying experiences, it is likely Mateen also faced adulthood harassment over his
race and religion. 163 In a letter to his bosses at G4S, Mateen wrote the following statement: “I love
the United States. The boasting, I did it just to satisfy the gang of co-workers who ganged up
against me. I'm 1,000% pure American. I'm against these terrorists, any one of them.” 164 Mateen’s
statement reflected an absence of hostility against his national identity. As a result of this 2013
incident and in 2014 being linked to a fellow like-minded individual, Moner Mohammad AbuSalha, who worshipped at the same mosque with Mateen and later became a suicide bomber in
Syria, Mateen was “on the [government’s] radar” and interviewed three times but was not a target
for any specific investigation. 165,166 However, the FBI concluded Mateen was not a threat and
closed the investigations after 10 months. 167,168 This is evidence Mateen did not have personal
and/or direct contact with any violent extremists. In 2015, Mateen was denied admission when he
applied for law enforcement academy to become a police officer though he did not appeal that
decision (i.e., unfulfilled aspirations). 169,170 Because Mateen saw himself in uniform, buff and
armed, 171 this rejection might have been a blow to his ego and indicated his need for status. Caitlin
Kelly was a co-worker of Mateen at G4S in 2004 and 2005 said she reconnected with him in
October 2015 on Plenty of Fish, a Canadian online dating service widely popular in the U.S. 172
For several months, Kelly talked over the phone with Mateen and he came over one night a few
months ago in 2016. 173 Mateen claimed to have “baby mama drama” problems with his son’s
mother and never told Kelly he was married, pressuring her instead to have a sexual relationship
but she claimed to have rejected his advances. 174 In another instance, an unnamed woman claimed
Mateen’s pursuit of her turned toward stalking – he messaged her to tell her he was nearby, knew
the color of her car, and the general location of her place of work. 175 Such an attempted affairs
illustrated Mateen’s philandering ways (i.e., romantic relationship problems). His stalking
tendencies have even been observed in his teens. According to Bedar Bakht, a family friend,
Mateen “…used to chase girls a lot. We used to get complaints about that. Some girls have said he
was weird, kind of a stalking kind of a person.” 176 In fact, Mateen had even used a friend to hide
his infidelities from Salman and went through various usernames like “makeitlovelylol,” and lying
about his age. 177 In 2006, Mateen registered as a Democrat to vote in Florida but did not do so for
that year’s elections though he voted in the March 2016 presidential primary. 178 His participation
in voting also illustrated his societal involvement. The mass shooting appeared to have been
planned several months in advance. Mateen had used five Facebook accounts to write statements
and conduct searches on the ISIS. 179,180 Evidence indicated Mateen used Facebook to search for
San Bernardino terrorists in May 2016 and later searched for “Baghdadi speech” in June 2016.181
Investigators said Mateen became deeply entrenched with the extremist group and increasingly
sought out their videos and propaganda leading up to the attack. 182 Salman had once drove Mateen
to Pulse to surveil the location, explaining why some regulars at that particular nightclub reported
spotting him there. 183 However, forensic evidence disputed this and location data did not place the
couple anywhere in the vicinity of the nightclub prior to the attack. 184 This is evident Mateen may
have planned an attack but did not have a specific target in mind to focus his preparatory activities
on. Besides the Pulse nightclub, Mateen and his wife visited Disney in April 2016 and security
officials there speculated he was conducting surveillance and forensic evidence placed Mateen
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specifically at the Disney Springs and World on the day of the attack. 185,186,187 Mateen may have
intended to conduct the attack at Disney World but became alarmed by law enforcement
presence. 188 Hence, it is likely the Pulse nightclub was selected on the day of the attack resulting
in the “identification of target in response to perceived injustice” being coded as absent and
demonstrating his highly impulsive nature. Months and weeks prior to the attack, Mateen added
Salman to his life insurance policy, ensured she had access to his bank accounts, and transferred
his share of the home (where his sister and brother-in-law lived) to them for just $10 (i.e., evidence
of Mateen dissolving personal effects). 189 Salman added Mateen spent thousands of dollars (i.e.,
funds) which included buying her jewelry worth more than $9,000, giving her spending money,
and the weapons used in the attack. 190 Because of Mateeen’s firearm licenses, it allowed him to
legally purchase a $500 handgun (i.e., Glock firearm) and a $1,800 long gun (i.e., semiautomatic
AR-15) weeks prior to the attack (i.e., access to weapons/firearms). 191,192 Based on his behavior,
it was obvious Mateen was planning to die in the attack. Investigators believe Salman knew about
the attack plans ahead of time and it was also worth noting Salman cautioned Mateen against doing
anything before he left their home the night of the shooting, indicating a degree of awareness
though she was later acquitted of all charges. 193,194,195 It is likely Mateen displayed his intent to
plan and prepare for violence for Salman to pick up on concerning behavior enough for her to warn
her husband that night. In fact, the jury foreman emphasized the jury was convinced she knew her
husband was planning an attack but “she may not have known what day, or what location, but she
knew. However, we were not tasked with deciding if she was aware of a potential attack.” 196
Similar to how Mateen behaved in the classroom, he checked social media during his violent
rampage to check the media coverage, clearly indicating his need for status and sense of
thrill/excitement. 197 In fact throughout multiple 911 calls during the attack, Mateen insisted to be
called a “mujahideen,” an “Islamic soldier,” and “Soldier of God.” 198,199 In one of the calls, Mateen
made the following statements indicating his affiliation to the group (i.e., by pledging allegiance
to the now deceased former ISIS leader) and commitment to the extremist ideology: 200,201 “I pledge
my allegiance to [Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi] on behalf of the Islamic State…My homeboy Tamerlan
Tsarnaev did his thing on the Boston Marathon, my homeboy [unidentified name] did his thing,
okay, so now it’s my turn, okay?” Further, Mateen claimed responsibility and stated he was doing
this on behalf of the group as exemplified from his statement (i.e., group influence and control),
“…Just let it be known it's going to be done in the name of the Islamic State…” 202 There are
several motivations put forth but none have reached consensus, though it is likely the mass
shooting was a result of mixed motivations – both opportunistic (i.e., personal hatred towards gays)
and political/moral (i.e., group-based injustice/victimization) in nature. In fact, the investigation
was veering toward the belief that Mateen’s motivation in engaging violence was more personal
than political. 203 According to Seddique asserted Mateen became furious after he saw a gay couple
kissing in front of his family, a possibility that could have triggered the gunman and led to the
mass shooting. 204 Seddique’s support for the Taliban (who preached gays should be punished and
stoned them to death) showed his implicit agreement with the violence. 205 In fact, Seddique posted
a video on Facebook in June 2016 (day after the attack) vilifying the LGBT community, stating
“God will punish those involved in homosexuality.” 206 It is possible such anti-gay sentiments were
passed from Seddique to Mateen. 207 According to Yusufiy, Mateen had “gay tendencies.” 208 Cord
Cedeno claimed he saw Mateen’s photos on several gay apps including Grindr, Adam4Adam, and
Jack’d and that had contacted him and his friends previously, stating that “[h]e was very creepy in
his messages, and I blocked him immediately.” 209,210 Multiple eyewitnesses placed Mateen at the
nightclub prior to the attack despite the FBI stating a lack of evidence. 211 Jim Van Horn, one of
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these eyewitnesses stated, “Nobody's going to say they slept with a terrorist and be on national
TV.” 212 Another eyewitness, Kevin West claimed he interacted with Mateen on Jack’d for a year,
asserting that “[i]t's almost certain that he covered his tracks. Lots of people are still secretive
about it. They say they don't show their face online because, 'I'm not out to my family, or because
of my career.” 213 In fact, from Mateen’s days at the community college, friends and co-workers
questioned his sexuality and some had simply assumed he was gay. A former college classmate
believed Mateen was gay and had once tried to pick him up at a bar in 2006. 214 Mateen had asked
the unnamed classmate about his sexuality to which he denied and Mateen responded “Well if you
were gay, you would be my type…It was not anything too crazy, but I take that as a pickup line.” 215
In another instance, David Gonzalez, a next-door neighbor of Mateen’s parents recalled how
Mateen had looked at him “in a certain way like he wanted me to approach him. He knew I was
gay.” 216 Based on Seddique’s post-attack statements, it was obvious Mateen’s father held
conservative views on homosexuality and would have made it difficult for Mateen to come out. 217
Literature suggests several motives for anti-gay crimes including proving heterosexuality and
purging secret homosexual desires. 218 According to Dr. Michael Stone, a professor of clinical
psychiatry at Columbia University, “[Mateen] is killing the homosexual side of himself in a jihadist
situation. He believes he’s going to heaven to be a hero. He’s not purely gay; he has two wives.
Therefore he was more tempted to prove that he’s 100 percent straight by killing gays. He had a
conflict about his sexuality where he would also struggle with his wishes to move in the
homosexual world. He thinks, ‘I’m the last person in the world you can call a f-g’.” 219 Further,
Mateen wrote the following statements in a Facebook post described to be his last, demonstrating
his attitude justifying his violent offending: “You kill innocent women and children by doing us
airstrikes. Now taste the Islamic state vengeance. In the next few days you will see attacks from
the Islamic state in the [USA]…may Allah accept me.” 220,221Additionally, over the 911 calls,
Mateen reiterated his strong feelings of redressing group-based injustice/victimization, “You have
to tell America to stop bombing Syria and Iraq. They are killing a lot of innocent people. What am
I to do here when my people are getting killed over there. You get what I’m saying?” Based on
these statements, Mateen’s motivation for the Orlando nightclub shooting was political and moral
in nature and indicated Mateen’s intention to engage in and glorify violence. Mateen demonstrated
the same intolerance and the “us and them” thinking, this time referencing the ‘other’ Muslims
illustrated by his post, “[t]he real [M]uslims will never accept the filthy ways of the west.” 222 Here,
it is clear Mateen expressed rejection of the Western society and associated values however it is
unknown if he held such views prior to the attack, hence evidence of the risk factor is coded absent.
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Appendix 6: Violent Extremist Case 2 - Leo Vincelette Felton
Perpetrator’s name: Leo Vincelette Felton a/k/a "Leo V Oladimu"
Event Narrative Summary
On April 19, 2001, Leo Vincelette Felton (30) and his girlfriend, Erica Chase (21) were arrested
when Chase attempted to use a counterfeit bill at a Dunkin' Donuts store and coincidentally on
the anniversary of the Oklahoma City bombing. 223,224 Felton and Chase belonged to Aryan Unit
One, a small violent extremist “cell” planning both criminal activities (fraud and robbery) and
terror attacks. The couple’s main objective was to ignite a “racial holy war.” 225,226 Both of them
were tied to white supremacist groups and extremist activities. 227 Later, the couple was indicted
in June on federal bomb, weapons, and counterfeiting charges. 228 Robert Anthony, a Boston
police officer who booked the couple stated “It's just like Timothy McVeigh. He was caught by
a cop at a traffic stop” 229 At the trial, the jury convicted both defendant on all counts except
acquitting Chase’s counterfeiting count. In 2002, Felton was sentenced to sentenced to 262
months (nearly 22 years) while Chase to 57 months (nearly 8 years). 230,231
Individual risk factors
Need for identity, meaning, belonging
Present
Need for status
Present
Need for excitement, comradeship, or adventure
Present
Need for dominance
Present
Susceptibility to indoctrination
Present
Political/moral motivation
Present
Opportunistic involvement
Absent
Transitional periods
Present
Mental health
Present
Criminal history
Present
Individual-situational risk factors
Family or friends support extremist offending
Present
Access to networks, funding, and equipment
Present
Early exposure to pro-violence militant ideology
Present
Individual knowledge, skills, and competencies: Tactical, paramilitary, explosive
Absent
training
Personal contact with violent extremists
Present
Seeker, consumer, developer of violent extremist materials
Present
Individual-group risk factors
Need to defend against threat
Present
Group influence and control
Absent
Over-identification with a group or cause/ Hostility to national collective identity
Present
Attitudes justifying offending
Present
Victim of injustice and grievances
Present
Feelings of hate, frustration, persecution, alienation
Present
Rejection of democratic society and values
Present
Dehumanization of the enemy
Present
Us and them thinking
Present
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Identification of target (person, place, group) in response to perceived injustice
Harmful end objectives / Anger and expressed intent to act violently
Harmful end objectives: Expressed desire to die for cause or martyrdom
Harmful means to an end / Intent to plan, prepare for violence
Extremist ideological training
Harmful means to an end: Glorification of violent action

Present
Present
Absent
Present
Present
Present

Perpetrator’s sequential background/profile with details/evidence below for each risk factor
present within the corresponding domain
Leo Vincelette Felton was born in 1970 in Silver Spring, Maryland to Calvin Felton, a black
architect and Corrinne Vincelette, a white voice and diction professor and an ex-nun, both of whom
became involved in the civil rights movement. 232,233 His parents divorced when he was only two
years old. 234 After the divorce, Corinne came out as a lesbian and later re-married Nancy Clinch,
a Jewish feminist author. 235,236 Together with Clinch, Corinne raised him and Clinch’s two
daughters in a upper-middle class, progressive and liberal home in Gaithersburg (i.e., high
childhood socioeconomic strata). 237,238 Growing up, Felton rubbed elbows with prominent figures
of the 1960s anti-war movement, anti-Vietnam War priests, brothers Daniel and Phillip Berrigan
and Pete Seeger, his mother’s friends while Corinne was leading anti-apartheid rallies and
protecting abortion clinics with her fellow members of the National Organization of Women. 239,240
Despite the divorce, Felton maintained a decent relationship with his father and spent weekends
with Calvin’s other family, including several of his adolescent years. 241 In spite of his success as
an architect, Calvin lives in a poverty-stricken, black-populated area in Baltimore with his seven
children (i.e., Felton’s five black half-brothers and two black half-sisters) from his second
marriage, perceived as an expression of racial solidarity. 242,243 Although Felton had relatively good
childhood with regular contact with his parents and siblings 244, Felton often felt out of place and
racially marginalized and had spent his adolescence looking for a “flock” to call his own but was
unable to find it. 245 This is indicative of his need to belong. In fact, he experienced discrimination
growing up (i.e., childhood bullying/discrimination – abuse), being one of the only few biracial
individuals in a significantly white neighborhood, which Corinne was unequipped to handle. 246 It
would always start off with a quarrel over someone saying something about either his absent black
father or his lesbian mother, and Felton would either tell him to shut up or end in a physical fight. 247
However, one afternoon Felton, 10, got into an argument with John, a white boy living in the
neighborhood and Cory, a black friend from John’s school. Cory called Felton a “half breed” and
Felton became furious, chasing after the boy with a knife from his tackle box, threatening he was
going to kill him. 248 Felton’s friends and relatives knew him as a mentally disturbed and violent
youth. 249 Felton was first institutionalized at 10 at the Psychiatric Institute of Washington, after
chasing after Cory with a knife and this institutionalization trend continued for the next four years,
going back and forth between psychiatric hospitals and schools before being discharged at
14. 250,251,252 This indicates Felton’s mental health issues and prior treatment. In fact, Dr. DiCataldo
cited Felton’s personality disorders and admits “the rehabilitation of a life-course persistent
criminal offender, the so-called antisocial or psychopathic character, is a problem that mental
health intervention has little empirical evidence supporting its success.” 253 At the same time, he
was enrolled and subsequently expelled from one school to another despite having a 150 IQ level,
along with an exceptional vocabulary and drawing talent and once took classes at the Corcoran
School of Arts. 254,255 It is likely Felton’s violent antisocial behavior and conduct problems was the
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result of his frequent expulsions. In fact, Felton was known as a bully who picked fights. 256
According to neighbors and school records, Felton had flung Molotov cocktails at garages, tried
to cut electric cables of a house across the street, and attempted to stab a classmate’s eye. 257 After
he dropped out of Mark Twain School for the emotionally disturbed at 17, Felton got into the
wrong crowd and hung out with the local skinheads (i.e., like-minded friends) and was constantly
at odds with white supremacist skinheads in nearby Baltimore, 258 getting his first and early taste
of the far-right extremist movement (adolescent exposure to violent extremist ideology). From this
exposure, it is likely Felton identified with the skinhead ideology from his group membership and
developed racial hatred towards minorities. Additionally, it is here Felton started to reject his
blackness. Though he later stopped blaming the racists from his childhood, it was not surprising
that Felton blamed his parents for mixing their blood, “contaminating” him with black blood and
labelled the act as “evil…and transgressing against the law of nature,” and by extension the
government was “wrong” for sanctioning such acts (indicating anti-government sentiments). 259,260
He came to view his mother as a pervert while he deliberately became estranged from his father
and the black culture. 261 In his own words, Felton described his “world prior to prison was
White…nothing ‘mixed’ or ‘black’ or ‘multicultural’…ever” and he blamed his criminality on a
combination of his institutionalization and the belief that his body contained “aggressive black
‘racial’ DNA.” 262 At this point, he got addicted to drugs namely heroine (“smack”) and the start
of his criminal and later violent history, demonstrating his risk-taking nature in criminal
engagement. 263 He stole vehicles including bikes and cars, and even a piggy bank from another
skinhead. 264 He tried to kill himself at least one time, demonstrating his suicidal tendencies and
mental issues. 265 Despite having a suspended sentence, Felton went on a cross-country petty theft
spree under a multitude of different personas. 266 In October 1989 at 19 when he viciously assaulted
Edward Torres (the victim suffered a fractured jaw and skull), a Cuban-American taxi driver using
a tire iron and left him to die in what he described as a ‘road rage’ incident (which was later duly
rejected by the jury) despite it bearing indications of racial animosity. 267,268 In fact, based on the
presentencing report (PSR), Felton had bragged that he had beaten a Pakistani. 269 While on release
in November 1989, Felton and a fellow delinquent peer burglarized a Rutgers’s fraternity house
and had hurled racial slurs (i.e., evidence of his hatred towards non-whites) while beating up a
fraternity member (the victim received 15 stitches to his head and later developed a paranoia about
“skinheads”). 270 Felton’s criminal binge ended in 1990 when he got into a dispute with law
enforcement and his fingerprints revealed a series of arrest warrants. 271 Ultimately, he was
convicted of assault and sentenced to three years in state prison, the sentence later extended after
he stabbed two inmates. 272 In February 1993, Felton assaulted a Hispanic inmate with a razor
resulting in a 12 inch laceration on his face with others on his arms and subsequently in July of
that year, Felton sliced a Black inmate’s neck in an ambush, yelling “that he wanted blood and that
he felt good.” 273 That same year, he got married to Lisa Meetre Felton though it was unknown how
they first met. 274 Despite Felton’s and his family and friends’ non-racist justifications, Felton’s
radicalization into a violent white supremacist bearing strong hatred towards non-whites because
of their unjust treatment towards the whites hardened behind bars. 275,276,277 In fact, Felton himself
witnessed racial segregation in prison while noticing the inmates’ negative reactions towards
enforced integration and the lack of societal stigmas or enforcement over racism. 278 Felton claimed
white inmates were constantly victimized by their non-whites counterparts and in spite of that the
whites were welcomed him and that “the only people that I had anything in common with all
happened to be white.” 279,280 Because the whites were the minority, they constantly felt threatened
– “This was not a game. Guys were dying. It was a very serious situation. There was definitely a
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siege mentality among whites…We were surrounded on all sides by an antagonistic alien presence.
We stuck together,” Felton stated. 281 In fact, the Blacks had attempted to rape him leading Felton
to draw conclusions from the black inmates’ behaviors to the black culture in general. 282,283 It is
likely Felton viewed the non-White inmates as a perceived threat to be defended against. The “us
and them” thinking permeated inmates and the overall prison environment and Felton was no
exception. Felton’s words aptly described the prison environment, “Everyone there is on a side,
and if you don’t pick one, then it’ll be picked for you.” 284 In one instance, when Felton was
transferred to Attica (upstate New York) where the prison already had a well-established racist
faction in the late 90s. Of 60 or 70 white prisoners in the C Block where Felton was held, only 20
were allowed to sit at the two mess hall tables he and others reserved for the “''politicized.” 285 Like
the time he spent as a skinhead youth, Felton began to seek out and indulge in neo-Nazi materials
from the Aryan nations, an Idaho-based hate group (i.e., violent extremist content). 286 Being deeply
ashamed of his mixed ancestry, Felton grew to believe that race as a spiritual concept instead of a
biological one based on Imperium by Francis Parker Yockey and understood race to be choice.
“'Race is, in the first instance, what a man feels,” Felton quoted. 287 Felton chose white, essentially
rejecting his black side and attempted to rationalize his choice by using his deep commitment to
the cause (i.e., over-identification with the far-right cause) in comparison to his fellow associates,
“My intention was something that nine-tenths of my comrades in the movement ran their mouths
about all day long for years on end yet simply lacked the courage to do. Under such circumstances
I saw nothing immoral in my withholding of part of my genealogy from them.” 288 It is likely Felton
tried to overcompensate for his lack of a ‘thorough white lineage’ through his deliberate overcommitment to the cause. Felton took inspiration from the White Order of Thule (WOT), later
becoming a member of the self-described Aryan Order with the same name, comprising of a small
“elite” group of racist pagans, which further shaped his ideological beliefs. 289,290 The group
advocates for violence to further white supremacy and to rid the U.S. of a multi-racial society and
Jewish influence. 291 Based on Felton’s WOT group membership, it demonstrates his antigovernment sentiments, specifically on the support for multiculturalism. Further, Assistant U.S.
Attorney Theodore Merritt stated this specific group were “committed to the idea that not all men
were created equal.” 292 This demonstrates Felton’s dominant thinking that a certain racial group,
in this case whites were deemed superior than the other races. During his prison stint, Felton
became involved in white supremacist groups and engaged in extremist activism to recruit others
to his cause. 293 According to Felton, “It became codified. We had mandatory workouts, mandatory
book reports. I had a whole curriculum developed. I kind of took pride in it...” Putting his artistic
skills to use, Felton drew and created a comic book about a lone-wolf terrorist committed to
overthrowing the U.S. government, demonstrating his anti-government sentiments while hoping
to find an external audience beyond his prison wall. According to court testimony, Felton’s Aryan
separatism and supremacy beliefs strengthened while in New Jersey prisons where he met and
became close to Wesley “Wolf” Dellinger, head of the East Coast Aryan Brotherhood and who
also decided which minority inmates were targeted for murder (i.e., had personal contact with a
violent extremist). 294,295 When he transferred to the maximum security prison at Northern States
in 1999, Felton had earned a reputation as a committed white supremacist and hardcore racist (i.e.,
over-identification with the violent extremist group and cause). 296 By that time, prison officials
knew Felton to be a prominent apostle of the WOT, Felton described as a “graduate-level school
of Aryan.” 297 Additionally, the prison staff knew he was a member of the East Coast Aryan
Brotherhood (multiple group memberships) and importantly knew Felton to be charismatic,
making him an effective recruiter. 298 In 2000, Felton took on an official leadership position within
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the white supremacy prison ranks and developed an elaborate system for Aryan separatism and
supremacy education and indoctrination for a select group. 299 In fact, prosecutors also alleged
Felton laid the foundation for “Aryan Unit One,” a terrorist cell attempting to instigate a “racial
holy war” (RAHOWA, a term created by the Creativity Movement – a white supremacist pseudoreligion; glorify violence). 300,301 His prominence not only gave him direct access to other likeminded violent extremists but other fellow inmates looked to him for racial instruction. Despite
having knowledge about Felton’s activities, prison officials have him a like-minded cellmate,
Michael Reid who was a fellow member of the Aryan Brotherhood while maintaining contact with
Dellinger. 302 Finally, Felton felt accepted and was part of a group, not marginally but extremely
involved with influential power which had a deeply addictive effect on him. 303 According to
Felton, “It's a different kind of belonging. It's like shooting half a gram of pure belonging into the
biggest vein in your arm.” This statement indicates Felton’s need for belonging and status. By that
time in April 2000, Reid had introduced Erica Chase to Felton and the pair began to correspond
with each other via a prison outreach program by the World Church of the Creator, a white
supremacist group which Chase was a member of thus beginning their year-long affair (i.e., likeminded romantic partner). 304,305 Beyond their discussion of racist ideologies in those letters, Felton
wrote about his plans though vague indicating a harmful objective of murder and violence, pending
his release. 306 In a letter to Chase three months before his release (approximately in October 2000),
Felton wrote “before too long, I will be dropping off the face of the earth to participate in the
historical process, at which time all ties to my past and current life (i.e., all means by which our
enemy can track me) will be cut.” 307 Though vague, this statement indicates a potential likelihood
of Felton’s willingness to die for his cause but it can also suggest his intent to engage in
concealment behavior after achieving his objective. As such, evidence for the ‘martyrdom’ risk
factor is coded absent. Additionally, this statement reflects Felton’s political motivation to ignite
RAHOWA to rid the United States of multi-racial society and Jewish influence. 308,309 In another
letter dated “Yule 26th” (December 26th) 2000, Felton wrote “If I don't hear back from you before
Jan. 28th,” he wrote, “I might be on the street! Scary thought (for the untermenschen, not me).” 310
Based on his written prose, Felton used dehumanizing language to describe non-Whites as inferior
and/or sub-humans and hinted at using violence to harm the minority races. Chase later confided
in a friend and a fellow white supremacist, James Niemczura, she intended to bomb a Holocaust
or black history museum while Felton was planning on “robbing banks” and “blowing stuff up”
upon his release and was prepared to die within the year (i.e., the lack of evidence resulted in the
martyrdom risk factor coded as absent). 311 At the same time, Felton plotted with Dellinger and
completely dissociated himself from the black side of his family, looking forward to igniting
RAHOWA in the U.S (i.e., harmful end objective and deliberate familial isolation/rejection). 312
Once Felton was released in January 2001, he went back to Lisa, in Ipswich, Massachusetts
(Apartment 161, at 101 Colonial Drive), who had stood by him for almost eight years and started
to execute his plot and working on Aryan Unit One, this time with specifics in mind. 313,314,315 The
plot was modeled on the Order (known as the Silent Brotherhood or Brüder Schweigen), a white
supremacist group of outlaws who robbed armored cars of $4 million, counterfeiting money, and
murdered Jewish radio host, Alan Berg in 1984 to further a white supremacist agenda – to ensure
the existence and a future for the whites and the children. 316,317 Bob Matthews, the pundit of the
Order became a ‘martyr’ to the movement when he was killed in an FBI shootout that same year.
In a letter to Felton, Wolf wrote “Hail to you, Hail to Odin, the Spirit of Bob lives on.” By taking
inspiration from a prominent figure in the white supremacy movement and considering Matthews
as a ‘hero’, Felton exhibits deep admiration and view Matthews as a role model. Felton purchased
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books and looked up websites containing instructions for homemade explosives and concealment
techniques using false identities. 318 Meticulously, he wrote ingredient lists and bought materials
to mimic the bomb Timothy McVeigh used in the Oklahoma City bombing (indicative from his
abbreviation “OKC” in some of his lists). 319 Felton had advised Lisa to get a firearm (supposedly
for her own protection) and she did, a .38-caliber revolver which he took for himself and obliterated
the serial number to curtail law enforcement tracing should he use it for his criminal activities (i.e.,
access to weapon). 320 He purchased software and printing supplies to produce counterfeit bills on
his home computer (i.e., access to equipment and to obtain funding through fraud). 321 Additionally,
Felton made plans to lease an apartment in Boston for Aryan Unit One headquarters while Chase
helped him “clean” the counterfeit money he printed by buying trivial items from stores and
receiving real money in return. 322 Two weeks after Felton left Northern State prison, he received
Dellinger’s letter. In it, Dellinger wrote “prison can be used as a training facility and should be,”
referring to indoctrinating potential recruits to their violent cause and as Dellinger knew Felton to
be living proof of effective such ‘training’ can be, demonstrating how susceptible to indoctrination
Felton was. 323 One such person was Thomas "Hammer" Struss who got in contact with Felton as
was instructed by Dellinger after he was released in February 2001. 324 Once Struss came over to
stay with Felton in Massachusetts at his invitation. 325 Within hours, Felton was convincing him
into being an accomplice for a bank robbery. “It'd be good to bind our blood as a loyalty test,”
Struss recalled Felton saying. This made Struss bewildered, “We'd just met each other six hours
ago and we were planning a job.” 326 All the same, they agreed bank and armored car robberies,
and counterfeiting were feasible attempts to obtain funding in order to further their violent cause
by going “underground” and provoking racial violence by bombing or killing minority-related
infrastructure such as Boston's New England Holocaust Memorial and Leonard P. Zakim Bunker
Hill Bridge and civil rights leaders like Reverend Jesse Jackson, Al Sharpton and Morris Dees,
amongst others (i.e., identification of targets for preparatory activities). 327,328 In fact, Felton had
surveilled the Holocaust Museum in Washington D.C., indicative from an admission “passport” to
said location during a search later. 329 In letters to an unspecified accomplice, Felton wrote “[T]he
primary goal right now is to foment revolution and inaugurate a natural order on the continent…the
means by which we will attain this is quite simply war.” 330 This statement reflects Felton’s political
motivation and his reference to the ‘natural order’ 331 was the same concept to Hitler’s,
demonstrating his need for social dominance favoring hierarchical racial relations. After hearing
about Felton’s plot targeting the Boston Holocaust Memorial, Dellinger wrote “In Odin's name,
may you guide us to victory.” 332 Reid agreed with Dellinger but added a warning, “I'm very excited
about this news. I know I don't need to say it, but heed it anyway: Many dry runs.” 333 Though
limited because of their incarceration, both Dellinger and Reid provided advice and recruitment
for the plot within prison. 334 Further, there was no evidence of Felton being under group influence
and control, partly because he engaged in the planning of the terrorist plot (together with Dellinger
and Reid), led and executed the attempt (together with Struss and Chase) without any evidence of
coercion and command and control links. Further, this demonstrates Felton’s access to a network
of accomplices. The pair executed a successful bank robbery located at 607 Boylston Street in
Boston that same month for two purposes – one to obtain funds and the second to test Struss’s
loyalty and commitment to the group and associated cause. 335 During that robbery, Felton was
waiting outside with the handgun while Struss went into the bank with a demand note. The total
loot from that robbery came up to a measly $1,128. 336 Days after that, Felton planned and
instructed while Struss executed an armored car robbery at gun point (using the same gun) in
Mantua Township, New Jersey where he was arrested. 337,338 After Struss’s arrest, Felton lost access
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to the Lisa’s gun. 339 Within a few weeks, Chase had obtained a firearm (a .38 revolver that Felton
got access to), which she had inquired prior to moving from Indiana to Boston. 340 In late February
2001, Chase stole from Niemczura and sent the money to Felton to finance the startup costs of the
counterfeiting operation. 341 Making bail (with thanks to Struss’s father) in early March 2001,
Struss received a phone call from Felton, reprimanding him, “You should be with me or I should
be mourning you, because you should've had a shootout.” 342 In the phone call, Felton told Struss
both he and Chase would provide Struss new identification documents and could provide him with
a “safe house” and Chase had purchased a Greyhound bus ticket for him to travel to Boston,
through an agency in Michigan City, Indiana. 343 By mid-March, Chase had purchased a .40-caliber
Iberia semi-automatic pistol which she revealed to Niemczura that the firearm was “for
protection… from anyone trying to interfere with her plan” with Felton. 344 Chase added they would
“burn off their fingerprints with hot oil and assume the identities of missing children” so they could
“go around and be terrorists” and Niemczura would read about the couple in the news, bragging
that both of them would “go down in history”. 345,346 From February leading up to April 2001, both
Felton and Chase had kept contact with each other through more than 200 calls. 347 Around the
same time, Felton was also having problems with his wife (i.e., romantic problems with one
possibility being his affair with Chase) because by April of that year, he moved out of her
apartment and in with Chase into an apartment leased by Felton in Boston’s North End. 348,349,350
At the apartment, the couple started to collect and store materials for a fertilizer bomb, including
a coffee-maker to use as a timing device and a 50-pound bag of ammonium nitrate fertilizer and
ordered explosive devices to be delivered to the apartment (i.e., access to bomb-making materials
and equipment). 351 There was no evidence Felton received prior military/paramilitary training or
has bomb-making experience. Chase told Niemczura the bomb was her “future” with Felton. 352
Like Chase had mentioned to Niemczura, Felton took steps to engage in concealment from taking
on the identity of Walter Thomas Ackerson, a 17-year-old blond and blue-eyed boy, last seen in
Oregon in 1990 to burning off his skinhead tattoo at the Lahey Center for Cosmetic & Laser
Surgery in Lexington, Massachusetts the day prior to his arrest. 353 On April 19 2001, the couple
was arrested in East Boston after Chase had attempted to pay using a counterfeit $20 bill at a
Dunkin' Donuts store. 354 While in police custody, the couple used their relationships with others,
specifically Felton’s estranged wife and Chase’s close friend, to persuade them to destroy and hide
evidence of their criminal activities including destroying Felton’s computer hard drive and
discarding the ammonium nitrate bag, coffee maker wiring, and uncut counterfeit money. 355 In a
letter to the judge after he was found guilty, Felton admitted his objective was to establish “a
politically and territorially autonomous White nation somewhere in North America” and saw no
“honorable alternative to armed revolt.” 356 His statement indicated his anti-government sentiments
and his negative loyalty towards national identity while demonstrating his allegiance and
commitment (i.e., positive loyalty) to an all-white nation while justifying his extremist actions. In
fact, Felton demonstrated no remorse when he sent a four-page handwritten letter to the Boston
Herald and ended it with the phrase “I remain, damned and defiant,” paying homage to the writings
of David Lane, an Order member. 357 He continued to remain resolute in his commitment towards
the white supremacist agenda despite being ostracized by his fellow associates because of his now
exposed biracial identity, writing “I am what I am. Contaminated, falsely condemned, and
alienated from my comrades. But a lover of Nature (sic) nonetheless, and a lover of the West, and
ever an unrepentant enemy of the multicultural myth.” 358
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Appendix 7: Violent Extremist Case 3 - Edward Lewis Brown
Perpetrator’s name: Edward Lewis Brown a/k/a Ed Brown
Event Narrative Summary
On October 4, 2007, both Edward Lewis Brown (a retired cockroach exterminator and
hairdresser) 359 and his wife, Elaine Alice Brown (a dentist), both American citizens were
arrested after an eight month-long armed standoff at his fortress-like home in Plainfield, New
Hampshire, that began in February with U.S. marshals to protest a January 2007 tax evasion
conviction. 360 After the events of 1992 Ruby Ridge (Idaho) and 1993 Waco (Texas), the Justice
Department adapted its approach to prolong such sieges (including the Browns’ armed standoff)
with patience. 361 The armed standoff concluded peacefully after the Browns were arrested by a
team of undercover U.S. marshals who disguised themselves as supporters. 362 Brown was
sentenced to an additional 37 years of imprisonment after the July 2009 trial, which runs
consecutively to the 63-month sentence (with three years of supervised release and ordered to
pay fines and unpaid taxes close to $1 million) for the prior 2007 criminal tax conviction (the
couple did not show up for their sentencing hearing in April 2007). 363,364 Initially, his wife was
sentenced to 35 years imprisonment but a judge decided in January 2020 she could be released
after serving over 12 years. 365
Individual risk factors
Need for identity, meaning, belonging
Present
Need for status
Present
Need for excitement, comradeship, or adventure
Absent
Need for dominance
Present
Susceptibility to indoctrination
Present
Political/moral motivation
Present
Opportunistic involvement
Present
Transitional periods
Present
Mental health
Present
Criminal history
Present
Individual-situational risk factors
Family or friends support extremist offending
Present
Access to networks, funding, and equipment
Present
Early exposure to pro-violence militant ideology
Absent
Individual knowledge, skills, and competencies: Tactical, paramilitary, explosive Absent
training
Personal contact with violent extremists
Present
Seeker, consumer, developer of violent extremist materials
Present
Individual-group risk factors
Need to defend against threat
Present
Group influence and control
Absent
Over-identification with a group or cause/ Hostility to national collective identity
Present
Attitudes justifying offending
Present
Victim of injustice and grievances
Present
Feelings of hate, frustration, persecution, alienation
Present
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Rejection of democratic society and values
Dehumanization of the enemy
Us and them thinking
Identification of target (person, place, group) in response to perceived injustice
Harmful end objectives / Anger and expressed intent to act violently
Harmful end objectives: Expressed desire to die for cause or martyrdom
Harmful means to an end / Intent to plan, prepare for violence
Extremist ideological training
Harmful means to an end: Glorification of violent action

Present
Present
Present
Present
Present
Present
Present
Present
Present

Perpetrator’s sequential background/profile with details/evidence below for each risk factor
present within the corresponding domain
Edward Lewis Brown (born on July 22, 1942) 366, an American citizen had joined the Navy in 1959
at 17. However, Brown received a dishonorable discharge over an assault with a deadly weapon
charge resulting in him spending 6 months in jail. 367 Though Brown joined the Navy, it is unknown
how long he served in the Navy before this violent incident. The lack of evidence surrounding the
individual knowledge, skills, and competencies risk factor (i.e., his prior military training) resulted
in an absent code. Additionally, this was the start of his criminal and violent history though he had
promised himself “never to break another law.” His dishonorable discharge from the Navy is
evidence of his unfulfilled career aspirations. Though much of Brown’s childhood and adolescent
life is unknown, there is no evidence Brown grew up with exposure to a violent extremist ideology.
In 1965, Brown received the governor’s full pardon. 368 Throughout the years, Brown had a
sporadic employment history. According to Brown, he held down “a job a month” from 1967 to
1979. 369 In 1979, Brown went to cosmetology school (i.e., vocational school). 370 From 1979 to
1984, Brown stated he was “homeless.” 371 From 1984 to 1993, Brown worked as a cockroach
exterminator, conducting his own business in New Hampshire. 372 After two failed marriages (i.e.,
1st marriage: 1963-1967 and 2nd marriage: 1971-1979), 373 each only lasting several years, Brown
married Elaine, a divorcee as well but with a thriving dentistry practice, in 1991 at 49 years old.
His failed marriages reflects a history of maintaining romantic relationships though his marriage
to Elaine lasted approximately 29 years (she was seeking a divorce in 2020). According to David
Hatch-Bernier, her son, when Elaine married Brown, she adopted his beliefs and lost friends and
patients as a result of Brown’s preoccupation with firearms and anti-government beliefs. 374 It is
likely Brown exerted his dominance and influence over his wife. In fact, her both her children (one
son and one daughter) noticed this and described her as “intelligent, successful professional who
is dominated by Edward Brown.” 375 On one occasion, Hatch recalled picking up his mother’s purse
and asking why it was so heavy. Elaine answered, “Ed told me I had to.” 376 Based on Elaine’s
upbringing, a wife has to obey her husband, reflecting the traditional values of gender inequality
of a patriarchal society demonstrated by Brown (i.e., need for dominance). In the early 1990s,
Elaine struggled to pay her tax bill that exceeded her estimates because of penalties and interest
and tried to work out a payment plan with the IRS but they never responded. 377 Instead, IRS
demanded Elaine pay her bill in full including the penalties despite her payment attempts and
eventually decided to stop payment when she later learned a further $3,300 was tacked on and the
money seized from her bank account. 378 In 1992, Brown began his research into conspiracy
theories and started developing certain ideas about the government (e.g., believes certain
governmental figures/entities are considered part of a conspiracy to deprive Americans of life and
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liberty, the New World Order). After the Waco siege (February 28, 1993 – April 19, 1993), Brown
became “deeply disturbed… [and] paranoid for one year.” 379 Brown stated he learned through his
research about the “…Illuminati and the New World Order and…determined there was a criminal
element within the Administration, the Executive Branch” during his court proceedings. 380 At this
point, Brown started to radicalize here and his statements indicated victim-based sentiments and
his concern over the government’s overreach of power. In response to this, Brown reportedly also
developed a survivalist mentality where he stockpiled 18 months’ worth of food, weapons, and
ammunition in his basement, believing the government would take over “private property, utilities,
health facilities, and the media.” 381 Brown became involved in the anti-government militia
movement in late 1993. 382 In 1994, Brown began to engage in non-violent political activism and
formed the Un-American Activities Investigations Commission to petition both the FBI and the
State Police in Massachusetts about multiple issues including the flow of drugs from South
America into America through Keesler Air Force Base and the flow of drugs into America through
Cape Cod respectively. 383 The authorities never responded. That same year in an interview, Brown
believed the militia were creating their own “courts…for the purpose of taking back America” and
asserted the conflict between the government and the militia movement would not conclude except
through violence – “There's two freight trains coming down the track full steam ahead. True
American citizens like myself will die for my country. We will never release any firearms to the
United States.” 384 His statement demonstrated his worldview in a rigid “us vs. them” fashion and
his willingness to die for the cause. Mark Potok of the Anti-Defamation League, which tracks farright extremist groups (e.g., anti-government militias and tax protest groups), knew Brown when
he was a leader of a New Hampshire militia group, Constitution Defense Militia in 1995. 385,386,387
According to reports at that time, this militia group had approximately 15 members and met locally
to train. 388 From 1996 onwards (till 2003), the Browns stopped filing their tax returns. After the
1996 Oklahoma City bombing, Brown became a prominent figure and spokesman for the militia
movement, asserting the attack was planned by government agents to discredit the movement. 389
In 2000, Brown joined the U.S. Constitution Rangers (which had no history of violence in New
Hampshire 390) whose mission according to him was “to protect and serve the Constitutional
Republic of the several states and the People thereof under the Creator” and he later became the
leader in 2003. 391 According to Brown, such organizations were developed to hold law
enforcement officials responsible for constitutional violations. 392 Robert Wolffe, Brown’s longtime friend (and future accomplice during the October 2007 standoff) was a former state
commander and is currently the director of the U.S. Constitution Rangers and running for a seat in
the Vermont House of Representatives. 393,394 Running such organizations would place him in
direct contact with other extremists, both violent and non-violent ones. By this time, Brown was
an ardent critic of the United Nations and the U.S. government specifically on taxation and gun
laws. 395 Similar to the profile of other anti-government protestors, the Browns had prior legal and
financial issues. In 2001, the couple lost a lawsuit against an individual to whom the Browns helped
with her bakery business before she could not afford payments to the couple though this issue
started since 1999. It is possible the loss of this 2001 lawsuit resulted in the hardening of Brown’s
anti-government sentiments. In fact in a February 2002 public hearing, 396 Brown expressed his
views on organizations influencing the Constitution and state government and state judicial
corruption and abuse. Like his 1994 petitions to the authorities, Brown complained about the lack
of response and interest in his group’s evidence regarding these issues. In 2004, the Browns were
subjected to a raid on Elaine’s dental office in Lebanon for financial records. 397 Subsequently, the
Browns claimed they were violated and belittled when armed government agents arrived to simply
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download files from their computers, indicating their strong feelings of being victimized by the
government. In an interview, the Browns expressed their distress over what they perceive to be an
“unlawful” search which violated their civil rights and sued James John, the retired IRS special
agent who led the investigation and Assistant U.S. Attorney Bill Morse, who is prosecuting the
case. 398 The suit was ultimately dismissed by a judge. Several years ago, Brown had taught a homebased paramilitary survivalist course (another evidence of his survivalist mentality) and the
husband of Elaine’s receptionist who took the course, accidentally killed himself trying to imitate
a gun trick. 399,400 Elaine fought the now former employee’s attempt to claim unemployment
benefits when she could not work after the accident. 401,402 Based on the Browns’ court history and
circumstances surrounding these lawsuits, it is likely the Browns felt unjustified by the court’s
actions. By the time the Browns were charged with tax evasion in 2006, the couple was in the
midst of extensive renovations, reinforcing their home with 8-inch thick concrete walls, an
underground bunker, and a four-story watchtower. 403 Even though there was no specific target, the
government and associated representations like federal or IRS agents were overarching targets for
the incident and these renovations were considered ideological preparatory activities towards the
eventual armed standoff. Several books recovered from their home demonstrating armed violent
resistance against the government (i.e., violent extremist materials) were introduced during
Elaine’s court proceedings. These included the following: “The Anarchist Handbook,” “Guerrilla
Warfare and Special Forces Operations,” “Unconventional Warfare Devices and Techniques,”
“Booby Traps,” and “Modern Chemical Magic.” 404
Though it is known Elaine had platonic relationship issues after her marriage to Brown, it was
evident Brown himself had similar friendship troubles. In fact, Marie Miller of Farmington was
the only longtime friend in attendance during Brown’s court trials. 405 Importantly, almost all of
his close friends were like-minded individuals involved in the extremist movements (e.g., “Joe”
whom he described as his one of his best friends was a former member of the U.S. Constitution
Rangers, a now defunct national anti-government militia group he led). This illustrates his social
network (i.e., friends) involved or supported extremism. Despite having like-minded friends,
Brown was still known to have platonic relationship problems within his social circle. Bill Miller,
an ex-military exercise trainer expressed his dislike of Brown to friends and that Brown was “worth
more to me dead than alive” and later declared in a “press release” explicitly stating the following:
“I do hereby officially state that I am not to be known as a 'supporter,' nor associate of EdwardLewis:Brown…Brown has ignored, on many occasions throughout the years, the good council
(sic) of some valiant, focused, hard-working freedom fighters whom, unfortunately, exemplify a
larger spiritual vision, and a more finely tuned sense of balance and reason than does Brown” 406
In another case, Doug Kenline, a blogger who helped set up a website dedicated to the Browns
situation and interviewed the couple for daily audio broadcasts. Brown snubbed him after learning
Kenline’s wages were garnished by the IRS to pay back taxes, stating “I'm not talking any more
to people who aren't going to stand up for the lawful laws of this land… People can be slaves, and
I'm not going to associate with them anymore.” 407 Similarly Dave Ridley, a Keene member of the
Free State Project who organized pro-Brown state-wide rallies and sending updates to the media,
another Brown supporter was rejected partly because Brown disagreed with Ridley’s non-violent
beliefs. 408 Potok stated it is not unexpected for leaders in such far-right extremist groups to fight
among themselves and Brown is just another example of a prominent figure clashing with his
supporters. 409 Based on such statements, these friendships never lasted long due to his domineering
personality and ideological differences. It was clear that Brown only accepted a singular view (his
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own) regarding taxation and the government and was unable to accept alternative views,
responding with either anger or dissociation (i.e., over-identification with both the anti-tax and
government cause). Additionally, Brown was involved in the loosely-organized sovereign citizen
movement. This was evident when he displayed a badge on his belt and his vehicles similar to that
of the U.S. Marshals (even though he was not law enforcement). 410 Further evidence stemmed
from Channell’s 30-day psychological evaluation of Brown’s beliefs being consistent with the
“sovereign citizen movement” and the FBI confirming the couple as being members of the
movement. 411,412 Throughout the course of the conspiracy, the Browns emphasized in their
“Declaration of Citizenship to New Hampshire” filed in Sullivan County, not recognizing their
American citizenship but instead were non-residents of the U.S. and demonstrating their antigovernment and tax sentiments, stating the New Hampshire tax laws were invalid and labor was
not taxable. 413,414 Additionally in their filings, the couple repetitively flaunted their Caucasian
race 415, attempting to indicate their racial superiority (i.e., dominant thinking). In fact, Jose
Gonzalez, 48, a former supporter of the Browns called him a racist. 416 Gonzalez even received
strange racial comments from Brown’s followers while at Brown’s home with his sons – “People
would walk up to us and say, 'Yeah, I've got nothing against you legal Mexicans, it's the illegals
that we don't like.” 417 Like his supporters, Brown himself was known to level generalized
accusations against certain groups. 418 For example, Brown blamed Jews and the Freemasons for
the world’s problems during an interview and foretells a “warrior class” will revolt against the
“Zionist Freemasons” who he believes have control over the world. 419,420 Based on such racial
undertones, it was evident Brown disliked minority groups (besides his expressed hatred for the
government), specifically faulting certain groups for issues. Similar to his past statements
indicating anti-government sentiments, Brown asserted “the industry and the military are working
together to control everything. People don’t even know it. Little frogs sitting in boiling water. The
United States of America now is a fascist country” 421 Brown also told Cirino "Reno" Gonzalez, he
was “the spawn” of his father and that he was “a soulless, godless, communist…” Based on these
statements, Brown also used language to dehumanize others who he deemed to be “uneducated”
in government and tax-related matters or those that goes against his beliefs. Over the course of
the armed standoff, Brown stockpiled weapons specifically firearms and rigged their home with
22 pipe bombs and improvised explosive devices (IEDs). Because of her occupation, Elaine
provided the much-needed funds but also served as ideological guide to her husband, making the
standoff possible. 422 According to Assistant U.S. Attorney Arnold Huftalen, Elaine was “his
coach…his supporter… and may have been his mentor.” 423 Additionally, Hatch-Bernier voiced
his support for Elaine’s tax arguments, stating “the more research I did, the more I found that their
position was valid… I certainly don’t have my mother’s courage, but I share her principles.”424
Such statements reflects his familial network (i.e., wife and step-child) in varying degrees of
involvement with extremist movements. Through the internet, Brown was provided access to
military equipment (e.g., flak jackets, air packs, and night vision goggles) and bomb-making
supplies via his recruitment of accomplices (many of whom were complete strangers). 425,426 The
couple’s armed standoff drew instantaneous support from far-right groups, specifically tax
protestors sympathizing with their stance against taxation and militia members attracted to
Brown’s violent and insurrectionist threats. 427 Indeed, these staunch supporters had spent weeks
to months with the Browns (throughout the standoff) and helped them to navigate both online and
offline communications with media outlets and other supporters, provided them with both weapons
and logistical advice, and even shopped and cooked for them. 428 In fact, Randy Weaver, a white
supremacist linked to such groups who survived the infamous 1993 Ruby Ridge standoff in Idaho,
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expressed support for the Browns and was one of many who visited his home (i.e., personal contact
with violent extremist). 429,430,431 It is likely Weaver was brought in as a political move. According
to Potok, “Ed Brown is trying desperately to portray himself as some kind of victim, and bringing
Randy in is designed as evidence for that idea.” 432 Huftalen accused Brown of recruiting and
mentoring like-minded individuals, four of them facing imprisonment for their heavy involvement
in the standoff (i.e., Wolffe, Daniel Riley, "Reno" Gonzalez, and Jason Gerhard). 433,434 As
established above, Wolffe, 50, a friend of Brown’s, requested supporters to send packages to his
own home after the authorities had cut off postal delivery to the Brown’s residence and made 25
to 30 trips, delivering these supplies to the couple. 435 Further, Wolffe is accused of providing a car
to supporters to run errands and gather supplies, providing armed security, and conducting
surveillance of the U.S. Marshals. 436 Riley, 40, an electrician was tasered by marshals in June 2007
after accidentally coming upon a surveillance team while walking the Browns’ dog, Zoe. 437
Despite this encounter, Riley was not deterred and continued to visit the Browns and was involved
in raising money to help the couple. 438 He (together with Shaun Kranish) had set up a PayPal
account and solicited for checks, money orders, and credit card payments. 439 Prior, Riley had
posted a video online in March 2007, expressing his support for the Browns’ “revolution” against
the “thieving international bankers” who “control [the U.S.] government and are out to destroy
[the] country” and had pledged to provide for assistance which included 12-gauge shotgun among
other weapons. 440 Gonzalez lived with the Browns for several months and provided online updates
about the Browns’ situation through a website he managed, running errands, and stocking up
Brown’s weapon arsenal. Gonzalez, a former military weapons expert provided the couple with
security-related advice and served as “volunteer security” (he later left the house after arguing with
Brown over security issues). Gerhard, an Army recruit from Brookhaven, N.Y., met Brown when
he agreed to Gerhard’s interview request for his college newspaper which took place on both
February 18 and 19. 441 His two published articles reflected his opinions, denouncing the couple’s
“sham” trial and conviction and described the atmosphere at the Brown’s home. 442 Expecting
violence, Gerhard prepared accordingly by aiding the couple to secure weapons, arm them and
safeguard their home from capture by law enforcement. Gerhard bought six guns, ammunition,
and pipe bomb ingredients. Further, Gerhard helped to run errands for the Browns. Later, he sent
an email to an unspecified group list in which he threatened law enforcement who “choose to come
into the [Browns'] house, it would cause them a lot of pain.” 443 In addition to using emails, blogs,
and forums to broadcast their situation to like-minded individuals, the Browns used a daily online
radio show to threaten law enforcement. 444 For example, Brown indicated his harmful end
objectives to engage in violence and murder if the authorities came for him and demonstrated his
us and them thinking, “the chief of police in this town, the sheriff, the sheriff himself will die. This
is war now, folks.” 445 In fact, he has been quoted in newspapers of his murder intent and specifying
that “there’s going to be a lot of hanging of government officials.” 446 In a telephone conversation
with a State of New Hampshire Department of Revenue Administration employee about his wife’s
state business tax liabilities, Brown made threats and asked where the employee would be “when
the bullets started to fly.” 447 Another example alluding to his us and them thinking against the
government and law enforcement, is his preferred metaphorical statement to a like-minded
sympathizer, Doug Tibbetts “There's two freight trains going just like this toward each other. So
you better take a side, buddy, because when they hit, it's going to be hellacious. And it all could
start right here.” 448 On several occasions, the Browns indicated they were willing to die for their
cause than surrender to the government. 449,450 In a March 2007 radio broadcast, Elaine stated, “We
don't know how this will end. But there are only two ways we are coming out of here. Either as a
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free man or as a free woman, or in body bags. That has not changed, and that's the stand that
everyone must take. Because if we come out in body bags, there's going to be a few more, too.
That's not a threat, that's just noticing them that this is the stand that we will take.” 451 In another
broadcast in May 2007, Elaine told Terri Dudley at Hanover's WTSL AM 1400, “We know there's
a possibility that this will end badly and they will end up killing us…but that happens in every
revolution” 452 Though Brown echoed similar sentiments, he was slightly more positive about the
ordeal’s conclusion, “Only God knows the time frame. And no matter how it ends, it will be good.
It doesn't matter. If they do something to us, they'll make martyrs out of us.” 453 Brown often likened
his situation to the standoff near Waco, Texas, 454 attempting to demonstrate the government’s
overzealous pursuit and persecution, and his victimization. Such victim-based sentiments
illustrates his need to redress injustice and express his grievances with the government. As such,
the standoff was seen as Brown’s response to the need to defend against the government threat.
Despite his wife being an ideological mentor and his many supporters (including Weaver) offering
him advice, it was unlikely Brown was under group influence and control, partly because he had
a domineering personality (and stuck to his beliefs throughout the years despite alternative nonviolent views from others) and he was also the one who engaged in and led the armed standoff
without any evidence of coercion and command and control links. Though amongst the many home
visitors, a man Brown called “Sonny” spent some time with the couple in March 2007 and
appeared to indoctrinate the Browns with his religious and legal teachings for days. In fact, the
couple spoke at length about their newfound religious beliefs in radio broadcasts, soon after that. 455
Brown believed that Joe diagnosed with cancer was being “killed” in the hospital because doctors
were giving him sugar as treatment for a morphine overdose. 456 Based on this statement, it is
evident Brown did not have favorable views on doctors and authority figures broadly (i.e., his
dislike towards government). In a 2006 summer interview, the Browns stated their skepticism over
mainstream medicine and believed all diseases can be cured without medicine or surgery. 457 It
appeared Brown was a follower of Dr. Lorraine Day, a former orthopedic surgeon advocating diet
and natural herbs to cure cancer, AIDS, and even blindness. According to her website, Day herself
claimed she “got well by using God's natural remedies instead” of turning to conventional medical
after being diagnosed with breast cancer. 458 Further, it is evident the Browns are followers of
medical conspiracies and broadly other conspiracy theories. As established above, Brown was an
advocate of anti-government theories (including the tax code) and by this time, his decades of
research have made him doubtful of government claims including his belief that the federal
government was involved in 9/11 attacks. 459 With Sonny’s indoctrination, the Browns further used
religion as an underlying justification for both their violent and non-violent criminal actions,
declaring they have abandoned “man’s law” and only follow biblical laws. 460 While Brown was
assessed for having no symptoms of mental illness by forensic psychologist, Dr. Shawn E.
Channell, he determined Brown to be “very intelligent” and concluded Brown showed traits
consistent with narcissistic personality disorder (i.e., superiority, grandiosity, need for attention
and lack of empathy). 461 Because such personality disorder traits are present, the mental health
risk factor is present. Further, such traits demonstrate his need for status. Based on medical records,
Brown had a history of high blood pressure (i.e., health issues). 462 Overall, Brown’s statements
and corresponding actions reflect a mixture of motivations, both political/moral and opportunistic
motivation with no evidence of a need for excitement/adventure. This is evident from Channell’s
evaluation of Brown – stating his unusual behavior was based on ideology (not mental illness) and
Brown’s beliefs are “held by a broad subculture,” comparable to the “unrealistic” beliefs of
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organized religions. 463 In fact, a letter written by Brown’s wife (dated April 20) appeared in the
June edition of PlainFacts, a monthly publication written by Plainfield residents stating that the
couple were trying to further the “cause of justice” (i.e., political and moral motivation, justifying
violent offense) but were unaware their behaviors were causing “…fear, anxiety…” to Plainfield
residents, police and town administrators. 464 In another letter (post arrest) to her supporters, Elaine
wrote “Ed and I have done our job as we have been directed by Yahweh. We know in our hearts
that we have done what is right. We must now pass the baton on to others to continue the fight.” 465
This statement indicates the Browns accept violence to be morally justified and sanctioned by a
higher entity. In fact, the Browns saw these actions as “civil disobedience” in the tradition of
biblical entities and the American founding fathers (i.e., glorifying violence). 466 This
aforementioned statement also reflects the Browns’ need to be accepted by others and obtain social
approval by highlighting their commitment towards the cause (i.e., need for identity, meaning,
belonging). In addition to being a racist, Gonzalez described Brown as being “arrogant, ambitious,
self-serving man that is using everyone around him (including Elaine) for his own personal
political gain” in an online posting. 467 Gonzalez also speculated Brown may have had his own
motivations for the standoff, unrelated to anti-tax and government movement – “Ed Brown
repeatedly has said in interviews and to the media that he will not be taken alive. But yet, he doesn't
seem to be doing anything to make anybody believe that he cares about people inside the house
surviving any sort of attack. And at the same time he's provoking an attack…I think Ed Brown has
no intention of dying for this cause. I think his intention is to be the sole survivor of some sort of
attack at his estate, from which he will gain political power.” 468 In court, Brown exhibited
insolence and refused to acknowledge the judge, frequently interrupting the proceedings with
complaints and derisive laughter. In his final opportunity to address the court, Brown went into a
victim-based tirade about the U.S. attorney’s involvement in a global conspiracy to undermine the
Constitution and deprive individuals of their rights and refused to accept any responsibility stating
“I didn't hurt those men - they destroyed us. The Freemasons, Zionists, Jesuits, Knights Templar,
the Fraternal Order of Police, the Moose Lodge. Hey, they're everywhere.” 469 Further, Brown
attempted to justify his violent offending and appeared to display no remorse, addressing the judge
as “the enemy” and that he would “never quit” his cause. 470
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Appendix 8: Non-Violent Extremist Case 1 - Donald Ray Morgan
Perpetrator’s name: Donald Ray Morgan a/k/a "Abu Omar al Amreeki" a/k/a “Nasser Abdul
Raheem”
Event Narrative Summary
On August 2, 2014, Donald Ray Morgan (44) of Rowan County, North Carolina, was arrested
initially at JFK airport in New York on a federal indictment for possession of a firearm by a
felon and therefore is barred from weapon possession. 471,472 Morgan had sold an AK-47 in
January 2012 on the Carolina Shooters Club website. 473,474 In reality, Morgan had spent months
unsuccessfully trying to get into Syria via Lebanon after a visit to his second wife and returned
back to the U.S. 475 On October 30, 2014, Morgan pleaded guilty to attempting to provide
material support (including his own services) to the foreign terrorist organization, Islamic State
of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) beginning in January 2014 until on or about August 2, 2014. 476 Morgan
was sentenced to 243 months (just over 20 years) imprisonment, 3 years of supervised release,
and a $200.00 special assessment fee. 477
Individual risk factors
Need for identity, meaning, belonging
Present
Need for status
Present
Need for excitement, comradeship, or adventure
Present
Need for dominance
Present
Susceptibility to indoctrination
Present
Political/moral motivation
Present
Opportunistic involvement
Absent
Transitional periods
Present
Mental health
Absent
Criminal history
Present
Individual-situational risk factors
Family or friends support extremist offending
Access to networks, funding, and equipment
Early exposure to pro-violence militant ideology
Individual knowledge, skills, and competencies: Tactical, paramilitary, explosive
training
Personal contact with violent extremists
Seeker, consumer, developer of violent extremist materials
Individual-group risk factors
Need to defend against threat
Group influence and control
Over-identification with a group or cause/ Hostility to national collective identity
Attitudes justifying offending
Victim of injustice and grievances
Feelings of hate, frustration, persecution, alienation
Rejection of democratic society and values
Dehumanization of the enemy
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Absent
Present
Absent
Present
Absent
Present
Present
Present
Present
Present
Present
Present
Present
Present

Us and them thinking
Identification of target (person, place, group) in response to perceived injustice
Harmful end objectives / Anger and expressed intent to act violently
Harmful end objectives: Expressed desire to die for cause or martyrdom
Harmful means to an end / Intent to plan, prepare for violence
Extremist ideological training
Harmful means to an end: Glorification of violent action

Present
Absent
Absent
Present
Present
Present
Present

Perpetrator’s sequential background/profile with details/evidence below for each risk factor
present within the corresponding domain
Donald Ray Morgan was born in 1970 to a “loving” middle-class Catholic family and grew up in
Rowan County, North Carolina. According to Morgan, his family was not particularly religious
but he did attend both church and Sunday school. 478 When Morgan was about 11 or 12 years old,
he got into frequent arguments with the priest and eventually rejected Catholicism and left the
church. 479 At this point, he was looking for a place to belong to. In fact, Morgan recalled his
struggles with faith, God, and his life’s purpose (i.e., need for identity, meaning, and belonging). 480
Though much of the details surrounding his childhood is unknown, his lawyer described it as
“troubled.” 481 Morgan’s father took his own life when he was 14 (self-inflicted gunshot wound to
the chest) 482 due to his failing business by his business partner who went on to marry his mother.
483,484
This might indicate strained familial relationships. Despite the fact he never got over the
pain of his father’s death and had anger issues 485, the lack of evidence whether Morgan had
undiagnosed emotional issues resulted in the ‘mental health’ risk factor coded absent. In the 1990s,
Morgan was enrolled in the University of North Carolina at Charlotte (UNCC) in the 1990s. 486
Morgan mentioned his first exposure to the Islamic faith was as a university student enrolled in
the “Contemporary Islam” introductory course taught by Professor Kathryn Johnson at UNCC. 487
Though, Morgan recalled his understanding of Muslims then was based on the Black Nationalist
organization, Nation of Islam. At this point, there is no evidence Morgan had early exposure to
any violent militant ideology. Growing up, Morgan had dreams of being in the U.S Special Forces
and went but failed the boot camp, which would allow him to deploy with the National Guard to
Kuwait during Desert Storm (i.e., transitional period). 488,489 Though Morgan claimed his failure
on an injury he suffered from a car accident and he received an honorable discharge from the
Army. 490 Morgan’s unfulfilled aspirations led him to fall back on a law enforcement career,
becoming a sheriff’s deputy. 491 Unfortunately, Morgan was fired from that job after only 18
months, for reasons unspecified. 492,493,494 Besides being a former Rowan County sheriff’s deputy,
Morgan worked as a correction officer in the jail and the Rowan County courts and as a reserve
East Spencer police officer in 1995. 495,496,497 Like the outcome of his prior deputy sheriff
employment, Morgan was fired from those positions. 498 In his own words, Morgan stated, “My
entire life growing up was surrounded by the idea that I would be 82nd Airborne, I would be
Special Forces, I would serve dutifully – duty, honor and country…I thought that I would make
this [law enforcement] my substitution for what I thought was going to be, in the beginning, a
military career, an achievement, leadership.” 499 By association of his career preferences, Morgan’s
unfulfilled aspirations and loss of employment could have impacted his views on the government
and led to disillusionment and the development of anti-government sentiments. Additionally, his
former employment with such government entities indicate prior exposure to formal training (e.g.,
weapon handling). Soon after, Morgan’s life began a downward spiral. 500 He began drinking,
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fighting, and partying, demonstrating a risky lifestyle and indicative of an alcohol problem. From
1991 to 1996, Morgan was arrested a total of four times, including twice for disorderly conduct. 501
In one case, Morgan reportedly “became [verbally] abusive” while another stated his intent to
“kick and kill police officers.” 502 One time in 1996, Morgan fired a pistol in a packed Las Palmas
restaurant on E. Fisher Street in Salisbury after employees refused to serve him and his brother
more alcohol. 503 The then-owner John Gray claimed that “after he was refused a drink, he backed
up a couple steps and then he went at my throat, he wanted to choke me.” 504 Based on the official
report, both brothers left the restaurant after the bartender cut them off and came back inside with
guns from their car and started shooting. 505 This incident resulted in Morgan’s 1997 conviction of
carrying a concealed weapon and shooting into an occupied dwelling and was not allowed to
possess firearms. 506,507 After his conviction, Morgan had to be restrained and even made threats to
the District Attorney. 508 Morgan spent slightly over two years in prison. 509 His violent and criminal
history demonstrated his propensity to violence and his anti-government sentiments. Morgan got
into amateur bodybuilding post-incarceration and had at one point even aspired to become a rapper
like Vanilla Ice. 510,511,512 His then coach, Quincy Roberts substantiated his earnestness in the
activity stating, “everything I told him to do, he took it very seriously.” 513 In 1999, Morgan married
a fellow bodybuilder, Tangela Horne and the couple welcomed a son in 2001. 514 Both were known
within the small bodybuilder community. 515 However, the eight-year marriage ended in a divorce
in 2007 (i.e., romantic problems). 516 It is possible he was estranged from his son after the divorce
and Horne got custody over the child. This is evident when Morgan wrote in his will indicating
his money to go to Horne for the care of his son and in a letter apologizing for being “…horrible
at love, commitment, being a father, husband…” 517,518 It was clear Morgan was trying to look for
structure to his life and a year later in 2008, he converted to Islam but he was not religious. 519 In
his own words, he described the religion as a “package that said: ‘this is, this is it…this is the path
and this is the way you’re going to go. There is not going to be this way, that way.” 520 In either
2009 or 2010, Morgan found work as a finance manager at an auto business in Salisbury. 521
Beginning in 2012, Morgan realized “that at some point you have to make a commitment.” 522
Morgan had access to weapons, specifically firearms though illegally because of his status as a
felon. This was evident when he advertised several guns and managed to sell an AK-47 for $700,
in January 2012 on the Carolina Shooters Club website under the username ‘Dmorgan080110’ but
calling himself Don in the advert and listed his real phone number and even offered firearms to an
FBI informant. 523,524,525,526 He founded the Islamic Center of Salisbury, located in a former
convenience store across from Salisbury High School. 527 Morgan’s intense devotion towards Islam
faced backlash and isolated him from his family and friends. 528 Based on this statement, there was
no evidence of Morgan’s social circle (i.e., family and friends) being involved in or supporting
extremist activities. Around this time, Morgan started to follow the Middle East conflicts and
began posting extremist statements on his Facebook page. 529 At this juncture, it is likely Morgan
started to develop feelings of injustice and expressed his grievances via such postings. According
to Bryan Beaver, a fellow colleague in the auto sales business and knew him periodically for more
than a decade, “(Morgan’s) Facebook posts were a bit extreme at times, and there were some
volatile statements in there. Some things that he would say that would make me think, ‘you know
this guy was going to the extreme with this. Derogatory statements toward Israel, some statements
about infidels. Things like that.” 530 Based on Beaver’s statement, it is clear Morgan expressed
hatred towards specific groups like the Jews, demonstrated an ‘us vs. them’ thinking, and used
dehumanizing language in his postings. One example of Morgan’s posts exhibiting moral
detachment would be the following: “Killing our enemies and beheadings are justified.” 531 Further,
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his postings under the alias ‘Abu Omar al-Amreeki’ starting in January 2014 through July 2014
supporting ISIS, were partly what drew the authorities’ attention, after he had traveled to Lebanon
to visit his wife. 532,533,534,535 By association of his online activities and active presence on social
media, Morgan had radicalized online. According to FBI Assistant Special Agent in-charge, Tim
Stranahan, Morgan was “…somebody that was radicalized online. He viewed the material. He
accepted a different, perverted way of Islam.” 536 Morgan described himself as a ‘mujahid’ (i.e., a
holy warrior), 537 demonstrating his desire for status perceiving himself as a soldier of God. During
this eight-month period in Lebanon, Morgan attempted to get into Syria but was unsuccessful (the
first being in May 2014). 538,539 According to Morgan, he had tried other ways to enter Syria after
Turkey turned him away. 540 It was likely Morgan had to return to the U.S because he was low on
funds. 541 Morgan described his attempt as “planned” and had begun to withdraw from society as
he “began to dissolve [his] effects in the U.S., personal property, items that [he] owned…. [He]
began to set up things that would protect those that [he] was leaving behind and then, after all of
that, [he] purchased the ticket with the intent of entering to Syria, either joining up with medical
and food aid convoys or directly with Islamic State.” 542 Based on his statement, there is no
evidence Morgan had a violent intent to harm others hence the ‘harmful end objective/intent to act
violently’ was coded absent. In describing Morgan’s postings, the judge at the trial stated he had
“clearly implied…he is trying to go to Syria or Iraq as the next step and trying to be actively
engaged” (i.e., harmful means to an end). 543 Morgan met and had access to an online network of
like-minded individuals over the internet who had him “vetted” and later advised him on how to
cross the border. Because of the lack of evidence about the people he interacted with online were
actual violent extremists (e.g., foreign fighters), the risk factor ‘personal contact with violent
extremist’ is coded absent. In June 2014, Morgan “officially” pledged his allegiance to the ISIS
leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and described himself as a “mujahid pledging allegiance to alBaghdadi and Islamic state commanding good and forbidding evil,” demonstrating his
commitment to the group and its cause. Further, Morgan’s clear demarcation between evil and
good and his support for the destruction of Israel by “any methods” illustrates his “us vs. them”
thinking. In subsequent postings, Morgan retweeted photos and videos praising al-Baghdadi,
exhibiting his deep admiration and support for the extremist leader. 544 His online activity involving
information dissemination and communication illustrates his seeking and consumption of violent
extremist activities. Over the summer in an interview, Morgan declared his reason “for the support
of ISIS is because they’ve proven time and time again to put Islamic law as the priority and the
establishment of an Islamic state as the goal… [and that] someone has to defend Islam, and
someone has to defend innocent Muslims” 545,546 His statement indicates his desire to conduct
himself under Sharia law. Additionally, Morgan stated the reason behind his radicalization was
“…being mistreated by people around me who didn’t share the views I had.” 547 It is possible
Morgan had experienced discrimination and/or was victimized by others around him after his
commitment to the religion in 2012 (i.e., adult mistreatment/abuse). In July 2014, a month prior to
his arrest, Morgan tweeted the following statement, “To brothers in Iraq, be patient. Many of us
trying to come… Allah, you brought me here and I need to take rest of my journey to join the most
beautiful brothers on earth…Give me martyrdom wherever I may be.” 548 This statement indicates
Morgan’s willingness to engage in martyrdom, his travel intent, and his need belong. In the same
month during Israeli’s assault on Gaza, Morgan highlighted both his feelings of outrage over
Palestine civilian fatalities and his hatred for Israel and its Jewish citizens while dehumanizing
them “Let’s gets some quality rockets to [H]amas [because] these ones aren’t hitting and
destroying anything. Over 1000 & no deaths? [H]onestly can we not kill one piece of crap
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Zionist?” 549 Morgan went on to urge others to take action and glorified violence. “When that door
opens to sacrifice for Allah will you walk through?” Based on Morgan’s statements and
corresponding actions, he sympathized with ISIS’s ideology and exhibited a need to defend against
a perceived threat. In another posting, Morgan retweeted “Welcome to Jihadi Marriage Bureau We help American girls find new husbands by making them widows!” 550 His retweet implies his
implicit agreement on women and marriage – how they can be passed around like objects once
their husbands have passed, illustrating hierarchical inter-group relations. Though Morgan
engaged in ideological preparatory activities and later attempted travel to Syria to join ISIS,
Morgan did not explicitly identify targets to focus these activities on. Indeed, there is no evidence
Morgan is not involved in any violent plots within the U.S or elsewhere but was more of
“aspirational” ISIS supporter (i.e., sensation-seeking). 551 Later in a statement seemingly with no
remorse, Morgan (a/k/a Nasser Abdul Raheem) blamed the U.S government to justify his extremist
offending, “Ironically, you are the best ‘recruiter’ for jihad. Your terrorism, foreign policies, drone
attacks, propaganda, and killing of innocent Muslims invoke the most passive, moderate Muslim
to take action” and proclaimed his actions are in support of ISIS, “I pledge my life to establishing
and defending the Islamic State, fighting for the cause of Allah and defending Muslims. I will do
this from any place on earth, including this prison cell.” 552 Overall, Morgan’s statements and
corresponding actions reflect a political/moral motivation and is unlikely he engaged in such
criminal extremist activities to fulfill opportunistic needs. In fact, Morgan himself stated he was
answering a higher calling.
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Appendix 9: Non-Violent Extremist Case 2 - Gerald Joe Henson
Perpetrator’s name: Gerald Joe Henson a/k/a Jerry Henson
Event Narrative Summary
The December 1993 raid on the offices of U.S.A. First, an anti-government group in a
Waxahachie strip mall resulted in 16 arrested, accused of producing, distributing and/or using
the counterfeit money orders. 553 The Waxahachie bust led to the arrest of Gerald Joe Henson
(56), a leader who founded a tax protest organization, the United Sovereigns of America, a group
involved in the patriot movement and had assisted in setting up common-law courts in many
states in March 1996. 554,555 Henson was later convicted in June of that year for printing and
selling these bogus money orders. 556 Later, Henson was sentenced to 97 months imprisonment
(approximately 8 years). 557
Individual risk factors
Need for identity, meaning, belonging
Absent
Need for status
Present
Need for excitement, comradeship, or adventure
Absent
Need for dominance
Present
Susceptibility to indoctrination
Present
Political/moral motivation
Present
Opportunistic involvement
Present
Transitional periods
Present
Mental health
Absent
Criminal history
Present
Individual-situational risk factors
Family or friends support extremist offending
Present
Access to networks, funding, and equipment
Present
Early exposure to pro-violence militant ideology
Absent
Individual knowledge, skills, and competencies: Tactical, paramilitary, explosive
Present
training
Personal contact with violent extremists
Present
Seeker, consumer, developer of violent extremist materials
Present
Individual-group risk factors
Need to defend against threat
Present
Group influence and control
Absent
Over-identification with a group or cause/ Hostility to national collective identity
Present
Attitudes justifying offending
Present
Victim of injustice and grievances
Present
Feelings of hate, frustration, persecution, alienation
Present
Rejection of democratic society and values
Present
Dehumanization of the enemy
Present
Us and them thinking
Present
Identification of target (person, place, group) in response to perceived injustice
Present
Harmful end objectives / Anger and expressed intent to act violently
Present
Harmful end objectives: Expressed desire to die for cause or martyrdom
Absent
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Harmful means to an end / Intent to plan, prepare for violence
Extremist ideological training
Harmful means to an end: Glorification of violent action

Present
Present
Absent

Perpetrator’s sequential background/profile with details/evidence below for each risk factor
present within the corresponding domain
Gerald Joe Henson was born on September 5, 1939 in Cushing, Oklahoma to Oscar and Beatrice
Henson. 558 Though much of the details surrounding his childhood is unknown, Henson graduated
from Capitol Hill High School in 1957. 559 An active high school sports player, Henson kept in
touch with his classmates, illustrating he had no platonic relationship issues and was capable of
maintaining such relationships. 560 After Henson graduated high school, he served in the Air Force,
illustrating his formal military training though it is unknown how long he served. 561 Since the
1970s, Henson has been in the printing business and owned a commercial printing company in
Oklahoma, operating under the names Spirit Publications and Lighthouse Color Press. 562,563 Based
on this, Henson has had regular employment as an entrepreneur and enjoyed a relatively middle to
high class socioeconomic status. In May 21, 1971, Oscar passed away at 58 when Henson was 32.
It is unknown how his father’s death affected him. Later in 1980, Henson married Rebecca “Ann”
Henson when he was 41 and was in the marriage for 30 years (before his demise in 2010). Henson’s
son, Randy (born to both Henson and Geraldine Wilson) died in 1992 at 32 due to unspecified
reasons. 564 It is assumed that both Henson and Wilson either separated or divorced since he married
Rebecca in 1980 (i.e., prior romantic relationship problems). Additionally, it is unknown how his
son’s death affected him directly prior to his crime commission. From 1984 to 1995, Henson faced
financial and legal problems evidenced from the multiple lawsuits filed against him. In 1984,
Transamerica Financial Service filed a civil lawsuit of less than $10,000 against Henson over a
promissory note. 565 In 1985, Sanco Financial Corporation filed a lawsuit of more than $10,000
against Henson’s company, Endee Printing, for a breach of contract. 566 In 1994, Ferguson Pontiac
GMC Inc. filed a lawsuit of more than $10,000 against Henson for an incurred debt. 567 In 1995,
Laidlaw Waste Systems Inc. filed a lawsuit against Henson for a small debt of $355.09. 568 Henson
ran into tax problems indicated when the businesses, both Denim MFG. Inc. and Dove Marketing
Inc., he created in 1982 were suspended by the Oklahoma Tax Commission, resulting from a tax
charge in Texas in 1995 (i.e., prior criminal history). 569 Henson’s loss of businesses may indicate
unfulfilled career aspirations. Henson, called a “freeman” and was wanted by authorities for
violating his bond conditions (i.e., relocated his residence without informing the authorities) on
said tax charge. 570 Similar to the profiles of other anti-government extremists, such prior legal and
financial issues and their perceived prejudiced outcomes (a potential risk factor) might have
spurred Henson’s anti-government sentiments and in turn led him to seek out unconventional albeit
criminal means to resolve such issues (i.e., need to redress an injustice). Oklahoma’s first common
law court (and one of the first in the U.S) was established in December 1993 in Garfield County.
The first justice of “Our One Supreme Court in and for Garfield County,” Warren Ensminger (a
man with legal and financial problems of his own prior to joining the anti-government and
sovereign citizen movement) was joined in court by like-minded jurors specifically Henson
himself. 571 This is evidence Henson had been involved in the anti-government movement since at
least by 1993. Prior to a law enforcement raid in December 1993, 572 Henson first became exposed
to the counterfeit money order scheme when he attended a seminar promoting it at the USA First
offices in Waxahachie, Texas and helped to videotape the seminar. Hence, there was no evidence
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Henson had any early exposure to violent extremist ideology. Later in Del City, Oklahoma, Henson
was one of the leaders who founded the United Sovereigns of America, a group involved in the
patriot movement and has assisted in setting up common-law courts in many states. 573 He became
the director of the United Sovereigns of America, in-charge of managing material (i.e., books and
tapes) distribution denouncing the IRS and U.S government, sold bogus securities, and was a
representative for the group. 574,575 As the director and spokesman, Henson enjoyed a relatively
high-ranking status within the group. Because of his position, it is likely Henson was deeply
entrenched in the group’s cause by then. Additionally, Henson was behind some of the writings.576
Extremist material published included the group’s anti-Semitic ‘50 States Constitutionalist
Newspaper’ 577, the “Protocols of the Elders of Zion” (content described a plan to for world
domination by the Jews), the Posse Comitatus handbook, a far-right violent extremist group
involved in an armed conflict with federal marshals in the 1980s, and the “OPLAN [Operation
Plan] American Viper” (a document describing a strategy for militia groups waging a guerilla war
against the federal government). 578,579 Based on the evidence, it is clear Henson had access to both
non-violent and violent content and was involved in extremist content consumption, creation, and
distribution. Henson’s anti-U.S government and anti-tax beliefs stemmed from his ideological
training (both violent and non-violent) from such content and from his teacher/guide whom he
works closely with, 580 Darrell L. Frech, a prominent figure in the anti-government movement (i.e.,
indoctrination). In fact, Henson was influenced by several national leaders in the Christian Patriot
movement. 581 Of interest, the ‘extremist ideological training’ risk factor was found to be common
across both violent and non-violent extremists. Henson printed two types of counterfeit money
orders (i.e., “certified money orders” and “certified bankers checks”) to perpetrate the financial
scheme. 582 Because Henson had a lucrative printing business, he had access to advanced printing
equipment to successfully create these counterfeit products and funds, enabling him to sponsor
seminars to promote anti-government/tax beliefs and use of these phony money orders. Further,
Henson’s involvement and organization in anti-government groups gave him access to
accomplices. Further, Frech (i.e., a common-law activist and teacher) 583 was one of the leaders in
the United Sovereigns of America organization and an advocate of the illegitimacy of the federal
government. 584 Indeed, such hard-core racist materials distributed by the United Sovereigns of
America demonstrates Henson’s views. 585 Though Henson rejected being a racist, his views are
aligned with Frech, a follower of the Christian Identity movement that white Europeans are true
‘chosen’ people and America is the ‘promised land.’ 586,587 Further, the Christian Identity doctrine
asserts Jews to be the offspring of Satan and nonwhite races as subhuman and in a manifesto states
“It is the colored people, and the [J]ews, who are the descendants of Cain...when We move into a
new land, We are to kill all of the inhabitants of the other races....We are not to allow women nor
foreigners (colored people, [J]ews, and/or citizens of the United States) to rule over us.” 588 Further,
the pseudo-religious doctrine demonstrates the likelihood of Henson’s dominant thinking (i.e.,
patriarchal beliefs about gender hierarchy), intolerance towards non-Whites and minorities (i.e.,
us vs. them thinking), and hostility towards his own national identity as an American. Though the
doctrine advocates for violence against minorities, it is unknown whether Henson himself accepted
violence as morally justified and sanctioned by a higher despite his links with such violent groups.
Hence, the lack of evidence for the risk factor ‘glorification of violent action’ was coded absent.
In fact, Henson held freemen beliefs evidenced from the authorities calling him a “freeman” and
when he considered himself a “sovereign citizen of the Republic of Oklahoma,” served as a jury
foreman and marshal of the Oklahoma common law court, and possessed a marshal’s badge. 589
His declaration of being a citizen of the “Republic of Oklahoma” demonstrates his lack of
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recognition of his U.S citizenship. According to Frech, citizenship is based on phony racial
distinctions between “organic state citizens” (i.e., white people) and “14th amendment citizens”
(i.e., non-whites), further illustrating the ‘us and them’ thinking. 590 In fact in February 1995, Dan
Leslie Meador, a contributing editor to the United Sovereigns of America newspaper and a leader
of Kay County Patriots, published “The Oklahoma Writ,” declaring the “fourteenth amendment
United States citizen did not have inherent rights of Preamble sovereign people rhetorically
referenced as United States citizens…” 591 Together with Meador, Henson delivered a copy of the
writ to “one of the (state) legislators who is pushing to restore constitutional government and who
is a good friend of Jerry [Henson].” 592 It is clear Henson has friends supporting the antigovernment movement (i.e., network supporting extremism). Further, Henson was active with the
Kay Patriots and served as a foreman at a Kingfisher County court proceeding. 593 Speaking to the
media in February 1996, Henson (in his authority as a United Sovereigns of America
representative) expressed his anti-government grievances and the need for his group to defend
against this threat – “Christians uniting together to bring this country back to where God is in
control instead of the stinking people that run this country, and the elitist people that are devil,
[S]atanistic worshippers” and disparaged the Jews referring to them as “Czarian, Zionist pigs.” 594
Based on his statement, it was clear Henson had a harmful end objective (through unclear means),
rejected democracy (i.e., not recognizing government authority or statues/proceedings and
recognizing Biblical laws) and exhibiting hatred towards certain groups and used dehumanizing
language to describe them. Further, Henson’s statement identifies the targets of his antigovernment grievances and had engaged in preparatory activities against them (e.g., seminars
promoting such ideas). Further, Henson confirmed Larry D. Pratt’s involvement with the United
Sovereigns of America and had written for their publication. 595 Pratt was an anti-gun control
activist and the executive director of Gun Owners of America (GOA), a more radical organization
compared to the National Rifle Association (NRA). 596,597 Henson described Pratt as “one of the
finest gentlemen that ever walked the face of the earth.” 598 Pratt’s worldview is heavily influenced
by Christian Reconstructionism, an extreme version of Christian dominionism (i.e., enforcement
of Biblical law on civil society). 599 Based on this statement, it is clear Henson exhibited deep
admiration for Pratt and shared similar conservative religious, anti-government, and militia beliefs.
Illustrating his deep commitment to the group’s cause, Henson expressed his aspirations to reprint
the Protocols of the Elders of Zion 600 to promote and distribute such ideas and likely with intent
to incite hatred and violence (i.e., harmful means to an end). On 22nd to 26th February 1996, the
United Sovereigns of America had sponsored a four-day seminar, “Common Law and You” at an
Albuquerque motel, intending to teach its approximately 100 attendees how to organize “common
law courts.” 601 The Waxahachie raid resulted in the arrest of 16 people across five states, accused
of producing, distributing and/or using the counterfeit money orders. 602 In March 1996, Henson
was arrested and later convicted in June for printing and selling these bogus money orders. 603
Later, Henson was sentenced to 97 months imprisonment (approximately 8 years). 604 Similar to
other sovereign citizens after their encounter with government officials or law enforcement,
Henson attempted to retaliate by filing “common law” documents blaming government authorities
(i.e., investigators, prosecutors, and the presiding judge) for his unjust victimization (i.e., tyranny)
and treason after his arrest and prior to his trial. 605 During trial, it was revealed Henson was
associated with both violent and non-violent anti-government militia groups like the Montana
Freemen of Justus Township (Montana) and the Republic of Texas respectively, demonstrating
Henson’s direct contact with violent extremists. 606,607 Harris, a San Antonio prosecutor observed
that white-collar criminals justify their actions using anti-government rhetoric and stated their
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motivation was “''80 percent greed, 20 percent political protest.” 608 In fact, Henson’s criminal
actions involved selling extremist materials and counterfeit financial instruments for a $300 fee 609
(i.e., opportunistic/financial motivation) and justifying his actions using anti-government and
white supremacist rhetoric (i.e., political motivation), demonstrating mixed motivation. Because
Henson was one of the leaders of the United Sovereigns of America and a mastermind behind the
financial scheme, it is unlikely he was under any group influence or control (i.e., no evidence of
coercion, done for social approval, or command and control links). As such, it is unlikely Henson
demonstrated a need to belong with a group. In fact, Henson rejected the authorities’ label of him
as a “freeman” and stated, “I am a free man with God. I don't claim to be part of that organization”
during an Oklahoma City court hearing. Similar to other sovereign citizens, Henson identified
himself as a citizen of the Oklahoma Republic 610 and is likely to exhibit contempt for authority
due his ideological beliefs and as evidenced from his attempted retaliation post arrest. Because of
Henson’s age (he was in his 50’s at the time of crime commission) and the nature of the crime, it
is unlikely he engaged in such extremist criminal activities out of excitement or adventure. Further,
court testimony from an alleged co-conspirator, Johnny Johnston revealed Rebecca (Henson’s
wife) was involved in selling a book with content promoting counterfeit financial instrument use
with Henson. Based on Rebecca’s behavior, it is clear she supported her husband’s actions (i.e.,
network variable – spouse). 611 There was no evidence Henson was willing to die for his cause (i.e.,
martyrdom). Additionally, there is no evidence Henson committed these actions under the
influence of mental illness. Later in August 10, 2010, Henson later died at 70, after a long battle
with progressive supranuclear palsy (PSP). 612
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Appendix 10: Non-Violent Extremist Case 3 - Raymond Leo Jarlik-Bell
Perpetrator’s name: Raymond Leo Jarlik-Bell a/k/a Raymond Leo Bell a/k/a Raymond Leo Bell
Jr.
Event Narrative Summary
In July 2011, a sovereign citizen, Raymond Leo Jarlik-Bell (68) from Yelm, Washington was
arrested. 613 In March 2013, Bell was convicted of five counts of filing false, fictitious, and
fraudulent claims, fifteen counts of assisting in filing fraudulent tax returns, three counts of mail
fraud, and one count of criminal contempt. 614 In June 2013, Bell was sentenced to 97 months
(approximately eight years) imprisonment and three years of supervised release. 615,616
Additionally, Bell was ordered to pay $705,276 in restitution and undergo substance abuse
treatment and abstain from alcohol (though there was a lack of prior substance abuse/addiction
history because of his apparent lack of cooperation during the presentence investigation). 617,618
According to court records, the investigation centered on the filing of fraudulent tax returns
using the Original Issue Discount (1099-OID) scheme and Bell’s role in advising and assisting
others to engage in this scheme. 619
Individual risk factors
Need for identity, meaning, belonging
Absent
Need for status
Present
Need for excitement, comradeship, or adventure
Absent
Need for dominance
Present
Susceptibility to indoctrination
Absent
Political/moral motivation
Present
Opportunistic involvement
Present
Transitional periods
Present
Mental health
Absent
Criminal history
Present
Individual-situational risk factors
Family or friends support extremist offending
Present
Access to networks, funding, and equipment
Present
Early exposure to pro-violence militant ideology
Absent
Individual knowledge, skills, and competencies: Tactical, paramilitary, explosive
Absent
training
Personal contact with violent extremists
Present
Seeker, consumer, developer of violent extremist materials
Present
Individual-group risk factors
Need to defend against threat
Present
Group influence and control
Absent
Over-identification with a group or cause/ Hostility to national collective identity
Present
Attitudes justifying offending
Present
Victim of injustice and grievances
Present
Feelings of hate, frustration, persecution, alienation
Present
Rejection of democratic society and values
Present
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Dehumanization of the enemy
Us and them thinking
Identification of target (person, place, group) in response to perceived injustice
Harmful end objectives / Anger and expressed intent to act violently
Harmful end objectives: Expressed desire to die for cause or martyrdom
Harmful means to an end / Intent to plan, prepare for violence
Extremist ideological training
Harmful means to an end: Glorification of violent action

Present
Present
Present
Present
Absent
Present
Present
Absent

Perpetrator’s sequential background/profile with details/evidence below for each risk factor
present within the corresponding domain
Though much of the details surrounding his childhood is unknown, Raymond Leo Jarlik-Bell (born
in April 1943 620) graduated with at least a high school diploma (evidenced from his occupation as
a contractor 621). Further, his legitimate blue-collar job and his living in a trailer prior to his arrest
indicated a relatively low to middle class socioeconomic status. Additionally, there was no
evidence Bell had early exposure to violent ideology. From 1981 to 1989, Bell experienced
financial and legal difficulties evidenced from the multiple lawsuits filed against him. In 1981 and
1982, the State Revenue filed lawsuits for unpaid taxes (later satisfied in 1982 and 1985
respectively). 622,623 Additionally in 1981, Washington Employment Security Department filed a
lawsuit against Bell for unpaid unemployment insurance (later satisfied in 1983). 624 In 1983, Bell
was sued by a Marilyn L. Wachsman for a breach of contract and simultaneously Contractors
Bonding and Insurance Company filed a contractors’ bond lawsuit (unpaid dues which still
remains unsatisfied at the time of this writing). 625 In 1984, Bell faced a foreclosure lawsuit of his
home for delinquent real estate taxes and associated penalties from 1982 to 1984 (later satisfied in
1985). 626 In 1988, Grimm Collections, a debt-collections agency filed a lawsuit against Bell for
unpaid dues and interest charged at 12% per annum (which still remains unsatisfied at the time of
this writing). 627 Similar to the profiles of other anti-government extremists, such prior legal and
financial issues (a potential risk factor) and their perceived prejudiced outcomes (i.e.,
victimization) might have spurred Bell’s anti-government sentiments and hatred for the
government and in turn led him to seek out unconventional albeit criminal means to resolve such
issues (i.e., need to redress an injustice). Together with Bell, Rita Mae Bell was also a debtor over
the course of these lawsuits. It is clear this woman was an ex-wife of Bell’s evidenced from the
abbreviation “et ux” to mean “and wife” and that he later married another woman, Ute Christine
Jarlik-Bell assumed to be in the 2000s because Ute engaged in Bell’s financial scheme as an
accomplice in 2004 but had dutifully paid her taxes prior to the marriage, indicating romantic
relationship problems (i.e., divorce). Though “American Beauty Rose” lacked details of when it
was established, Bell got his company “Best Way” incorporated in 1998. 628 It is reasonable to
assume that both companies were set up in the 1990s which promoted two tax fraud schemes and
later barred from doing so in May 2005 by U.S District Judge Robert J. Bryan. 629,630 The first
scheme used bogus trusts and unincorporated businesses to conceal income from the IRS and the
second scheme involved Bell assisting his clients to falsely claim tax-exempt status for their
businesses and fabricating deductions fraudulently to evade income and employment taxes. 631 This
indicates Bell was already involved at least within the tax protestor movement and the beginning
of his criminal history, albeit non-violent extremist financial crimes. Though it unknown how Bell
first got introduced to the tax protestor ideology and which groups and/or leaders he was influenced
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by or had worked with during his radicalization process (i.e., indoctrination). The lack of evidence
surrounding the ‘susceptibility to indoctrination’ risk factor resulted in an absent code. Despite
being barred from using the tax fraud and evasion schemes in 2005, Bell filed five fraudulent tax
returns using the 1099-OID fraudulent tax scheme for the 2004, 2006, 2007 (plus an amended
return), and 2008 tax years. 632 In 2004, Ute relied on the same tax scheme when she reported
income of $812 but claimed over $36,000 while Bell obtained a tax refund in excess of $30,000 in
2006. 633,634 Additionally, Bell began to recruit others into this scheme and promoted the scheme
at seminars in Hawaii, California, and Arizona. 635 In fact from October 2008 to October 2009, Bell
assisted six people in seeking fraudulent tax returns amounting to over $2.7 million and caused the
IRS to make over $670,000 in refund payments. 636 One woman even received a tax refund of over
a $590,000. 637 Between 2008 and 2009, both Bell and Ute filed three fraudulent tax returns,
seeking $320,000. 638 According to court records, the investigation centered on the filing of
fraudulent tax returns using the 1099-OID scheme and Bell’s role in advising and assisting others
to engage in this scheme. 639,640 For his assistance, Bell received a 10% cut of his ‘customers’ tax
refunds and a flat fee for each fraudulent return filed. 641 The tax fraud cost the government
$700,000 in erroneous payments. 642 According to assistant U.S attorney Matthew Diggs, Bell had
both political and opportunistic for these criminal extremist activities, “First, greed played a central
role – [He] wanted something for nothing. Second, [his] motivation was ideological.” 643
Additionally it is clear from such financial schemes, Bell had access to funds with the capability
to engage in criminal activities in furtherance of his objectives. Throughout the years, Bell was
well-known to the Tenino law enforcement due to his multiple encounters and had served papers
to the cities of Tenino, Rainier, Yelm and Lacey previously. 644 Similar to her husband, Bell, Ute
was arrested twice driving with expired tabs and without license plates in King County in
September 2009 and April 2010 respectively. Ute exhibited defiance and asked the deputy
involved in both incidents, for personal information like his name, address, and social security
number. 645 In the second incident, Ute handed the deputy a placard stating “Peace Official Duty
County Ranger On the County of Thurston On the state of Washington” before she explained her
right to drive an unregistered vehicle on public roads and handed the officer a badge impersonating
law enforcement. 646 At the same time, Ute had Bell on the phone and when she passed the phone
to the officer, Bell begun “yelling at the officer and asking him if he could read. After about 10
seconds of listening to the man yell, he handed the phone back to Ute Jarlik Bell.” 647 At the police
station, Ute described herself as a “queen” and threatened the deputy he would be in a military
prison. 648 Ute read the deputy’s name aloud from the documents given to her before she was
released and mentioned, “Oh, that’s how you spell it. We’ve been looking for you.” 649 In May
2010, the deputy saw a suspicious vehicle parked outside his home. 650 In fact, investigators
claimed both Bell and his wife conducted surveillance of the home of the said deputy and had also
threatened arrest on the Duvall Mayor, using any force necessary. 651 In fact, Ute filed a 26-page
memo in King County District Court stating “I view your threat … against my exercise of my right
to public vehicular travel to be baseless and unlawfully intended to coerce me into a mode of
compliance with laws which DO NOT pertain to public vehicular travelers such as myself and my
family. Your judges, Duvall mayor and prosecutor and police chief, and KING COUNTY
SHERRIF(sic) Sue Rahr, KING COUNTY SHERIFF officers, and KING COUNTY
COMMISSIONERS are enforcing a privilege code upon public vehicular travelers … when in fact
the law used to do it is wholly inapplicable to me, my family, and my automobiles as has been
proven, so every man or woman on the soil of Washington can arrest all judges presiding over
such cases therein, and any other public official in collusion with this racketeering activity.” 652
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Based on Ute’s statements and the couple’s actions, it was obvious Bell identified specific targets
and engaged in preparatory activities against them (i.e., surveillance and filing nonsensical legal
documents with the courts). Bell’s wife added that, if individuals who went against her were not
arrested or prosecuted, she would “…rip their front doors off, if necessary, to arrest them … and
to deliver them to federal authorities” and demanded $3.5 million in compensation for her arrest.
Here, Ute demonstrated clear “us vs. them” thinking. Based on their behaviors, the couple
demonstrated their intent to prepare and was not above using threats and violence to achieve their
objectives. Ute’s misdemeanor charges on driving with a suspended license, obstruction of justice
and impersonating a police officer filed remained unresolved. 653 Like Bell, Ute sympathized with
and perceived the government as a threat to be defended against and demonstrated beliefs aligned
with the sovereign citizen movement (network – spouse). In June 2010, Bell was stopped in a
routine traffic stop by Tenino police officer, Adam Haggerty, when he noticed Bell’s car did not
have a rear license plate. 654 As Haggerty approached Bell, he demanded the reason for the traffic
stop and refused to provide Haggerty with his license and registration and instead with a copy of
his “political will.” 655 Bell claimed he had diplomatic immunity from the federal government, 656
illustrating his need for dominance over the law. The encounter turned violent when Bell remained
combative towards Haggerty resulting in Bell being physically removed from his car and later
tasered. In his own words describing his views on the incident and law enforcement post arrest,
Bell “really didn’t appreciate being tased and they are lucky [he] didn’t have [his] shotgun with
[him] or there would have been a bunch of dead cops. Not that [he’s] hunting cops; but like hunting
pheasant, when you see one, you shoot one.” It was clear Bell had access to weapons, specifically
a firearm. Based on Bell’s statement, he used dehumanizing language to describe government
authority and moral detachment over killing a police officer. Additionally, this incident and his
veiled threats to law enforcement demonstrated Bell’s potential for engaging in violence. In fact,
Bell had prior history of threatening law enforcement officers. 657 Additionally, Bell added
Haggerty stopped him because the officer recognized him. 658 Based on this, it was clear Bell felt
victimized and discriminated against. Despite Bell’s prior criminal extremist history and him
receiving many IRS warnings and letters, and even downloading IRS publications describing such
schemes as illegal, he “redoubled his efforts to defraud the IRS.” 659 Additionally, Bell exhibited
extreme anger over prior encounters with law enforcement over the validity of vehicular licensing
disagreements (sovereign citizens do not believe in driver’s licenses). As such, this is evidence
Bell is deeply entrenched within the anti-tax protestor and sovereign citizen movements’
ideologies. Like Bell, his friends also face similar legal and financial difficulties. For instance,
Centralia (Lewis County) hoarder Victor Bonagofski faced a decade-long battle (since
approximately 2003) with the county over $16,500, the cost for a month-long cleanup of his
property and the county took legal action against him in 2004. 660 On three occasions, the county
abated Bonagofski’s property and the bills amounting to over $100,000 remained unpaid. 661 In
March 2013, the court authorized Lewis County to remove the waste and vehicles and to apply the
proceeds from the sales of the materials to the outstanding abatement costs and was considered the
first step to towards foreclosure. 662 In order to impede collection efforts, Bell established both the
Pisces Family Trust and Golden Unicorn Family Trust and Bonagofski appointed Keith Crawford
(who had filed a note charging $799,096.38 to the IRS Criminal Investigation Division on behalf
of his friend, Daniel Haines who owed the IRS $800,000 in back taxes) and Bell as trustees
respectively for his two properties. 663 Like Bell, both Bonagofski and Crawford held similar antigovernment sentiments (i.e., network – friends) and each of them had argued in court of the
illegitimacy and corruption of the federal government, attempting to justify their criminal extremist
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actions. 664 Bell’s membership to the loosely organized sovereign citizen movement and the leader
of the Thurston County Assembly, provided him with direct and personal contact with both violent
(e.g., Francis Schaeffer Cox) and non-violent extremists (e.g., Kenneth Wayne Leaming and
Timothy Garrison who were also active members of the Assembly 665). For instance, Bell had direct
ties to Cox, the leader of an Alaskan militia and a sovereign citizen who advocated for vigilante
justice and either enslavement or execution of anyone convicted of murder by the “common law”
courts he and other like-minded individuals created and used the Old Testament to justify the use
of violence. 666 However, there is no evidence Bell used any ideological authority to glorify the use
of violence. Bell’s personal contact with a violent extremist is evident from the numerous
occasions he had been in contact with Cox over the militia leader’s problems with the U.S
government. 667 Additionally, Cox claimed to have established a separate government structure
with an armed force equipped with “rocket launchers and grenade launchers and claymore (mines)
and machine guns.” 668 According to an FBI agent in the Anchorage joint terrorism task force,
“…their collective belief … at some undetermined point in the future [is that] they will have to
take up arms against the government … or lead a revolution against the government by force of
arms.” 669 This video of Cox’s speech is widely available on militia and sovereign citizen websites
including one hosted by Bell. By making this speech encouraging a violent revolution against the
government available on his own website, it indicates Bell’s consumption and propagation of
violent extremist content. Based on this, it is clear Bell’s anti-U.S government and anti-tax beliefs
stemmed from his ideological training (both violent and non-violent) from such violent content
and prior ideological-related training. Additionally, Bell is now conducting his own training
seminars promoting the anti-government and anti-tax doctrine across multiple states. Of interest,
the ‘extremist ideological training’ risk factor was found to be common across both violent and
non-violent extremists. Cox was also involved in a plot to state judge and trooper who were in
conflict with the group. 670 Leaming was illegally in possession of six firearms because of a prior
felony conviction of operating an aircraft without a pilot’s license resulting in his weapon
prohibition. 671 According to prosecutors, Leaming’s circumstances makes his illegal firearm
possession more severe. 672 First was his clear hatred towards the U.S government. Second, was
Leaming’s possession of official-looking law enforcement equipment (e.g., badges, light bars,
sedan modified into a police vehicle). In fact, the Assembly have an armed division, the “County
Rangers” whose members are required to own firearms and display official-looking badges and
credentials. Additionally, Bell is also a member of the County Rangers. 673 This illustrates the
aspect of Bell’s group’s capability for violence and by extension, the likelihood of his own support
for violence. 674 Third, was Leaming’s repeated praise of the shooting of Southern California police
officers by disgruntled Christopher Dorner, an ex-police officer with an underlying threat he might
also follow suit should he be prevented from pursuing his “petitions for redress.” 675 Additionally,
Leaming had harbored two fugitives from Arkansas in his home and both him another coconspirator and Arizona federal prison inmate, David Carroll Stephenson had been colluding to
file liens against several government officials including the Arizona prison warden. 676 Timothy
Garrison, an accountant cum tax preparer had prepared more than 50 fraudulent returns resulting
in $2.5 million loss of tax money. Garrison was active in the Assembly as a treasurer and its County
Ranger subgroup (Leaming is also a member) and the sovereign citizen movement more
broadly. 677,678 Additionally, Garrison made threats to “arrest” police officers and filed phony liens
against their homes. 679 Being a leader within the sovereign citizen movement, Bell enjoyed the
prominence that came with it. In fact, U.S Deputy Marshal Raymond Fleck who investigated these
extremists met with Bell to learn more about the group’s doctrine and beliefs. 680 Additionally, he
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made headlines in 2010 as a member of the Assembly of Delegates of the United States of America
AD 1791, a Constitutionalist movement. 681 Since the couples’ arrests in July 2011, approximately
40 of Bell’s supporters signed and filed several nonsensical memos with the court demanding for
their release, further evidence of his status within the movement. 682 Despite his arrest, Bell
continued to reject his country’s laws including the tax laws, demonstrating deep commitment
towards the sovereign citizen doctrine while exhibiting no remorse for his criminal extremist
actions. 683 Bell’s “scheme embodied this ideology” and he continued to file “frivolous and
nonsensical” legal documents from his jail cell. 684 Later, third-degree assault and felony
harassment charges were tacked on after Bell was heard threatening to kill law enforcement. 685
Prosecutors described him as a “determined, persistent offender who does not believe federal or
state laws apply to him.” 686 During a court hearing, neither Bell, his attorney, nor his wife chose
to testify regarding his mental state. The lack of evidence surrounding the ‘mental health’ risk
factor resulted in an absent code. Because Bell was one of the leaders of the United Sovereigns of
America and a mastermind behind the financial scheme, it is unlikely he was under any group
influence or control (i.e., no evidence of coercion, done for social approval, or command and
control links). As such, it is unlikely Bell demonstrated a need to belong with a group. There is no
evidence Bell is willing to die for his cause. Because of Bell’s age (he was in his 60’s at the time
of crime commission) and the nature of the crime, it is unlikely he engaged in such extremist
criminal activities out of excitement or adventure. In March 2013, Bell was convicted of five
counts of filing false, fictitious, and fraudulent claims, fifteen counts of assisting in filing
fraudulent tax returns, three counts of mail fraud, and one count of criminal contempt. 687 Ute was
convicted of four counts of filing false, fictitious, and fraudulent claims. 688 In June 2013, Bell was
sentenced to 97 months (approximately eight years) imprisonment and three years of supervised
release. 689,690 Additionally, Bell was ordered to pay $705,276 in restitution and undergo substance
abuse treatment and abstain from alcohol (though there was a lack of prior substance
abuse/addiction history because of his apparent lack of cooperation during the presentence
investigation). 691,692 The U.S District Judge Ronald B. Leighton stated “Your scheme…is fraud at
its core. You are hurting people intentionally, regardless of your adherence to [your beliefs].” 693
At the same time in June 2013, Ute was sentenced to 39 months (approximately 3 years)
imprisonment and one year of supervised release. 694 In 2018, Ute Christine Jarlik-Bell filed for
divorce from Bell. 695
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